

AFFATUS: NATURAL SCIENCE AS MORAL THEOLOGY

(Part one)

Ramon Llull's proposal that speech constitutes a sixth sense called *affatus* is, arguably, the most unusual doctrine from his entire extraordinary career. Almost every modern scholar of his work has speculated about its origins or purpose. This interest has increased lately thanks to the publication of critical editions of the Catalan and Latin texts of Llull's monographic treatise on *affatus*.¹ In addition, modern trends of linguistic and literary theory—from generative grammar to semiotics to deconstruction—have also encouraged further study of *affatus*.² Recent interpretations of Llull's proposal have ranged from Jordi Llovet's analysis of its "nostalgia for the letter of desire" to Joan Tusquet's critique of its "semiotic apologetic".³ Despite this diversity of perspective, most studies of Llull's doctrine have sought to identify a precise "source" for his proposal, either in a single linguistic precedent for the term *affatus* itself or in a single philosophical precedent for the classification of speech as a sixth

¹ Catalan *Lo sisè seny*, ed. Josep Perarnau i Espelt, "Lo sisè seny, lo qual apellam *affatus*, de Ramon Llull. Edició i estudi", *ATCA* 2 (1983): 23-121; text cited as *SS* by line, introduction cited as "Lo sisè seny" by page. Latin *Liber de affatu*, ed. Armand Llinarès and Alexandre Jean Gondras, "Affatus", *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 51 (1984): 269-97; cited as *LA* by page. Interested readers should consult these editors' introductions for full reviews of the history of older scholarship on *affatus*; this article will cite only those earlier studies that bear directly on questions discussed below.

² Sebastián Triás Mercant's *El pensamiento y la palabra (Aspectos olvidados de la filosofía de R. Llull)* (Palma de Mallorca: Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Baleares, 1972) remains the best comprehensive account of Llull's linguistic ideas apart from *affatus*.

³ Jordi Llovet, "Ramon Llull: nostàlgia de la lletra", in Jordi Llovet, Xavier Rubert de Ventós, and Eugenio Triás, *De l'amor, el desig i altres passions* (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1980) 89-151 (esp. 139-42). Joan Tusquets i Terrats, "El lenguaje como argumento, en la apologética de Ramon Llull", *EL* 28 (1988): 169-210.

sense. Neither approach has proven completely successful, and it is easy to accept Josep Perarnau's conclusion that Lull's proposal is simply not "homologable" with common Scholastic linguistic or psychological doctrines.⁴ Such a judgement does not, however, mean that Lull's proposal is incomprehensible as a contribution to late-thirteenth century philosophy or theology. This study proposes to render *affatus* comprehensible by broadening our perspective of inquiry to include medieval Christian moral theology regarding speech. It attempts to show how *affatus* results from Lull's effort to reform linguistic or psychological doctrines regarding speech by elucidating their implications for ethical conduct.

That is, Ramon Lull creates *affatus* by moralizing Scholastic scientific accounts of speech. To argue that a medieval writer finds spiritual lessons in natural phenomena is scarcely a novel insight. We acknowledge the pervasive role of moralization in medieval culture whenever we speak of the "symbolist mentality" or "ethical poetic" of the Christian Middle Ages.⁵ The practice of applying *tropologia* or *moralizatio* to the *liber naturae* stretches in a virtually unbroken tradition from the *Physiologus* of Late Antiquity to the *Tractatus moralis de oculo* of Pierre de Limoges in Lull's own day.⁶ The mendicant preachers' use of the moral interpretation of natural *exempla* in popular preaching assured its pervasive contribution to the development of vernacular literature.⁷ In a superb article

⁴ "Lo sisè seny" 51. Reviewing Perarnau's work and other recent scholarship on *affatus*, Anthony Bonner observes that an adequate understanding of *affatus* still requires further investigation of at least three questions: its place in semiotics, its possible Stoic origin, and its place within Lullian epistemology; see *EL* 25 (1981-83): 280-1.

⁵ Marie-Dominique Chenu, "La mentalité symbolique", *La Théologie au douzième siècle* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957) 159-90. Judson Boyce Allen, *The Ethical Poetic of the Later Middle Ages: A Decorum of Convenient Distinction* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982).

⁶ *Physiologus*, tr. Michael J. Curley (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979). On Late Antique theories of spiritual interpretation, see James A. Coulter, *The Literary Microcosm: Theories of Interpretation of the Later Neoplatonists* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976), Jean Pépin, "L'absurdité, signe de l'allégorie", *Studia Patristica* 1 (1957): 395-413, and Graziano Ripanti, "Il problema della comprensione nell'ermeneutica agustiniana", *Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes* 20 (1974): 88-99.

⁷ On Pierre and his work, see Nicole Bériou, "La prédication au béguinage de Paris pendant l'année liturgique 1272-1273", *Recherches augustiniennes* 13 (1978): 105-229 (esp. 107-16). On the evolution of tropological exegesis in the period, see Gillian R. Evans, *The Language and Logic of the Bible: The Earlier Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) and *The Language and Logic of the Bible: The Road to Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), as well as the standard works of Henri de Lubac, *Exégèse médiévale: les quatre sens de l'écriture*, 4 vols. (Aubier: Montaigne, 1959-64) and Beryl Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1952).

⁸ The superlative definition of this practice is the late Professor Allen's summary in *The Friar as Critic: Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1971) 97-8. On the style and methods of vernacular popular preaching, see the exhaustive study of Michel Zink, *La prédication en langue romane avant 1300*

recently published in this journal, Ll. Cabré, M. Ortín, and J. Pujol have demonstrated very clearly and carefully how the *exempla* of the *Arbre exemplifical* exhaustively develop moral lessons from the mass of scientific and philosophical data collected in the first fourteen trees of Lull's *Arbre de ciència*.⁸ Cabré, Ortín, and Pujol develop their analysis from R. D. F. Pring-Mill's seminal suggestions regarding Lull's methods of "transmuting" scientific into literary texts through analogical argument.⁹ The three authors note that Lull's analogies invariably tend to move from presentation of literal exemplary material to exposition of its tropological sense, achieving ultimately a fusion of scientific data and moral lesson.¹⁰ This moralization shows how a creature achieves its *prima intentio*, as Lull calls it, of knowing, loving, and honoring the Creator. As a practical strategy of mission and reform, Lull's exercise of moralization develops the "evangelical allegory" and "philosophical anagogy" that Vicente Servera perspicuously identifies as a basic feature in all his proposals for conversion of the infidel and renovation of Christian society.¹¹ Lull himself declares that he discovers *affatus* by following the method of his own Art.¹²

Hence, it should not surprise us that, even though various parallels for *affatus* appear among Scholastic authorities, Lull's proposal of speech as a sixth sense ultimately results from his effort to correct and rectify their doctrines. Likewise, it should hardly surprise us to find that, even though Lull appears to introduce his proposal of *affatus* suddenly in 1294, the process of moral interpretation that produced this new doctrine was already under way in his earliest works, as Joan Tusquets has lately indicated.¹³ Careful attention to Lull's accounts of language from both

(Paris: H. Champion, 1976). On the Catalan tradition, see Vincent Almazán, "L'Exemplum chez Vincent Ferrier", *Romanische Forschungen* 79 (1967): 288-332.

⁸ "Conèixer e haver moralitats bones". L'ús de la literatura en l'*Arbre exemplifical* de Ramon Lull", *EL* 28 (1988): 139-67.

⁹ "Els recontaments de l'*Arbre exemplifical* de Ramon Lull: la transmutació de la ciència en literatura", *Actes del Tercer Col·loqui Internacional de Llengua i Literatura Catalanes* (Oxford: Dolphin, 1976) 311-23.

¹⁰ "Conèixer e haver moralitats bones" 155, 145.

¹¹ "Utopie et histoire: Les postulats théoriques de la praxis missionnaire", *Raymond Lulle et le Pays d'Oc*, Cahiers de Fanjeaux 22 (Toulouse: Privat, 1987) 191-229.

¹² LA 280; cf. SS 28-9. Perarnau identifies this *manera* as the system of Absolute and Relative Principles, as expounded in the *Ars inventiva*, and the doctrine of innate correlatives, as presented in the *Taula general* ("Lo sisè seny" 62). Not all of Lull's arguments, however, rely on the Principles or correlatives. Others employ obviously analogical demonstrations that also appear in the *Taula general*, as Perarnau notes ("Lo sisè seny" 77, 79).

¹³ "Lenguaje como argumento" 176. This development is no more unusual than the process through which Lull evidently "discovered" the figures of his Art, in the manner

before and after 1294 allows us to appreciate how he develops his theory of *affatus* by elucidating the moral issues pertinent to Scholastic philosophical and scientific doctrine concerning speech. In order to show how he does this, the two parts of this article will review in detail the natural science and moral theology that *affatus* comprehends. Part One describes the role in Lull's new doctrine of commonplace physiological and psychological doctrines regarding the organs of speech, formation of concepts in the mind, or operation of the internal senses, and definitions of the "mental language" of the soul. Part Two describes the role of traditional views from moral theology and spiritual instruction regarding the subordination of body to soul and the fulfillment of love for God and neighbor.

Part One: *Affatus* as Natural Science

Lull's proposal of speech as a sixth sense implicates a very wide range of commonplace medieval physiological and psychological lore concerning the nature and functions of language. Our knowledge of Lull's medical learning has improved tremendously thanks to the recent researches of Pereira, Rodríguez Tejerina, and others.¹⁴ A full account of the development of his psychological theories remains to be written, however.¹⁵ For the purposes of understanding *affatus*, it is most important to recognize how it incorporates physiological and psychological lore concerning three broad subjects: the first is the classification of the cognitive faculties; the second is the operation of these faculties; the third is the function of cognition in general as "mental discourse".

