
ABSTRACTS

The crisis of the Missiles in Cuba: twenty years later

The crisis of the missiles in Cuba gave rise to a large set of analysis also in the strategic field as well as in the field of international policy. Twenty years later, interest and even polemics raise between sections close at one time during the last two decades in the elaboration of foreign policies in the U.S. An example for this is the «actualized» treatment of this crisis by experts of the subject such as Robert McNamara, Georges Kennan and others.

The shown interest among the specialists for the study of the crisis comes from the characteristics which came together: given the central part contributed to the nuclear capacity of the two parts in the conflict, the crisis exemplifies perfectly the bipolar character of the international system.

The policy of prestige, inherent in the move developed by a big power, plays a central part in cause and final development of the

crisis. The characteristics of the negotiating game undertaken in a hidden way between the two big powers in an atmosphere derived from the habits of the cold war will give place to the «diplomacy of bipolarity».

The installation of the red telex and the new atmosphere of coexistence between the «super-bigs» prove it.

The part of irrationality, derived from the nuclear element, central during the crisis, poses doubts concerning the capacity of any state to realize an effective defense. Therefore a climate of relative security between the two bigs and for the states in their entirety its established. A substantial climate, as the crisis exemplifies and as we shall experience late, for an international system based on predominance of the two powers whose force derives from an «irrational» factor: the nuclear over-capacity.

Contentious with Morocco and the strategic future of Spain

In spite the fact that the admission of Spain into NATO will mean, for the government, the «officialisation» of a new «enemy», the Varsovia Pact, it's true that orthodoxy of the Spanish foreign policy has been, and is still, to regard Morocco as the only country with which Spain can have, hypotheti-

cally, an armed conflict. Of the contentious that both countries have established the most important and tension-producing is that which stems from the sovereignty of Ceuta and Melilla, Spanish territories claimed by Morocco.

The objective of the study is the analysis of the circumstances sur-

rounding this contentious, considering specially those factors that merge in the Moroccan position. In this sense there are five fundamental aspects which together condition the Moroccan position and explain, in large part, the essence of what may be the immediate future. The consensus of the people and of the political forces of Morocco, aggravated by the war of the Sahara and which place this country in a context of permanent instability, close relations with the U.S. that openly supports the policy of Hassan; the accelerated process of rearmament that Morocco has followed since the beginning of the 70's and, finally, the Hassan II's pretensions convert the kingdom of Morocco into a country which is a regional leader or a police state.

Before this Moroccan panorama is an ambiguous Spanish foreign policy a fruit of the lack of a global vision in this region and of the inability of the Spanish political and intellectual class to understand the process of Moroccan national affirmation. Lamentably, the point of view which is favoured in Spain is centered basically on viewing the neighbour country as a «potential threat», with an awareness of its military more than of its political characters. Repeatedly the matter of Ceuta and Melilla has been singled out as the one serious problem that Spain has in area of foreign defense, without concerning the reduced vision that political treat-

ment would require to reduce or eradicate the bellicose aspects and connotations of the problem. In any case, both countries seem to take a hopeful stand; the resolution of the contentious is based on the diplomatic outcome which will derive from the decolonization of Gibraltar. It's a logical position, certainly, but one which retards unnecessarily the adoption of political and cultural measures and which would make impossible the escalation of tension due to the Spanish holdings on the African coast.

Indispensably, this treat of a conflict to which it's not possible to apply a typical solution of a Standard pattern of resolution, given that both countries have substantial arguments to uphold their positions. But it's precisely, as a results of this, of the existence of arguments, by which it will be possible to begin a broad dialogue, deemotionalising the polemic present and accepting the fact that both countries have a right to maintain their criteria. For both countries, the solution for this point of contentious would bring great advantages, political as well as economic and cultural. For Spain, speaking concretely, insolving the problem the hypothesis of threat would be left reduced to nothing, which would result in a radical reformulation of strategic plans and which would effect, without risks, a gradual and exemplary process of demilitarization and disarmament.

Use of armed force and Falklands-Malvinas case

Use of force is still used as a national policy tool when the other part in the conflict is hoped not to react or to be crushed by under a total attack (as in the Irak-Iran case). There is a worrying tendency to maintain that these armed actions are in defense of the law, in a *sui generis* resurrection of the *bellum iustum* doctrine. The efforts to reinforce the Principle of prohibition of the use or threat of force, as the special Committee created in 1977 for this task seem painfully useless if there is not an alternative method for solving the disputes. And the pacific solutions as negotiation are very difficult to implement due to the very logic of the strategic system: the coexistence of two Super-Powers tend to exacerbate the tensions favoring one of the parts.

The Malvinas-Falkland Case is atypical in this general scheme: both parts were siding the U.S.A.; the dispute did not affect any vital or strategic interest of the United Kingdom. Why war?

It might be sustained with sound reasons that the legal sovereignty over the islands belonged to Argentina, and that U.K. titles are poor, as has been recognized even by high diplomats of the Foreign Office; the main and undoutable fact was her pacific possession of the islands for 150 years. But acquisitive prescription, when protested by the other part as Argentina always did, is not a title by itself.

