Habermas, modernidentity and human enhancement. Is the way forward?

The aim of this paper is threefold. First, the structure of Jürgen Habermas’ argument on human enhancement technologies shall be exposed in sections 1 and 2. In order to do so, this paper shall discompose Habermas’ argument in the following three parts, which will be taken to be its central pillars: a) designed people cannot self-conceive themselves as the sole authors of their lives; b) the Kantian distinction between objects and persons falls apart due to the way in which modified people experience their bodies; c) the relationship between parents and their modified offspring turns into an asymmetric one, so it is con- trary to the rules of communicative action. Secondly, several objections to Habermas’ claims shall be exposed in section 3, which is mainly conceived as a dialogue between Habermas and his critics.Thirdly, section 4 shall analyse the validity ofHabermas’ claims. It shall firmly argue that his position sheds light on the right way to analyse human enhance- ment technologies from a moral point of view.