Classification of affatus among the senses

The easiest way to begin understanding *affatus* is to consider it simply as a reclassification of the sensitive and cognitive powers commonly attributed to both humans and animals by most ancient and medieval

suggested by Dominique Urvoy, "Sur les origines des figures de l'«Art» lullien", *Raymond Lulle et le Pays d'Oc*, Cahiers de Fanjeaux 22 (Toulouse: Privat, 1987) 249-59 (esp. 256).

¹⁴ Michela Pereira, "Le opere mediche di Lullo in rapporto con la sua filosofia naturale e con la medicina del xiii secolo", *EL* 23 (1979): 5-35. José María Rodríguez Tejerina, "El pensamiento médico de Ramon Llull en la época de Miramar", *EL* 22 (1978): 71-6.

¹⁵ For an initial orientation, see Celestino Aós Braco, "La imaginación en el sistema de Ramon Llull", *EL* 23 (1979): 155-83. Still useful is the review of Lullian psychology by Bishop Joan Maura of Girona: "Psicología lulliana. El entendimiento agente y el entendimiento posible", *Revista Lulliana* 4.37-38 (Oct.-Nov 1904): 129-38 and 4.39-40 (Dec 1904-Jan 1905): 161-71; "Psicología lulliana. Verbo mental", *ibid.* 5.43-46 (Apr-Jul 1905): 225-37; "Psicología lulliana. El verbo sensible y el sexto sentido", *ibid.* 5.47-48 (Aug-Sept 1905): 1-8; 5.49 (Oct. 1905): 33-7; and 5.50-51 (Nov-Dec 1905): 49-77.

authorities. Llull's reorganization of these powers is not merely arbitrary, but involves, as will become clear, the redistribution of their functions in order to maximize their ability to achieve his preferred moral objectives.

From the beginning of his career Llull expounds a model of human nature that distinguishes five separate, cumulative levels of human powers or souls: vegetative, sensitive, imaginative, intellective, and motive.¹⁶ Most of these divisions ultimately remit to Aristotle.¹⁷ However, they recall more immediately Avicenna's basic levels of vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual souls.¹⁸ They also follow the tradition of internal senses based on Augustine's tripartite scheme of sensual, spiritual, and intellectual vision.¹⁹ The functions that Augustine describes for spiritual vision—the formation and retention of *imagines*—become the task of *imaginatio* in later medieval schemes.²⁰ Llull clearly regarded this traditional tripartite scheme as authoritative, and its three-fold division was essential to his "trinitarian world-picture".²¹ The clear definition of an intermediate stage between sensation and intellection especially facilitates

¹⁶ E.g. *Libre de contemplació* 40.1 (OE 2: 182a).

¹⁷ Since Llull's habit of not citing other authorities makes it difficult to identify specific "sources" for his arguments, subsequent discussions of Aristotelian doctrines simply give references to the relevant loci in the Philosopher's works, using these abbreviations: *Cat.* = *Categoriae*; *De an.* = *De anima*; *De part. an.* = *De partibus animalium*; *De interp.* = *De interpretatione*; *Hist. an.* = *Historia animalium*. All references employ book, chapter, and Bekker numbers as given in *The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Perarnau's notes throughout his edition of *Lo sisè seny* offer some suggestions regarding particular later medieval authorities that Llull might have read.

¹⁸ *De anima* 1.5, ed. Simone Van Riet, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972) 1: 79-102. On Avicenna's scheme, see E. Ruth Harvey, *The Inward Wits: Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (London: The Warburg Institute, 1975) 40-1. The *De anima* was already available in Latin in the twelfth century, and soon afterwards in vernacular versions as well: see J. Homer Herriott, "The Ten Senses in the *Siete Partidas*", *Hispanic Review* 20 (1952): 269-81.

¹⁹ *De Genesi ad litteram libri XII* 12.6-9, *Patrologia Latina* 34 (Paris: J.-P. Migne, 1887) cols. 245-486 (at cols. 458-61). On Llull's debt to Augustine in general, see Victor Capánaga, "San Agustín y el lulismo", *Augustinus* 21 (1976): 3-15.

²⁰ E.g. Richard of St. Victor, *Benjamin minor* 14, *Patrologia Latina* 196 (Paris: J.-P. Migne, 1880) cols. 1-64 (at col. 10); Alcher of Clairvaux, *De spiritu et anima* 11, 33, *Patrologia Latina* 40 (Paris: J.-P. Migne, 1887) cols. 779-832 (at cols. 786-7, 802-3); or Hugh of St. Victor, *Didascalicon* 2.4-5, ed. Charles H. Buttner (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1939) 27-9. These chapters of Hugh's widely-read text describe the organization of the human soul and body according to schemes of triple and quadruple faculties that merit comparison to Llull's own system. On all these schemes, see Robert Javelet, *Psychologie des auteurs spirituels du XII^e siècle* (Strasbourg: Société Nouvelle d'Impression, 1959) esp. 8, 119-20. References to an intermediary level of spiritual senses between the corporal senses and intellect already appear in Patristic writings: see e.g. Karl Rahner, "Le début d'une doctrine des cinq sens spirituels chez Origène", *Revue d'ascétique et de mystique* 13 (1932): 113-45.

²¹ As explained by R. D. F. Pring-Mill, "The Trinitarian World-Picture of Ramon Llull", *Romanistisches Jahrbuch* 7 (1955-56): 229-56.

Llull's explanation of a *modus naturalis intelligendi* that would lead readily to recognition of spiritual truths from material knowledge. At the same time, traditional medical doctrines also defined an intermediate position for the organs of imagination within the structure of the brain,²² which Llull also mentions.²³

With respect to *affatus*, the most important feature of the Avicennan scheme is its division of the operations of the sensitive soul into two broad categories: movement and apprehension.²⁴ Movement includes both appetite or the stimulus to movement and muscular activity or the mechanism of movement.²⁵ Apprehension includes the five commonly recognized external senses and five internal senses: *sensus communis*, imagination, cogitation, estimation, and memory.²⁶ Most Scholastic authorities base their classifications on Avicenna's.²⁷ The distinction between these powers never plays a major role in Llull's theories, however. From the beginning of his career, he distributes the functions of the apprehensive power between the imaginative and sensitive souls and consequently never employs the apprehensive power as a functional division in his psychological model. His recognition of the motive power as a separate level of soul with distinct functions gradually diminishes, and ceases altogether by 1924. A brief review of his remarks on the functions of the motive and apprehensive powers will readily show the evolution in his definition of each.

The term *apprehensivus* rarely appears in Llull's writings.²⁸ When Llull mentions the apprehensive powers at all, he attributes them to the

²² Harvey *Inward Wits* 55.

²³ *Liber novus physicorum* 3.3 (ROL 6: 78); *Libre de ànima racional* 2.7.6. (ORL 21: 206).

²⁴ *De anima* 1.5 (ed. Van Riet 1: 79-102).

²⁵ Bishop Maura felicitously suggested a connection between *affatus* and "muscular sensitivity" ("Verbo sensible" 68). Although he explained it by appealing to modern medical theories, it is tempting to imagine that his Neoscholastic training enabled this insight, which no subsequent scholar pursued, even though Scholastic accounts of the motive power include, as we will see, a close parallel to Llull's *affatus*.

²⁶ *De anima* 1.5.

²⁷ E. g. Aquinas 1a.78.4. All references are by part (1a, 2a2ae, etc.) and question to *Summa Theologiae*, 60 vols., Blackfriars Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964-76). Cf. Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum naturale* 25.1. All references indicate book and chapter from *Bibliotheca mundi*, 4 vols. (Douay, 1624, Rprt. Graz: Akademische Druck. v. Verlagsanstalt, 1964). Most of Vincent's material comes from John of La Rochelle's *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, ed. Pierre Michaud-Quantin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1964). Perarnau cites John's famous work as an example of the more sophisticated analyses of the soul pursued by Llull's Scholastic contemporaries, but does not notice John's summaries of views regarding the motive power of the sensitive soul ("*Lo sisè seny*" 48-50).

²⁸ See the scant entries in Miquel Colom Mateu, *Glossari general lullà*, 5 vols. (Mallorca: Moll, 1982-85), s.v. 'aprensibilitat' and 'aprensiu'.

imagination. This reductive treatment of apprehension is critical to Lull's classification of speech among the senses, as we will see.²⁹ The *Libre de contemplació* of 1273-74 does mention five "intellectual senses" —cogitation, aperception, conscience, subtlety, and courage (*coratgia*)— that largely serve the needs of contemplation, but does not identify them with the imagination.³⁰ The *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam solubiles* of 1290-91 explain how the imagination in animals includes the powers of appetite, recollection, and estimation, but without distinguishing these as motive or apprehensive powers.³¹ The discussion of imagination in the *Arbre de ciència* of 1295-96 names no specific internal senses, although the operations that it performs do recall the apprehensive functions of fantasy, instinct, and memory.³² Finally, the *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus* of 1305 does specifically note that in animals imagination comprises only the apprehensive, appetitive, and estimative powers, while in humans it includes fantasy and movement toward the desired sensory object.³³

The assignment of both appetite and motion to the imagination in the passage just cited illustrates the final result of Lull's gradual abandonment of the motive power as a separate level of soul. His earliest works do nonetheless clearly recognize a separate motive power. The account in the *Libre de contemplació* is not complex: it includes the appetite and will as sensual and intellectual divisions, following the understanding of Aristotle accepted by his Scholastic contemporaries.³⁴ It also mentions locomotion briefly, but says nothing about the muscles.³⁵ The *Doctrina pueril* of 1282-83 offers a lengthy *distinctio* for the multiple spiritual and corporeal meanings of *moviment*.³⁶ The last of these is the *motus* that occurs in the operation of the five external senses. Lull still includes the motive power as a separate level in the *Libre de meravelles* of 1288-89, but defines it simply as the mutual interaction of the other four levels of soul, which move one another just as the Divine Dignities

²⁹ Maura also recognized the importance of this treatment ("Verbo sensible" 49-68).

