
ABSTRACTS

The mediterranean region and NATO'S southern flank

This is the first in a series of three articles that will examine the mediterranean region in terms of western strategic interests.

This article specifically analyzes the southern flank of the North American Treaty Alliance (NATO) within the mediterranean geopolitical context. After defining the two elements that determine the cohesion of the region (the ocean and the presence of the two super-powers in the zone) the author goes on to discuss the flank itself.

This definition allows us to understand the geographical characteristics of the region (the largest and most dispersed of all the NATO zones) which directly affect the alliance's defensive organization. The importance of the region stems from the direct control it maintains over all mediterranean traffic from a military point of view as well as from a commercial perspective (petroleum-maritime corridor).

The southern flank finds itself threatened by the fragmentation resulting from internal conflicts as well as by the numerous and diverse defensive fronts. One of these, the eastern-turkish front, has been reappraised in the light of the unstable internal situation of recent years.

Alongside this lack of internal cohesion there exists a situation of subordination within the alliance. Given the policies developed by NATO based on the notion of a central european front, the southern region has traditionally been considered a peripheral zone. As viewed by the U.S. the southern flank is simply encompassed in the global mediterranean strategy. This position treats this passageway as merely one more element in a grand strategy of a global nature in which the ocean plays the role of «middle point» between the atlantic and the Middle eastern zone of «vital interest».

The day after...deployment

This article examines some of the deployment of the euromissiles. Two questions are posed in order to establish a framework for discussion: first, does the deployment of the euromissiles strengthen the security of western europe? and second, how does the deployment of these missiles influence the risk of nuclear war?

The answer to the first question is «no». Deployment doesn't strengthen the region's disuasive capability; and yet it adds to the risks faced by Europe if such disuasion is unsuccessful.

The second question draws our attention to what is known as the theory of «nuclear blackmail» which it clearly reinforces; and this merely encourages the tendency towards «proliferation». But in addition to this, the euromissiles mark the introduction of a new generation of nuclear weapons and systems. The characteristics of this new generation of weapons will only create conditions of strategic ins-

tability which in turn will only increase the risk of nuclear war.

It would certainly be preferable to avoid viewing these conditions in terms of traditional bi-polar politics, although one obviously cannot prevent this from occurring. The reader is free to do so, if he or she chooses; but the author wishes to emphasize that the arguments presented in this paper don't single out a «good guy» a «bad guy»; nor is there an «aggressor» or a «defender». Everything follows from what is the logic of «nuclear disuasion», as well as from the technical characteristics of the devices themselves.

Perhaps the greatest paradox of our times is that the disuasive deposits increase the risk of war more than they guarantee the security of western europe. In fact, in trying to avoid premeditated nuclear wars which are currently unfeasible, undesired nuclear wars might become feasible (although no less deadly).

December, 1983 - Epicenter of the crisis

In the first part of this article the author analyzes the crisis in relations between the two blocks. Particular attention is paid to the most acute manifestation of this crisis when in 1983 discussions between the U.S.A. and the USSR were completely broken off. The successive negotiations in progress at the time were also discontinued;

and, above all, the installation of the Pershing II and cruise missiles began in West Germany, Great Britain and Italy.

Nevertheless, the author believes that January 1984 marks the beginning of a period of de-escalation. There are various indicators to this effect, such as Reagan's re-election campaign this year; the ambiguity

of the soviet position owing to the absence of Andropov; the opening of the conference on disarmament in Europe (CDE); and the interview scheduled to take place between Gromyko and Schultz.

The article goes on to analyze the chronology and consequences of the failure of the INF negotiations, emphasizing the importance of the northamerican attitude in the evolution of events.

The author notes that efforts to establish a stable balance of forces

are relative. This is evident in the diversity of explanations as to why this project has been stalled, as well as the distinct factors or variables that must be taken into account when comparing the arsenals of both bands. The underlying question in negotiating isn't the «technical» pursuit of parity (which in fact exists but cannot be achieved absolutely) but the attitude and political disposition of the two super-powers.

Democratic recovery and relations with Latin America

In the conference given by Luis Yañez at CIDOB two main points were discussed: the appearance and recuperation of democracy in Latin America; and relations between Spain and Latin America.

The world economic crisis has affected Latin America in an special way. All the effects, however, have not been negative. In the political sphere there is intense popular pressure to achieve democracy and new modes of participation: Latin America enters the 1980s under the sign of pluralistic democracy. Nowadays this concept is not associated with communism by the bourgeoisie, nor is it equated with «continuismo» or «integrismo» by the left. The example of Spain's transition to democracy has played an important role in the rebirth of democratic ideas in Latin America.

Yañez undertakes a historical review of iberamerican —spanish relations since the colonial period and including: the process of in-

dependence, the Franco period in Spain (represented by theories of *hispanic identity*), etc; but in addition to these historical characteristics, there remains a cultural-linguistic heritage which includes idiosyncracies, a sense of solidarity and mutual closeness, as well as those factors contributing to socio-economic dependence and underdevelopment. These conditions together with the shift to democracy have paved the way towards new perspectives in spanish-latinamerican relations since 1977.

The author maintains the need to advance toward the concept of regional integration in the form of an iberamerican community of nations (not in the way outlined by the EEC in the treaty of Rome but with long term, concrete policies). In fact, there already exist a number of elements that define the framework for such policies: the spanish constitutional monarchy; our ties to regional iber-

ramerican organizations such as the OAS, CEPAL, SELA, ALADI, the Grupo Andino...; the principal of cooperation; and above all contributions in the cultural, technological, scientific, educational and communicative realms. In the authors opinion none of the above represent new forms of dependence or neocolonialism.