Nationalistic claim of the Malvinas was a way of keeping national unity between all the political groups of a progressively impoverishing and decaying country; and Argen-

tina Government exploited this feeling. Great Britain's attitude helped to the growing impatience among Argentinians.

London tried to put paramount the *kelpers'* rights over the wishes of Buenos Aires, maintaining that it was a case of self-determination, and *kelpers* desired to keep their status in connexion with United Kingdom. U.N. practice, however, as in Gibraltar's case, has showed that the General Assembly believed that small enclaves, with imported population, were a case of territorial integrity and not of self-determination, and only interests, and not right of these populations should be respected. Rights of the neighboring country were paramount. But London did not accept this point of view and footdragged negotiations for 17 years.

The strategic situation of the Falkland, controlling the Southern traffic of goods between Atlantic and Pacific, the 1991 end of the Panama Treaty, the potential wealth of oil, krill and polinodules have favorised «conspirative» explanations, suggesting U.S.A. participation in the outbreak of the invasion, due to its interest in a military base in the islands. Anyway, internal factors of the collapsing economy of Argentina.

The political pressure over the Junta, and in United Kingdom the desire of Mrs. Thatcher to show to the electorate her strength and to rally on the Falklands' case all the factions of the Conservative Party are, in my opinion, the main factors that have caused this old-fashioned war.

Mexico: Crisis and new Gouvern Ment

What will be shown here is that Mexico goes through a deep crisis of its development model following the pattern of accumulation of existing capital, a crisis which radiates in the critical situation of the world's capitalist system, of which its forms part as a country on the periphery of dependent capitalism.

This present conjuncture is the results of a process turning around an oligopolical domination of production with predominance of the big bank capital, related to a process of accumulation of capital strongly dependent on foreign countries. To this must be added a diagram of political domination based on the bureaucratic state subordination of waste organized sectors of urban and rural workers.

In a brief pursuite of some of the principale variable of the economic and social structure during the last years of the 70'es we can observe its cleary differing character. Mexico, land of manifold richness; with a spectacular increase of oil production and export, has a medium rate of rise in value, but an inflation which is much higher. The commercial deficit of the country is increasing and foreign investments are placed in strategic sectors of industry, at the same time as it is decapitalizing and salaries are loosing purchasing.

In this same years alternative projects are going to be outlined with regard to the society model wanted. On one hand, the impresarial, neoliberal, relatively homogeneous and always gaining more space in civilized society, approaching to the centres of political power. On the other hand popular projects which in some way or

another set up the need to strengthen the state and to increase the presence of the workers organized in it. In 1977 a political electoral reform takes place which permits a high presence of oppositional parties in the legislative power on a federal and state level. The main Parties are registered and channel their activities into established, legal ways. So it comes to the presidential and legislative federal election in July 1982, where is confirmed that the gouvernement party, PRI, goes on controlling fully the political state machinery. It is to stress that these elections are realised while the country goes through a deep crisis, pointed since the fall of the oil price in June 1981. Mexico decapitalizes quickly, there are big capital escapes, the banks is only oriented on the Dollar and speculates, etc. In February and August big devaluations take place and in September the banking is nationalized and exchange control established.

The views for the new gouvernement which takes up its duties in December 1982 are not very favorable and surely it will find itself forced to reformulate the present model with a large «rationality» in the management of the public cause, trying to move between running the economic crisis and running the social conflict. The big obligations of the foreign debt, the strong inequality in the distribution of the national income, the compromises signed with the FMI, the pressure of the social mouvement, etc., are some of the big challenges which are to face in sight of the immediate future.

Europe in the conquest of space (I)

The initiation of the operational phase of the rocket Ariane, in spite of its last minutes troubles, showed for the first time to the international public opinion the intensity of the labour realized since 1975 by the European Space Agency (ESA). The famous American weekly magazine «Time» could affirm that, for the first time Western Europe is able to defy the condominium of space of the Soviets and the Americans.

In the last seven years, the European Space Agency has completed, pending on the last corrections, the programme Ariane-I, which provides the eleven states of the ESA of an own satellite shuttle able to compete with the Soviet and American rockets in laying satellites in orbit around the Earth. It has collaborated in the American Space programme Post-Apollo fabricating the Spacelab which will travel in the Space Shuttle, actually tuned up in the United States. The ESA

has also realized numerous satellite shuttle of scientific satellites and satellites of application (meteorological, telecommunication, etcetera).

The actual European presence in space conquest is the result of more than two decades of efforts initiated in 1960 and 1961 by the works which, in 1962, lead to the constitution of the ESRO (European Space Research Organization) and the ELDO (European Launcher Development Organization), both organizations preceding the actual ESA.

The efforts of the ESRO and the ELDO, which had different luck, lead to the union of the European Space Conference, which took place in Brussels in December 1972 where the successes and failures obtained till that moment, were revised and the bases of a new European policy in the field of space were settled.