³⁰ 193.5 (*OE* 2: 567a).

³¹ Qu. 176 (*MOG* 4: 174a-175b).

³² 4.4.1 (*OE* 1: 609ab).

³³ The "sensibilem appetitum": 5.1.10, 6.4.1 (*ROL* 9: 77, 95).

³⁴ See 44, 268.27 (*OE* 2: 191a-193b, 820a). Cf. *De an.* 3.9 432b6 and Aquinas 1a.80.2 or 82.5.

³⁵ 44.28 (*OE* 2: 193b).

³⁶ 92 (*ORL* 1: 179-81). Use of *distinctiones* is probably the most characteristic "scholastic" feature of Ramon Llull's work and suits well his preference for analogical argument. On the theory and practice of this device, see J. B. Allen *Ethical Poetic* 142-51 and Richard H. and Mary A. Rouse, "Biblical *Distinctiones* in the Thirteenth Century", *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 41 (1974): 27-37.

coessentially interact.³⁷ In the *Arbre de ciència*, however, the sensual appetite becomes an operation of the vegetative soul,³⁸ while the intellectual appetite becomes an operation exercised jointly by the three faculties of the mind.³⁹ In the *Liber novus physicorum* of 1310 and *Liber lamentationis philosophiae* of 1311 the motive sensitive power is simply one among many modes of the natural motion (*motus*) that occurs in the change from potentiality to actuality.⁴⁰

Although Llull never fully recognizes the apprehensive power and eventually discards the motive power altogether, he nonetheless incorporated their component functions among his divisions of sensitive and imaginative souls. In the case of the motive power, the reclassification of its functions may well have provided the opportunity to “discover” *affatus*. We have seen that Avicenna’s scheme lists voice as a function of the motive power, because the production of vocal sounds requires the movement of muscles, nerves, and vocal cords. Thus, Vincent of Beauvais explains how the motive power’s *virtus vocativa* emits sounds, has the lungs as its organ, and serves the purpose of manifesting *affectiones* in the soul.⁴¹ The association of voice and sensation was common in many ancient authorities. Aristotle himself treats speech with hearing in his review of the senses, and medieval commentators, always attentive to such aspects of the *forma tractatus*, follow his order of presentation.⁴² According to Diogenes Laertius, the Stoics listed speech, reason, the generative power, and the five senses as the eight parts of the soul.⁴³ Evidently alluding to this doctrine, Tomàs and Joaquim Carreras i Artau suggested that Llull’s theory of *affatus* derived from Stoic theories.⁴⁴ Llull’s direct

³⁷ 44 (*OE* 1: 393a).

³⁸ 2.3.1 (*OE* 1: 591a). Compare the similar revision described by Josep Maria Ruiz Simon, “De la naturalesa com a mescla a l’art de mesclar (sobre la fonamentació cosmològica de les arts luhianes)”, *Randa* 19 (1986): 69-99 (at 87).

³⁹ 5.3.B.3 (*OE* 1: 625a-626b).

⁴⁰ Dist. 3 (*ROL* 6: 74-83) and Chap. 9 (*ROL* 7: 114-16) respectively.

⁴¹ *Speculum naturale* 25.104.

⁴² *De an.* 2.8 420b5-1a6. On the commentaries, see Alastair J. Minnis, *Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic literary attitudes in the later Middle Ages* (London: Scolar Press, 1983) 145-59. Perarnau cites various examples (“*Lo sisè seny*” 60).

⁴³ *Vitae philosophorum* 7.157, ed. R. D. Hicks (London: William Heinemann, 1925) 261.

⁴⁴ *Arbre de ciència* 3.3.6 (*OE* 1: 599n23, 1041). Anthony Bonner notes that Seneca (*Epistulae* 117.13) and Cicero (*Academica* 2.29.95) both use the term *effatum* to translate the Stoic term *axioma* (*EL* 25 (1981-83): 280). However, *axioma* indicates the *enuntiatum* or logical proposition, not the power of speech. On the logical and linguistic theories of the Stoa, see Edward Vernon Arnold, *Roman Stoicism* (New York: Humanities Press, 1958); Marc Baratin, “L’identité de la pensée et de la parole dans l’Ancien Stoïcisme”, *Signification et référence dans l’antiquité et au moyen âge*, Special Issue of *Langages* 65 (Mar 1982): 9-21; A. C. Lloyd, “Grammar and Metaphysics in the Stoa”, *Problems in Stoicism*,

access to Stoic texts is historically improbable, but various early medieval Western and Islamic authorities do cite them. Chalcidius mentions the *vocalis substantia* in his widely read *Commentarius* on Plato's *Timaeus*.⁴⁵ The encyclopedic *Rasa'il* of the Ikhwan al-Safa lists five corporeal and five spiritual (internal) senses: imagination, cogitation, memory, speech, and production. A scheme apparently adapted from the *Rasa'il* appears in the widely-circulated *Picatrix*: in this work speech is one of seven powers of feeling or perception.⁴⁶ A more influential Stoic doctrine was the theory of *pneuma*, which passed chiefly through Galen to medieval authorities. Some of these, evidently following Haly Abbas, distinguish three spirits—the natural, vital, and animal—that join the soul to the body.⁴⁷ Thus, Alcher of Clairvaux's widely diffused *De spiritu et anima* explains how the *vis animalis* is located in the brain and causes the operation of the senses, movement of the limbs, and production of vocal sounds.⁴⁸

These ancient and medieval doctrines associating speech and the senses provided the premises, but not the precise "source" for Ramon Llull's proposal of speech as a sixth sense called *affatus*. The "discovery" of the sixth sense still faced the taxonomic problem of placing the power of speech within his psychological model. We have seen that voice was often associated with the motive functions of the sensitive soul and the belief that all humans and animals make sounds necessarily implied that speech must derive from the sensitive or imaginative powers that they both possess.⁴⁹ Llull, of course, did not explicitly recognize the apprehensive powers and eventually abandoned the motive power as a separate level of soul. He assigns many of the apprehensive and motive functions to his imaginative soul and only recognizes the five external senses as powers of the sensitive soul. Consequently, any other function—such as speech—that he associates with the sensitive soul would also receive the

ed. A. C. Lloyd (London: University of London and The Athlone Press, 1971) 58-74; A. C. Lloyd, "Language and Thought in Stoicism", *ibid.* 75-113; and Benson Mates, *Stoic Logic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961).

⁴⁵ *Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus* 220, ed. J. H. Waszink, Plato Latinus 4 (London: Warburg Institute, 1962) 232.

⁴⁶ See John Dagenais, "Origin and Evolution of Ramon Llull's Theory of *Affatus*". *Actes del Tercer Col·loqui d'Estudis Catalans a Nord-Amèrica*, ed. Patricia Boehne et al. (Montserrat: Publicacions de l'Abadia, 1983) 107-21, at 111. On the terminological confusion in the scheme of the *Rasa'il*, see Henry A. Wolfson, "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts", *Harvard Philosophical Review* 28 (1935): 69-133.

⁴⁷ See Harvey Inward *Wits* 7, 62n22.

⁴⁸ 22 (PL 40:795). Perarnau suggests a single line from Alcher's treatise as a possible inspiration ("*Lo sisè seny*" 59-60) but Llull's classification of *affatus* among the senses necessarily depends on further distinctions than those available from the Galenic scheme.

⁴⁹ As Perarnau notes "*Lo sisè seny*" 53.

designation of external sense. Thus, we can understand Lull's proposal as a result of this redistribution of apprehensive and motive functions within his basic model of human nature. Still, to us moderns, the mere possibility of classifying speech as an external sense may hardly justify doing so. In order to understand how speech functions as a sense, we must examine carefully the physiological and psychological functions that Lull attributes to *affatus*.

Operation of affatus among the senses

Lull's explanations of how *affatus* functions rely upon the same physiological and psychological doctrines that explain the operations of the other senses. The doctrines that Lull adapts are not in themselves difficult to understand. Although his presentation of them continuously increases in elaboration throughout his career, they nonetheless remain founded on the broadly Neoplatonic axiom of "like knows like" and therefore rarely engage the specifically Aristotelian questions of causal order that exercised his Scholastic contemporaries.⁵⁰ An excellent example of his argument appears in his account of vision.⁵¹ Like all ancient and medieval authorities, Lull describes vision most fully, stating explicitly in his *Arbre de ciència* that it provides a paradigm for understanding all the other senses.⁵² Virtually all of Lull's later writings on psychology explain sensation and cognition through the operation of the "innate correlatives" of essential activity, passivity, and act that he considered fundamental constituents of all beings.⁵³ Thus, visual sensation begins with the individual and actual passive correlative "visibility", which exists in the thing seen and participates formally with the general and potential passive correlative "visibility" existing in the eyes. The external "visibility" is first "digested" into

⁵⁰ See e.g. the development of his arguments from the *Libre de contemplació* 41.5 (OE 2: 184b) to the *Libre de ànima racional*. On the principle of *simile simili cognosci* see Aquinas 1a.75-79 and esp. 85,2 on the *antiqui* and *Platonici*.

⁵¹ See LA 282-3; cf. SS 67-113. Cf. *Arbre de sciència* 3.3.1 (OE 1: 596b-97b).

⁵² 3.3.1 (OE 1: 597b). The Western philosophical tradition has long associated essential nature and visible image as *forma* or *eidos*. See Jacques Derrida, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy", *New Literary History* 6 (1974): 5-74 (at 54).