Yañez notes, however, that Spain has limited experience in this area. None of the initiatives taken were the product of any pre-existing policies. As a result there has been confusion and duplication in role

assigned. Neither the legislative initiatives, administrative structures nor the budget commitments sufficiently respond to the needed cooperation for development in Latin America. Paradoxically, Spain is the most country for the undertaking of such cooperation plans in Latin America.

In the author's word, «The strategic objective is the construction of an Latin American community of nations based on the principal of integration with cooperation being the most valuable tool with which to facilitate development».

The democratic state and the judicial question: the case of Argentina

This article attempts to explain the traditional mode in which the administration of justice has functioned in the argentinean republic. This mode of functioning is found to be bound to a conception of jurisprudence described as legalistic positivism expressed in the form of cryptic justice, removed from the social reality it has duty to comprehend.

In an effort expound on some alternative conception, reference is made to other contemporary perspectives which based on principal of law and jurisprudence, have emerged from diverse cultural experiences. These views question the belief in the judicial function as a power independent of the argentinean state in accordance with the classic tripartite concept. From this analysis a serious criticism, supported by abundant evidence, emerges of the highly regarded ju-

dicial «independence». A close look at said «independence» highlights the need to re-evaluate the concept with special emphasis on the service tradition the argentinean judges—as a body— have shown towards certain social interests.

The search for new channels undertaken in other cultural realms allows the author to suggest the possibility of finding ways to guarantee the necessary independence of judges. This guarantee would seem to be that of self or co-government of the judicial system, which in other countrys has achieved a somewhat different expression and application as well as different results, as one would logically expect.

This system of autor co-judicial government should be accompanied by a re-evaluation of the principal of association among argentinean judges which has always

been clearly understood to be the simple corporate expression adeptly disguised behind a mask of false apoliticism.

From the analysis of the various experiences in other cultural areas

a skeletal program emerges with which to advance a profound democratic reform of the argentinian justice system which will undoubtedly have to confront deeply entrenched problems.

The foreign policy of the Rumanian Communist Party

National interests are the focal point around which revolve foreign as well as national policies. According to the author this national interest has two significant components: economic development and national unity. Both are an integral part of the much broader concept of national sovereignty, avidly defended by the Rumanians.

The rumanian communist party boasts of having a central role in national and foreign decision making, although in reality it exercises its authority in internal policy matters in accordance with standards provided by the soviet model. In questions of foreign policy, however, Rumania diverges from the political line defined by the USSR whenever this line interferes with the nationalistic content of objectives pursued within the country.

This interpretation of the country's ideology is reflected in the concept rumanian leaders have of the norms that should govern relation with other countries. Nonetheless it should not be forgotten that Rumania is an integral part of the community of socialist countries and a member of the Varsovia Pact which imposes certain limits on the country's foreign policy conduct. All in all, Rumania is

quite autonomous in this respect, although its initial positions have changed owing to the evolution of international political realities as well as changes in the country's economic necessities.

Since 1965 two stages can be distinguished in the evolution of political events within the country: in the first, the national and foreign policies put forward by the communist party complemented each other. The process of national awareness was fostered by the presence of a more open cultural climate; internationally this awareness found its expression in the defense of the country's territorial integrity and national sovereignty. The development of the rumanian economy together with climate of détente at that time resulted in the forging of diplomatic relations with western countries. This in turn opened the door to important international commercial markets. This divergent posture, however, didn't provoke a direct response from the USSR, in that the constant strengthening of the role of party leaders nationally served as adequate compensation.

Nonetheless the rigidity of party structures, together with the impact of the international economic

crisis on the rumanian economy—given its foreign dependence—has modified the conduct of the country's politicians since 1974 (although this wasn't evident until 1979). In this second stage, then, economic problems, as well as the elevated foreign debt have brought the country closer to the Soviet Union. Currently, although Ceasescu keeps alive the traditional policy

of maintaining ties with all countries, while at the same time continuing to advocate disarmament and the development of a new international order, one can no longer talk of the union between national and foreign policy. The situation is quite the opposite: in the international sphere Rumania is trying to do what it can no longer achieve in the national arena.

Soviet international policy: mythes and reality

The history of soviet international policy is to a certain extent the history of how an atypical revolution (from the point of view of world-revolution theoreticians) gives rise to a normative model of world influence; at the same time it is the history of how the political, social and economic characteristics and dictates of a given historical moment in a given country become institutionalized in the laws and universal norms of social transformation.

From Stalin to Brezhnev all soviet foreign policy has evolved within the framework of fixed political and theoretical points of reference; and it has been guided by one immutable objective; the external consolidation of soviet state power, in its diverse forms, as func-

tion of the successive course of internal priorities as well as the correlation of forces in the international arena. Along side this exists the unvarying perspectiva of world hegemony that avoids direct confrontation. «Socialism is just one country», «peaceful co-existence», «detente», are different names for the same dynamic as understood by the soviet leaders who—ever since 1917—have stated their loyalty to a coherent political line (although not for the reasons they cite). The study of this coherence, of how it has continued adapting itself to international developments, as well as the impact it has had on the latter, is the basis sine qua non for an understanding of soviet foreign policy.