⁵³ See, for example, *Liber lamentationis philosophiae* 7 (ROL 7: 110-12); *De refugio intellectus* (ROL 11: 247); *Liber de peruersione entis removenda* 7 (ROL 5: 486-7); or *Liber correlativorum innatorum* 9 (ROL 6: 149-50). On the importance of the correlatives in Lull's gnoseology, see Ruiz Simon "De la naturalesa com a mescla" 83. The fundamental study of Lull's doctrine of innate correlatives is Jordi Gayà Estelrich, *La teoria luliana de los correlativos* (Palma de Mallorca, 1979).

the internal "visibility" by the vegetative power (which the higher sensitive power virtually comprehends).⁵⁴ When the active correlative "visitivity" takes up this "visibility" the correlative act of vision and the sensation itself are complete. The complementary operation of the correlatives in the reception of sensible forms ultimately performs the role of the spiritual immutation described by Aquinas.⁵⁵ More importantly, the active "visitivity" defines a variety of *sensus agens* similar at least in principle to that recognized by some of his Scholastic contemporaries.⁵⁶ One of the few mentions of Lull in contemporary Scholastic literature is in fact a refutation of *affatus* as a *sensus agens*, by Bartholomew of Bruges.⁵⁷ As Perarnau perspicuously observes, the definition of active and passive correlatives for every sense certainly serves to assimilate the almost wholly active operation of *affatus* to the largely passive operations of the other five senses.⁵⁸ In Lull's system, all the senses become both active and passive through his correlatives.

Lull imitates contemporary Scholastic accounts of sensation that define a "medium", "organ" (or "instrument"), and "object" for each sense power.⁵⁹ The *Liber de affatu* specifies the object and instrument or organ of every sense faculty.⁶⁰ At the same time, Lull departs radically from customary doctrine by disregarding entirely the definition of a sensory medium and attributing instead to all the senses the extramissional "line" of sensation usually associated with vision alone. According to the ancient theory already explained in Plato's *Timaeus*, vision occurs when the eye emits a ray or line that contacts the object of sight.⁶¹ By Lull's day, this explanation was ceding to the new optic theories of Alhazen.⁶² The tra-

⁵⁴ Many of the authorities compiled by Vincent of Beauvais offer organic explanations of sensation (e.g. *Speculum naturale* 25.10). However, the digestive role assigned to the vegetative power in the interaction of internal and external correlatives is peculiar to Lull. It illustrates well the role in his Art of the "elemental exemplarism" described by Ruiz Simon, "De la naturalesa com a mescla", 72, 90.

⁵⁵ 1a.78,3.

⁵⁶ See Stuart MacClintock, *Perversity and Error: Studies on the "Averroist" John of Jandun* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956) 10-50.

⁵⁷ See Auguste Pelzer, *Études d'histoire littéraire sur la scolastique médiévale* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1964) 532.

⁵⁸ "Lo sisè seny" 53-4.

⁵⁹ On the designation of organ as instrument, see e.g. Vincent of Beauvais *Speculum naturale* 25.24, 59, 62, or 64. For typical brief accounts of sensation, see e.g. Aquinas 1a.78,1 and 3 or Vincent of Beauvais *Speculum naturale* 25.25.

⁶⁰ Perarnau sees a "distinció ben concreta" between organ and instrument in the treatise ("Lo sisè seny" 64, with reference to LA 296; cf. SS 460). In fact Lull does not distinguish organ and instrument for touch, vision, or hearing.

⁶¹ 45B-46A.

⁶² See David C. Lindberg, *Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976) 104-21.

ditional ancient and medieval authorities compiled by Vincent of Beauvais mention this line only in the sense of vision.⁶³ Some explicitly deny that any sense besides vision functions in a direct line; they especially note the circular propagation of sound waves.⁶⁴ Llull nonetheless attributes this line to each sense,⁶⁵ comparing its conductive power to the mast of a ship or a hollow tube (in the case of hearing).⁶⁶ His extrapolation of this extramissional line to the operations of all the senses reveals the power of his analogizing procedures of exposition, which readily rework the tenets of received doctrine. It also solves the widely-debated problem of explaining the projection of sensible species through intervening space.⁶⁷ Llull's arguments evidently acknowledge these questions. For example, the *Liber de affatu* specifies no line for taste, just as Aristotle states that taste has no medium.⁶⁸ On the other hand, in the case of touch it defines flesh as its organ and specifically describes a line of sensation as the medium of touch.⁶⁹ This is the only explicit definition of a medium in the *Liber de affatu*. Aristotle posed for later authorities the question of whether flesh is the organ or medium of touch,⁷⁰ and Llull's account apparently confronts this issue.

Finally, where other medieval authorities attributed to each sense power a single predominant element,⁷¹ Llull argues that the sense object, the line of sensation, and the eyes possess all four elements, as well as vegetative and sensitive natures.⁷² In the case of smell he does note that the element air predominates in this line,⁷³ and air is the medium of smell recognized by Aristotelian commentators.⁷⁴ Since all entities in the hierarchy of being participate in the levels of being or natures inferior to them, this line allows the elemental, vegetal, and sensual natures of the eyes to participate with those of the perceived object "by contiguity".⁷⁵ Consequently, vision "attains in its own visibility the visibility appropriated from without, with these two visibilities participating to-

⁶³ *Speculum naturale* 25.9-83.

⁶⁴ See Perarnau "Lo sisè seny" 70-1.

⁶⁵ LA 282-6; cf. SS 68-196. Cf. *Arbre de ciència* 3.3 (OE 1: 596a-99b).

⁶⁶ LA 284; cf. SS 129-38.

⁶⁷ See Perarnau's excellent discussion ("Lo sisè seny" 65-9, with reference to lines 67-113).

⁶⁸ LA 285; cf. SS 164-78. Cf. *De an.* 2.10 422a16.

⁶⁹ LA 286; cf. SS 185-90.

⁷⁰ *De an.* 2.11 422b20-22; cf. Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum naturale* 25.79.81.

⁷¹ See Perarnau, "Lo sisè seny" 66.

⁷² *Arbre de ciència* 3.31 (OE 1: 596b-97b).

⁷³ LA 284-5; cf. SS 149.

⁷⁴ See Perarnau "Lo sisè seny" 72.

⁷⁵ *Arbre de ciència* 3. Prol., 3.3.1 (OE 1: 594ab, 597a).

gether in species and sustained in one single line of elements stretched between the forms"; that is, "between both forms stands the line of elements, similiary formed and subject to vision".⁷⁶ Although this passage employs Llull's correlatives, it also shows how his model of sensation still assumes the "elemental exemplarism" found in earlier redactions of his system.

If we turn now to Llull's accounts of how speech functions as a sixth sense, we find that this model can only accommodate with difficulty the functions of *affatus*. The difficulty ultimately arises from the divergence between the exteroceptive operation of the five external senses and the interoceptive operation of Llull's sixth sense. To fully understand *affatus* we must, as will become evident, regard it as a process of communication among the external and internal senses. In order to see how *affatus* functions in this fashion, we will trace the process of *affatus* through each stage that Llull seems to recognize in its operation as a sense. His various accounts of *affatus* suggest four principal stages: 1) the generation of concepts or desires as mental objects for *affatus*; 2) the apprehension of those objects by *affatus*; 3) expression of these objects by *affatus* in speech; and finally; 4) the reception of speech by hearing.⁷⁷ Our exposition of these stages collates remarks about *affatus* with others on language found in works written throughout Llull's career. Although this procedure necessarily includes some inconsistent or confusing claims, it nonetheless usefully shows how Llull's proposal of speech as a sixth sense develops within a context of related doctrines. For each stage we will consider the conventional tenets of medieval physiological or psychological doctrines that he adapts, and then examine how that adaptation serves his definition of speech as a sense.

Stage One: Generation of Concepts. To begin with, *affatus* transmits both thoughts and desires. These correspond broadly to the objects of the intellective and sensitive appetites.⁷⁸ Llull generally refers to these thoughts and desires with the comprehensive term "internal conceptions", in the manner of a traditional general category such as *affectus animae*.⁷⁹ Perarnau suggests that "internal conception" means either desires or

⁷⁶ "Visitivum attingit in sua propria visibilitate visibilitatem de foris appropriatam, participantibus ipsis duabus visibilitatibus simul in specie sustentatis in linea una cadem elementata inter figuras terminata;" "inter ambas figuras stat linea elementata, modo simili figurata, subjectata ipsi videre" (LA 282-3; cf. SS 82-6 and 89-91).

⁷⁷ These four stages effectively invert the process through which the other five senses operate. For different schematizations of the operation of *affatus*, see Perarnau ("Lo sisè seny" 42) and Tusquets ("Lenguaje como argumento" 178-9).

⁷⁸ Cf. Aquinas 1a.80.2.

⁷⁹ See Alcher *De spiritu et anima* 4 (PL 40: 782).

thoughts, depending on the context.⁸⁰ It seems more likely though that Llull seeks to maintain a single, general object for *affatus* since this better serves his identification of speech as a discrete sense and maintains the continuity that he posits between the levels of soul in human beings.⁸¹ Llull repeatedly states that the purpose of *affatus* is to allow one animal to share its "internal conceptions" with another animal.⁸² This primary purpose evidently justifies his definition of these as the formal and final cause of *affatus*.⁸³ Although many thoughts or desires presumably arise from sensations of the external world at large, Llull most often mentions only their appearance within the soul. Where humans possess both intellectual thoughts and imaginative desires, animals possess only the latter.⁸⁴ Drunks and fools speak without using their imaginations at all.⁸⁵ All these remarks assume Aristotelian doctrine.⁸⁶

Llull's accounts of how these concepts arise draw especially on various elements of traditional physiological lore. He explains that thoughts arise in the heart and brain of those animals that have hearts, and in the brain alone of those that lack hearts.⁸⁷ This claim derives from various Aristotelian teachings, well-known from Avicenna and other authorities.⁸⁸ Llull's distinction between those animals that possess or lack hearts conflates two elements of Aristotelian biology: first, the division between nonsanguineous and sanguineous animals, all of which possess hearts and brains;⁸⁹ second, the observation that all nonsanguineous and some sanguineous animals lack voices.⁹⁰ The *Lectura super Artem inventivam* explains that speech better manifests what is conceived in autumn and summer than in winter, with the result that birds sing and people speak more joyfully in spring and summer.⁹¹ These comments evidently assume commonplace medical

⁸⁰ "Lo sisè seny" 89, 94.

⁸¹ As Perarnau recognizes, "Lo sisè seny" 64.

⁸² E.g. LA 280, 293, 296; cf. SS 12, 390, 459. Cf. *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem* 240 (MOG 5: 325. All references are to questions from Pars 2 of Distinctio 3); *Proverbis de Ramon* 262.2-3 (ORL 14: 286); *Arbre de ciència* 3.3.6 (OE 1: 599ab).

⁸³ *Lectura* 239.

⁸⁴ LA 280, 294; cf. SS 14, 419. Cf. *Arbre de ciència* 1.7.89 (OE 1: 587b); *Arbre de filosofia desiderat* 1.3.17 (ORL 17: 421); *Lectura* 240; *Proverbis de Ramon* 184.12 (ORL 14: 197) and *Arbre de ciència* 16.7.366 (OE 1: 1024a).

⁸⁵ LA 295; cf. SS 438.

⁸⁶ *De an.* 2.8 420b33 and 3.3 427b6-8b17.

⁸⁷ *Lectura* 244.

⁸⁸ *De an.* 5.8 (ed. Van Riet 2: 174-85). Cf. the texts summarized by Vincent of Beauvais *Speculum naturale* 21.2.6, 26-8.

⁸⁹ *Hist. an.* 1.16, 2.5 494b26, 506a5.

⁹⁰ *De an.* 2.8 420b7-10.

⁹¹ *Lectura* 243.

theories regarding the interaction of physical environment and temperament. Contemporary authorities also adapted these to explain the hygienic and psychotherapeutic value of literature.⁹²

In general, then, *affatus* provides both humans and animals with a means of communicating all those *affectiones* or *passiones* that arise in the sensitive, imaginative, or rational soul.

Stage Two: Apprehension of Concepts. Next, *affatus* receives these thoughts or desires from the intellect or imagination, and thereby "conceives" or "senses" them.⁹³ It thus performs an apprehensive function internally within the soul, which Llull habitually terms "conception".⁹⁴ Llull emphasizes in the *Liber de affatu* that whereas the other five senses apprehend external objects, *affatus* apprehends internal ones.⁹⁵ Despite the prominent role that Llull's correlatives play in his accounts of other senses, only once does he fully explain this internal apprehension with them: *affatus* conceives exterior "conceptibilities" with its natural, bodily affative "conceptive" and own affable "conceptible", and these participate in species with the interior "conceptible", and thus *affatus* moves the tongue and speech to manifest externally what was conceived internally.⁹⁶ The reference to conceiving exterior "conceptibilities" evidently indicates the apprehension of external forms. Better understanding of this internal *conceptio* or *apprehensio* will be possible once we come to consider the role of *affatus* as mental discourse.

Stage Three: Expression or Manifestation of Concepts. After apprehending or conceiving thoughts and desires, *affatus* then manifests them externally through vocal sounds.

Llull's explanation of voice again includes various elements taken from medieval medical doctrine, and notably more than appear in his

⁹² On these theories, see the excellent study by Glending Olson, *Literature as Recreation in the Later Middle Ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) 1982.

⁹³ E.g. *Lectura* 244. Perarnau believes that the vernacular "sent" means "fer sensible" in the following passage from the vernacular version: "car sent la manifestatió de la concepció, coué que sia distinció enfre éla e la concepció, car si no u era no seria miigüa qui sentís la concepció" (SS 424; "Lo sisè seny" 91). The Latin text gives "sentit" (LA 294).

⁹⁴ Llull's recourse to verbal analogy appears explicitly in his explanation that the sensitive soul presents instincts to the imagination just as "la fembra qui concep infant imprem en aquell alguna semblança de l'object que imagina; e açò mateix del mascle" (*Arbre de ciència* 16.7.366; OE 1: 1024a). The dual sense of 'conception' ("conceive a thought" vs. "conceive a child") allows a comparison of mental and bodily operations that effectively explains both operations through appeal to a single relationship, the communication of a likeness.

⁹⁵ E.g. LA 289, 290; cf. SS 271, 287-8, 297-8.

⁹⁶ *Lectura* 246.

earlier writings. In the *Libre de contemplació*, he explains simply that words and cries result from things moving, touching, speaking, crying, or sounding, following the Aristotelian axiom that noise occurs when one object strikes another.⁹⁷ He mentions also that the tongue and lips serve as organs of articulation, and his remarks recall the descriptions of voice found in basic school texts.⁹⁸

The *Liber de affatu* of 1294 and contemporary writings offer so much more detail regarding the physiology of speech that it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Llull had gained some new familiarity with texts from the medieval medical tradition.⁹⁹ Still, his accounts are undeniably idiosyncratic, eclectic, and synthetic. His model of the cumulative levels of being organizes his explanation of the sixth sense, as it does all the senses, in the *Arbre de sciència*: air provides vocal sound (i.e. as the contribution of the elemental level of being) the vegetative power provides the pleasure desired in the species (of the things) communicated, while the sensitive power provides the act of sensation.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, the object, medium, and organ of *affatus* are necessarily Llull's own invention. He always identifies the manifestation of internal conceptions as the object of *affatus*.¹⁰¹ However, the definitions of organ and instrument are less consistent, naming variously the tongue, speech, and their "movement".¹⁰² Most of his writings describe this movement as the passage of air from the lungs and out of the mouth, following Aristotle's explanation of how speech sounds arise.¹⁰³ More remarkable is the quasi-Pythagorean expla-

⁹⁷ 125.1 (OE 2: 374a); cf. *Libre de demostracions* 1.49 (ORL 15: 48). *De an.* 2.8 419b3-420b4. See Perarnau "Lo sisè seny" 70.

⁹⁸ 125.22 (OE 2: 376a). Cf. e.g. Boethius's *In librum Aristotelis de Interpretatione Commentaria majora* 1, Patrologia Latina 64 (Paris: J.-P. Migne, 1891) cols. 393-639 (at col. 394AB).

⁹⁹ Most of these sources — Razes, Haly Abba, Costa ben Lucca, Platearius, Constantinus Africanus, and above all, Avicenna — were based ultimately on Aristotle and Galen (see Harvey *Inward Wits* 28). Moreover, their teachings circulated widely in manuals such as the famous compendium prepared in 1301 by Bernard of Gordon for his medical students at Montpellier; Bernard's text even appeared in vernacular translations. (Professor Brian Dutton of the University of Wisconsin informs me that an edition of a fourteenth-century Castilian version of Bernard's work is under way.)

¹⁰⁰ *Arbre de sciència* 3.3.6, 3.7 (OE 1: 599a, 606b).

¹⁰¹ E.g. LA 280, 287, 290, 296; cf. SS 18, 217, 300, 471. See also *Arbre de ciència* 3.3.6 (OE 1: 599a); *Proverbis de Ramon* 262.3 (ORL 14: 286); *Liber de praedicatione* 2.B.1.36.2.1 (ROL 4: 141).

¹⁰² Contrary to Perarnau's claim "Lo sisè seny" 94. Cf. *Arbre de ciència* 3.3.6. (OE 1: 599a); LA 296 (cf. SS 459-61); *Proverbis de Ramon* 184.8, 262.3-4 (ORL 14: 197, 286); *Liber de praedicatione* 2.8.1.36.2.1 (ROL 4: 141); *Lectura* 242.

¹⁰³ *De an.* 2.8 420b23-7. The *Liber de affatu* states that the internal conception both 'accipitur' in the lungs and 'formatur' in speech (LA 296). Hence, Perarnau concludes that the lungs are the physical location in which formal conception and material airstream unite

nation of sound in the *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus*, which notes that the heavens cause vowels or consonants in sound with their harmony or melody.¹⁰⁴

The "line" of sensation for *affatus* is the *motus* that begins in the *membris sensatis* (i.e. lungs, tongue, and palate) and *pars, in qua non est sensata* (i.e. speech).¹⁰⁵ This division between "sensate" and "insensate" parts combines several Aristotelian arguments: the claim that only the sanguineous parts of animals possess sensation;¹⁰⁶ the description of the organs of speech;¹⁰⁷ and remarks on the relations between the heart and the lungs.¹⁰⁸ The trajectory of this line seems directly dependent on the conception of *affatus* as a version of the *virtus vocativa* of the motive power. This line presumably allows, by virtue of its comprehensive composition, the same interaction between *affatus* and its object as it does for vision and its object. Thus, the *Liber de affatu* describes this line as both *elementata* and *sensata*.¹⁰⁹ More importantly, it connects the correlative "sensitive" and "sensible", that is, the conception and its vocal manifestation.¹¹⁰ It joins the mind, mouth, and speech, Llull claims, because the intellect has an apprehensive nature, which is thus able to participate and join with the sixth sense.¹¹¹ Vincent of Beauvais argues against certain unnamed authorities who maintained that imaginable and intelligible species are born directly from the anterior ventricle of the head to the tongue and vocal organs by means of a nerve descending from the inner chamber of the brain.¹¹² They thus attributed an active and motive function to a nerve that is actually passive and sensitive (or apprehensive) and serves only to convey the sensations of taste from the

("Lo sisè seny" 94 with reference to SS 460-2). The variations in Llull's other accounts of *affatus* make this difficult to establish.

¹⁰⁴ 7.2.3 (ROL 9: 110). Tusquets notes Llull's subsequent qualifications to the apparent celestial determinism suggested by this claim ("Lenguaje como argumento" 195-6). On Pythagorean theories of language, see S. K. Henninger, *Touches of Sweet Harmony: Pythagorean Cosmology and Renaissance Poetics* (San Marino, California: Huntington Library, 1974).

¹⁰⁵ LA 296; cf. SS 463-70.

¹⁰⁶ *De part. an.* 2.10 656b18-21.

¹⁰⁷ *De an.* 2.8 420b5-21a5.

¹⁰⁸ *De part. an.* 3.4,6 666a12-15, 669a15. The best single comprehensive source of all this Aristotelian lore regarding the comparative physiology of speech in humans and animals is Avicenna, *De natura animalium* 4.1, *Opera* (Venice, 1508; rpt. Louvain: Bibliotheca Societatis Iesu, 1961) 33ra-b. Llull probably knew it from various encyclopedias or compendia.

¹⁰⁹ LA 296; cf. SS 465.

¹¹⁰ *Arbre de ciència* 3.3.6 (OE 1: 599a); cf. *Lectura* 241.

¹¹¹ *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus* 3.2.6 (ROL 9: 49).

¹¹² Cf. *Speculum naturale* 25.71.

tongue to the mind.¹¹³ Like Aristotle and his commentators, Llull notes that the tongue is the organ of both taste and speech.¹¹⁴ This common function evidently reinforced a parallel between taste and speech as faculties of sense apprehension.

All these explanations of the vocal manifestation of concepts through *affatus* imply the existence of separate phonic and semantic aspects in speech, even if Llull does not distinguish them very precisely. In regard to the phonic component, he states that the locutive power informs (*specificat*) sound and moves the instrument where voice is formed;¹¹⁵ speech is informed by or from sound;¹¹⁶ the manifestation occurs through sound informed in voice or speech;¹¹⁷ the concept extracts speech from sound materially and *affatus* gives itself the specified form of speech;¹¹⁸ and finally, the tongue *artificialiter* disposes sound, just as *affatus* naturally causes voice.¹¹⁹ All these statements regarding *specificatio* attempt to define the *informatio* of the matter of vocal sounds with the forms of words (regarded as intelligible species). Where the speculative grammarians treat this hylemorphic relationship strictly,¹²⁰ Llull does so more loosely and is thus better able to develop his new theory. Thus, the *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus* explains that *affatus* imposes names on things, assigns predicates to subjects, and proffers discrete and continuous syllables as forms of particular or universal concepts.¹²¹ This last remark and similar ones in the *Proverbis de Ramon* rehearse Aristotle's examples of quantity in language, correlating them with the equally fundamental logical distinction between particular and universal.¹²² The elementary nature of these

¹¹³ *Speculum naturale* 25.26.

¹¹⁴ *De an.* 2.8 420b17; *De part. an.* 2.17 660a20-25. LA 287, 294; cf. SS 221, 401-8. *Proverbis de Ramon* 262.4 (ORL 14: 186). Perarnau notes that Llull's comments on taste ignore various details of conventional doctrine ("Lo sisè seny" 78).

¹¹⁵ LA 280; cf. SS 22-23.

¹¹⁶ LA 290, 293, 296; cf. SS 301, 387, 473.

¹¹⁷ *Lectura* 238.

¹¹⁸ *Ars iuris quae est de inventione mediorum juris civilis* 5.5, ed. E. Wohlhaupter, *Estudis Franciscans* 46 (1935): 196-215 and 47 (1935): 161-250 (at 47: 196).

¹¹⁹ *Metaphysica nova et compendiosa* 2.8.1 (ROL 6: 51).

¹²⁰ See Geoffrey L. Bursill-Hall, *Speculative Grammars of the Middle Ages* (The Hague: Mouton, 1971) 50-51.

¹²¹ 2.2.4; 6.9.10 (ROL 9: 26; 104). Tusquets claims that *affatus* employs only sounds without conceptual sense, while another "habla racional" does employ sounds joined to concepts; "Lenguaje como argumento" 179-80. Given Llull's limited attention to the processes of semiosis in his accounts of *affatus*, it seems optimistic to agree with Tusquets that the sixth sense "vale para construir una metafísica semiótica y la correspondiente apologetica"; *ibid.* 184. Such a judgement applies far better to the *Liber de significatione* (ROL 10: 1-100); see the author's *The Spiritual Logic of Ramon Llull* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987) 163-75.

¹²² 184.4-6, 17 (ORL 14: 196-7). Cf. *De interp.* 7 17a35 and *Cat.* 6 4b30-5.

classifications demonstrates Llull's minimal concern for the material constituents of discourse. His interest lies almost exclusively in the spiritual objectives of communication.

These objectives necessarily involve the semantic component of language, which he usually identifies with the concept as intelligible species,¹²³ form,¹²⁴ or simply likeness.¹²⁵ Although this terminology resembles that employed by Latin or Arab authorities, it is difficult to consider this explanation of how concepts "inform" speech as "purely formal".¹²⁶ Llull's fundamental "elemental exemplarism" just as readily favors organic analogies for describing the process through which concepts "inform" speech: for example, *affatus* transmutes the concept into speech, just as the vegetative power does food and drink into flesh and blood.¹²⁷ These organic analogies not only explain the *specificatio* of language, but also validate references to the physiology of speech elsewhere in Llull's analyses of *affatus*.

Stage Four: Reception of Concepts. Finally, once speech achieves the manifestation of thoughts or desires in spoken words, the ears hear these words, according to the usual process for the reception of sensible species by the five external senses. Llull says relatively little about this stage, but it is essential to his arguments regarding the communicative function of *affatus*. Especially notable is his observation that speakers hear the sounds emitted from their own mouths. The *Arbre de ciència* explains that a roaring lion hears its own voice and the voice of others.¹²⁸ The *Liber de affatu* states somewhat obscurely that the "voice is received externally in the auditive power, which through its own correlative audible power offers to the inner manifestation a likeness of the conception of the object created in the external manifestation".¹²⁹ It is important to note that this last passage does not clearly distinguish between the auditive power of the speaker and the auditive power of the listener. This

¹²³ E.g. LA 280; cf. SS 22-3.

¹²⁴ E.g. LA 280, 296; cf. SS 17, 473. Llull often uses *figuratum*, meaning "given form" or "formed"; see Colom, *Glossari* 1: 49 (s.v. *affigurar*).

¹²⁵ E.g. LA 280; cf. SS 24-5. See also LA 296 (cf. SS 475) and *Arbre de filosofia desiderat* 1.3.17 (ORL 17: 421).

¹²⁶ As Perarnau suggests "*Lo sisè seny*" 61. Cf. Aquinas 1a.85.2; Avicenna *De anima* 5.6 (ed. Van Riet 2: 134-53); or the various authorities collected in Vincent of Beauvais *Speculum naturale* 27.29-60.

¹²⁷ *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus* 7.2.3 (ROL 9: 111).

¹²⁸ 3.7 (OE 1: 606b).

¹²⁹ "Recipitur illa vox per auditivum extra, qui in suo proprio audibili dat conceptionis similitudinem objectae manifestationi interius, in manifestatione exterius affectatae" (LA 280). Cf. SS 24-6.

slight ambiguity is perhaps purely coincidental, but nonetheless suggests a fundamental larger issue involved in Llull's proposal of speech as a sixth sense, namely the role of *affatus* as a mode of internal communication or "mental language" among the faculties of the soul.

All the remarks collected in the preceding summary demonstrate that *affatus* conceives thoughts or desires from within the soul and then expresses them orally in speech. *Affatus* is thus interoceptive, where the other five senses are all exteroceptive. Most of Llull's remarks on the operation of *affatus* concern this intrasubjective function, rather than the intersubjective function of communication between speakers and listeners. This emphasis hardly surprises: on one hand, the interoceptive function of *affatus* is certainly its most novel feature, and therefore most in need of explanation; on the other, analyses of the perception of oral language more properly pertain to accounts of the sense of hearing. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that the proposal of speech as a sense depends far less on speech as a medium of communication among individuals than on sensation as a cognitive operation of the individual subject. If we turn now to consider carefully how *affatus* fulfills this cognitive role, both its classification and operation among the other senses becomes far more easily comprehensible.

Affatus as oral and mental language

We have seen already that Ramon Llull's "discovery" of *affatus* resulted at least partially from a reclassification of the "inner senses" defined by Avicenna and based ultimately on Aristotelian theories. The scholastic psychology organized around such doctrines was, however, certainly not the only model of the soul's operations available to Llull. We have also noted a better-known and more authoritative scheme — the accounts of contemplation, inner vision, and meditation developed by Patristic and Prescholastic writers. Fundamental to their models of these functions is the so-called "language of the mind" or "discourse of the soul".¹³⁰ Exercise of this function in *affatus* places Llull's sixth sense in a tradition that ultimately remits to the Platonic "dialogue of the soul with itself".¹³¹

¹³⁰ As a guide to recent research on this topic, see Paul F. Gehl, "Mystical language models in monastic educational psychology", *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 14 (1984): 219-43 and "Philip of Harveng on Silence", *Proceedings of the Illinois Medieval Association*, vol. 2, ed. Mark D. Johnston and Samuel M. Riley (Normal: Illinois State University, 1985) 168-81.

¹³¹ As Sebastián Trías Mercant well observes *El pensamiento y la palabra* 17.

For Christian theology the *locus classicus* regarding mental language was Augustine's famous account of the *verbum quod intus lucet*.¹³² For philosophy and the arts a common authority was Boethius's analysis of the distinction between written, oral, and mental *orationes*.¹³³ The Schoolmen often describe the role of this mental discourse in faculty psychology.¹³⁴

Allusions to this language of the mind appear in accounts of human psychology throughout Lull's early writings,¹³⁵ but the *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles* of 1290-91 offer an especially explicit description, suggesting its growing importance in his models of sensation and cognition. In this work, the motive power already consists simply in the joint operation of the three mental faculties: when a person recalls something desirable, sensible species retained in the imagination move the imagination, the imagination the intellect, the intellect the will to a purpose, the purpose the will, the will the intellect, and the intellect the imagination to imagine the thing desired.¹³⁶ Within this process, Lull recognizes two varieties of mental language: in the first, intellectual, speech is generated from intellectual images in order to attain intellectual objects, such as God, the divine attributes, angels, or the soul; in the second, sensual, speech is generated from sense images in order to attain sense objects in the material world. In both cases the rational soul generates this inner speech in order to apprehend what is absent.¹³⁷ This kind of mental language constitutes the basis for communication between angels, as Lull explains in his *Libre dels àngels* or *De locutione angelorum*.¹³⁸ The arguments of these works are conventional.¹³⁹ The *Medicina de peccat* notes that devils who hear with spiritual

¹³² *De trinitate* 9.7.12, 15.10.18, 15.15.25, ed. W. J. Mountain, Corpus Christianorum 50-50A (Turnholt: Brepols, 1968) 1: 304; 2: 484-5, 489-9.

¹³³ *In librum Aristotelis de Interpretatione* 1 (PL 64: 407 B). On the significance of Boethius's formula, see Brian Stock, *The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) 366-72.

¹³⁴ E.g. Aquinas *De differentia verbi divini et humani*, ed. Raymundus M. Spiazzi, *Opuscula philosophica* (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1954) 101-2. Cf. also 1a.34,1; 79,11 ad 3; 107,1. George P. Klubertanz exhaustively analyzes the role of this discourse in Aquinas's scheme of the internal senses: *The Discursive Power: Sources and Doctrine of Vis Cogitativa According to St. Thomas Aquinas* (St. Louis: Modern Schoolman, 1952).

¹³⁵ E.g. *Libre de contemplació* 126-7 (OE 2: 377a-81b) or *Compendium Artis demonstrativae* 2.1.5 (MOG 3: 75b-76a).

¹³⁶ Qu. 175 (MOG 4: 89-90).

¹³⁷ Qu. 54 (MOG 4: 76).

¹³⁸ Perarnau, recognizing this connection, happily included an edition of this previously unpublished text as an appendix to his edition of the Catalan text ("*Lo sisè seny*" 104-21). It now appears in *ROL* 16: 207-36.

¹³⁹ Cf. the similar explanations of Aquinas 1a.107.

ears tempt men not to praise God.¹⁴⁰ As Joan Tusquets aptly indicates, this mental language completes a sort of communicative continuum, in which animals have sound but no sense, angels sense but no sound, and humans both sense and sound.¹⁴¹

The account in the *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam solubiles* is especially notable for its use of the term *phantasias*. Even though Llull employs this word interchangeably with *species* and *similitudo*, the role of these images in considering things absent from the senses clearly recalls one of the chief functions of the imagination. Llull thus evidently assumes the conventional classification of the imagination as one of the internal senses within the apprehensive power of the sensitive soul, as described above. By attributing to the intellectual and sensual divisions of mental speech the apprehensive functions normally assigned to the imagination, Llull describes one of the most important characteristics of *affatus*, namely its conception of thoughts and desires from the intellective and sensitive souls. These two types of mental language already constitute an analogical application to spiritual speech of the distinction between sense and intellectual knowledge. Only one further analogical step—the assimilation of corporeal sensation to spiritual cognition as common modes of “discourse”—would be necessary in order to create a single apprehensive faculty of communication, namely *affatus*.

It is perhaps hardly surprising that the *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam solubiles* is one of the last works in which Llull expounds the divisions of sensual and intellectual speech. Within a few years, his sixth sense of *affatus* would define a mode of communication that embraces both sensation and cognition, because it operates at two separate levels: on the one hand, it communicates with the higher faculties of imagination, will, reason, and memory; on the other hand, it communicates with its fellow external senses. Llull's accounts of the sixth sense usually treat each of these levels as a distinct function, since they correspond to separate corporeal and spiritual levels of cognition. If we examine how *affatus* communicates with each level, it becomes easy to see that Llull's sixth sense organizes a comprehensive system of internal communication among the faculties of the sensitive, imaginative, and intellective souls.

In its communication with the higher faculties, *affatus* plays an instrumental role. Llull explains that *affatus* and internal concepts differ: the latter pertain to the intellect and imagination and the former to the

¹⁴⁰ Line 3412 (ORL 20: 124). Cf. likewise *Libre de meravelles* 16 (OE 1: 348).

¹⁴¹ “Lenguaje como argumento” 173.

sensus communis. Therefore *affatus* serves as a mediator, conceiving imaginable or intelligible concepts and manifesting them in speech.¹⁴² Indeed, the operation of the imagination is better manifested through *affatus* than any other sense.¹⁴³ At the same time, *affatus* also represents "corporeal delights" to the imagination, which in turn represents them to the soul.¹⁴⁴ Similarly, the sense of touch "manifests" its sensations to the imagination.¹⁴⁵

One of the most quintessentially Lullian arguments of the entire *Liber de affatu* explains this function of *affatus* in the following sequence of propositions.¹⁴⁶ First, there is greater *concordantia* between a sensual and an intellectual power than between two sensual powers, because of the greater power that the intellectual possesses, as in the union of body and soul; here *concordantia* evidently indicates a relationship of necessary dependence. Second, only *affatus* manifests the operations of memory, which is a faculty of the rational soul that informs the body; this claim embraces the unique role of *affatus* almost as a separate argument, while developing as well an argument about the dependence of sensual on intellectual powers. Third, if the *sensus communis* acquires *virtus* from the objects of memory, then it must do so through *affatus* and this *virtus* must be as great or greater than the *virtus* that the *sensus communis* receives from the other senses. Finally, if these conditions did not exist, the *sensus communis* would receive greater *virtus* from the other senses and would receive greater *virtus* from memory through forgetting than through remembering, and these consequences are impossible. This conclusion requires, of course, the identification of forgetting as a lesser *virtus* received from the faculty of memory. The exercise of *affatus* mentioned here is clearly not communication between two separate persons.¹⁴⁷ It is instead the interaction of the senses and rational soul. It is interesting that this example does not mention the imagination, but rather attributes a mediating role to *affatus* and thus suggests how *affatus* functions at the same level of internal senses as imagination.

This intermediary position creates relationships that are basically reciprocal. For example, only *affatus* among the senses manifests the will, with the result that the will considers (*se habet ad*) the object of *affatus*

¹⁴² LA 294; cf. SS 418-25.

¹⁴³ LA 290; cf. SS 297-8.

¹⁴⁴ *Liber de praedicatione* 2.B.1.36.1 (ROL 4: 142).

¹⁴⁵ LA 294; cf. SS 403.

¹⁴⁶ These summarize LA 289; cf. SS 264-78.

¹⁴⁷ As Perarnau suggest "Lo sisè seny" 81, 83. The vernacular text gives *loqució* as the name of the speech power in this passage (SS 272).

faster.¹⁴⁸ Lull describes these processes most explicitly in the *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus*, where he portrays all the soul's faculties as quasi-personifications. He tells how, when the senses perceive particular stones, *affatus* speaks the universal term *lapis*, hearing receives that term, imagination imagines it, and the intellect creates the genus stone. But if the intellect questions the real existence of this genus, then *affatus* "truly declares that the genus is thus truly and really in the species of the stone, just as species are truly and really in their individuals. And thus the intellect knows that *affatus* speaks the truth, with the aid of hearing and imagination".¹⁴⁹ In this assertion of a Realist understanding of the Tree of Porphyry as cognitive *rectitudo*, both hearing and *affatus* act as spiritual senses that work to rectify the perceptions of the corporeal senses.¹⁵⁰

Lull's remarks on the interaction between *affatus* and the five other external senses use the relationship between speech and hearing as a paradigm. The interaction of the six external senses occurs through the *sensus communis*, the power responsible for synthesizing their disparate perceptions. Avicenna lists the *sensus communis* among the internal senses,¹⁵¹ which correspond to Lull's separate imaginative soul. Lull identifies the *sensus communis* with the sensitive soul and hence *affatus*, like the other five senses, pertains to the essence of the *sensus communis*.¹⁵² He ignores, moreover, this power's function of organizing a common object from the various perceptions of the individual senses, and mentions instead only its function as source of the sensitive capacity with which each sense grasps the objects "common" to it.¹⁵³ Thus, Lull notes that the objects of touch are things soft and rough, cold and warm, or hard and soft,¹⁵⁴ but without pursuing the question of the unity of the sense of touch.¹⁵⁵ Given this limited definition of the *sensus communis*, it is not surprising that Lull's explanation of how the *sensus communis* relates speech to the other senses is scarcely satisfying:

¹⁴⁸ LA 289; cf. SS 287-8. The comparative "faster" oddly implies that the will perhaps considers objects from the other senses as well, but not as readily.

¹⁴⁹ "Uere dicit, quod illud genus est uere sic in speciebus lapidis realiter, sicut species sunt uere et realiter in suis inuiduis. Et tunc intellectus cognoscit, quod affatus dicit uerum, auditu adiuuante et etiam imaginatione" (2.9.1; ROL 9:41-2).

¹⁵⁰ Tusquets considers this quasi-personified account of faculty psychology to be a "radically semiotic" procedure of argumentation ("El lenguaje como argumento" 199).

¹⁵¹ *De anima* 4.1 (ed. Van Riet 2: 1-11).

¹⁵² LA 295; cf. SS 436. Cf. *Arbre de ciència* 3.2 (OE 1: 595b-596a) and LA 294; cf. SS 421.

¹⁵³ LA 281; cf. SS 37-44.

¹⁵⁴ LA 281; cf. SS 43-4.

¹⁵⁵ As suggested by Perarnau "Lo sisè seny" 63. Aristotle's *De anima* (2.11 422b19-424a14) treats in detail the problem of the diversity in tactile sensation.

fari de rebus placidis atque pulchris movet potentiam visivam ad videndum ipsas, adeo quod homo desiderat videre pulchritudines rerum per affatum laudatarum, et conceptus illius placiti fit potius per vocis manifestationem, quae pulchra manifestat, quam per coloris modum; movet igitur citius potentia affativa oculos ad videndum quam color, qui est objectum visus, et quia causa est ante effectum, in isto motu oportet quod, si est causa, de necessitate sit effectus, et hoc convertitur; oportet igitur quod de necessitate sit potentia affativa pars sensus communis, sine qua oculi non posset appetitum habere naturalem ad videndum pulchra, quia non esset qui eis revelaret vel manifestaret res pulchras et placidas ad videndum, cum oculi non participent cum conceptu intra, quem conceptum in voce manifestat potentia affativa; et illa manifestatio est suum objectum, et vox est objectum illius auditus, qui movet oculos ad videndum per pulchritudines manifestatas in voce; est igitur affatus sensus de necessitate propter hoc, ut ipse et auditus possint movere oculos ad appetitum naturalem in videndo pulchra.¹⁵⁶

Llull's initial remarks here on how one person's speech moves another person to desire perception of an object are largely unremarkable. He makes similar claims for the power of speech to move the sense of touch.¹⁵⁷ However, his deduction that this influence requires the direct affiliation of speech and hearing in the *sensus communis* embraces several assumptions that appear extremely unorthodox, if not indefensible, within the context of received medieval doctrines regarding sensation and cognition.¹⁵⁸ First, it conflates the motive and apprehensive functions of the sensitive soul. Second, it apparently ascribes the motive function to the *sensus communis*. Third, it reverses the usual sequence of sensation and desire, or rather assigns to *affatus* a paramount role in presenting objects to the appetite and will. Fourth, it implies that the senses of one individual ought to participate with the mental concepts abstracted from sensible species by another individual. Fifth, it apparently asserts that these revealed or manifested concepts are the superlative objects of the senses. Sixth and last, it proposes that hearing (or more exactly, audible species) should move the eyes, rather than speech as originally stated. This last assumption perhaps supposes that the *sensus communis* has already coordinated the operation of vision and hearing.

¹⁵⁶ LA 286-7; cf. SS 205-18.

¹⁵⁷ LA 288; cf. SS 245-51.

¹⁵⁸ Perarnau finds Llull's argument in this passage unacceptable because it contradicts ordinary experience ("*Lo sisè seny*" 77).

Ultimately, however, Llull's argument is incomplete, because it fails to account for the power of appetite in animals or of will in humans to desire an object and of instinct in animals or cogitation in humans to judge that object, as usually recognized by the Schoolmen.¹⁵⁹ The link between motion, desire, and imagination is emphatic in Aristotle's *De anima* and plays a major role in the affective processes described there.¹⁶⁰ The *Libre de ànima racional* briefly notes that *affatus* stimulates bodily delights in the sensitive soul with the imagination.¹⁶¹ This comment presumably refers to the powers of cogitation or fantasizing that the imagination includes, but is too short to clarify the exact nature of the interaction between those powers. Overall, Llull's arguments regarding the interaction between *affatus* and the external or internal senses are only comprehensible as a series of comparisons between their respective functions: that is, all of his explanations constitute proportional analogies between the powers, objects, or media of *affatus* and those of the other senses. This analogy thereby defines a single role for *affatus* to play in both exteroceptive and interoceptive apprehension.

The validity of this definition ultimately depends upon the same Neoplatonic metaphysics of participation through resemblance that founds Llull's entire system.¹⁶² The operation of the senses, imagination, and intellect requires likeness in order to ensure the *multiplicatio* (in the Scholastic sense) of forms or species through the successive stages of internal conception or apprehension and external manifestation or reception that *affatus* includes. Llull defends the model of a *sensus agens* organized by his active and passive correlatives as necessary to ensure this participation of internal and external.¹⁶³ This participation implicitly constitutes the "communication" described in virtually all of the passages cited already.¹⁶⁴ An explicit example appears in the explanation of how speech is formed (*figurata*) and informed (*specificata*) between the internal

¹⁵⁹ E.g. Aquinas Ia.78,4 and 80,2.

¹⁶⁰ 3.10 433b27-30. On these processes, see Kathy Eden, *Poetic and Legal Fiction in the Aristotelian Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) 77.

¹⁶¹ 2.7.7. (ORL 21: 206).

¹⁶² See the excellent succinct explanation of Ruiz Simon, "De la naturalesa com a mescla" 81-3 and 90-93.

¹⁶³ See *Liber de possibili et impossibili* 3.2.5.6 (ROL 6: 421-2). The necessary bond created by the external and internal action of any being is indeed fundamental to Llull's entire metaphysics; see the excellent discussion by Charles Lohr, "Les fondements de la logique nouvelle de Raymond Lulle", *Raymond Lulle et le Pays d'Oc*, Cahiers de Fanjeaux 22 (Toulouse: Privat, 1987) 233-48 (esp. 240-7) and Walter W. Artus, "Ramon Llull, the Metaphysician", *Antonianum* 56 (1981): 715-49.

¹⁶⁴ Perarnau notes the importance accorded to this relationship, without attempting to explain it ("*Lo sisè seny*" 54).

mental and external verbal manifestation of a concept. Lull avers that natural appetite desires the manifestation made internally in order to be able to participate with another animal and to reveal its conception to it.¹⁶⁵ Aristotle suggests that every object of appetite is a real or apparent good and Lull describes an equally basic attraction using "elemental *exempla*".¹⁶⁶ However, he also attributes this innate attraction to the Divine Dignities that the speaker, listener, and language all bear. Lull explains that words proffered "under the sign" of the Dignities of *Bonitas*, *Magnitudo* and so forth are necessarily true, while false words necessarily arise "outside the sign" of the Dignities; moreover, words receive the Divine Dignity of *Virtus* just as plants or stones do.¹⁶⁷ This last analogy was a commonplace in Scholastic compendia of *distinctiones* and Lull cites it again in his *Rhetorica nova*.¹⁶⁸ It extends to language a basis for participation, like the comprehensive elemental composition already described for the "line of sensation", and thereby ensures that like knows like.

This communication between external corporeal and internal psychic powers allowed Lull to resolve gnoseological problems that vexed his Scholastic contemporaries.¹⁶⁹ The acute preoccupation with defining the exact connection between sensation and intellection surely contributed to Lull's insistence on imagination as an intermediary stage in his psychological model. We have already seen how *affatus* involves some of the apprehensive functions conventionally ascribed to imagination. The classification of speech as a sense allowed him to restore the continuity between external and internal senses that he lost by distributing them

¹⁶⁵ The Latin gives "naturalis appetitus desiderat manifestationem factam interius ut cum eo possit participare et ei suam conceptionem valeat propalare" (LA 280). The Catalan reads "apetit natural dezira la concepció que és feta dedins per so que ab él pusca partissipar e la sua concepció manifestar" (SS 19-22).

¹⁶⁶ *De an.* 3.10 433a27. Cf. *Liber lamentationis philosophiae* 7 (ROL 7: 111-12).

¹⁶⁷ *Ars brevis quae est de inventione iuris* 5.5 (ed. Wohlhaupter 196).

¹⁶⁸ Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale MS lat. 6443c, f. 105rb. Cf. e.g. Alan of Lille, *Liber in distinctionibus dictionum theologialium*, *Patrologia Latina* 210 (Paris: J.-P. Migne, 1855) cols. 685-1012 (at col. 1007, s.v. *virtus*).

¹⁶⁹ It proves nothing to mention, as Perarnau does ("*Lo sisè seny*" 50-1), the numerous treatises and commentaries *de anima* written by contemporary Scholastic masters: Lull also wrote various works on the soul. Comparison of his arguments and theirs does not indicate that Lull ignored the burning questions of his time, but rather that he regarded them differently: he considered as moral challenges to action questions that the schoolmen considered intellectual premises of study. Lull's arguments certainly demonstrate keen concern for the most fundamental issue of his era, the relationship between corporeal sensation and intellectual cognition. See the still useful account of Anton Pegis, *Saint Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1934) and the more recent studies cited by René Gauthier, "Le traité *De anima et de potentiis eius* d'un maître és arts (vers 1225). Introduction et texte critique", *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 66 (1982): 3-55.

between separate sensitive and imaginative souls.¹⁷⁰ In order to justify his classification, Llull strives to show how speech links the sensory and intellectual functions of the soul, and performs both apprehensive and expressive operations. But by stressing this cooperation of the internal and external or of the corporeal and spiritual, Llull necessarily elides the distinction between interoceptive and exteroceptive faculties or between internal and external discourse.

Nonetheless, Llull deemed that cooperation indispensable to the moral ends that speech should serve. Having examined in detail the physiological and psychological processes of sensation and cognition that *affatus* organizes, we may now turn to consider how those ends encouraged Llull to adapt those processes as he did in his "discovery" that speech functions as a sixth sense.

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¹⁷⁰ As L. Badia notes, *affatus* brings speech within the system of the Lullian Art; see Anthony Bonner and Lola Badia, *Ramon Llull: Vida, pensament i obra literària* (Barcelona: Empúries, 1988) 107.