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The Politics of Social Cohesion: Replies to Duarte, Lenard, Miklosi, and Parekh

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1. INTRODUCTION

Let me begin by thanking Melina Duarte, Patti Lenard, Zoltan Miklosi, and Serena Parekh for their insightful and thought-provoking comments on my book, *The Politics of Social Cohesion: Immigration, Community, and Justice*. Very briefly, in the book I discuss a common worry, namely that immigration poses a threat to social cohesion, and thus to the social unity that underpins cooperation, stable democratic institutions, and a robust welfare state. At the heart of this worry is the suggestion that social cohesion requires a shared identity at the societal level. As regards social cohesion, I focus in particular on generalized trust (trust in strangers) and redistributive solidarity. This is because these are generally thought to be especially important for the implementation of egalitarian justice.

I consider in greater detail the impact of immigration on social cohesion and egalitarian redistribution. First, I critically scrutinize an influential argument, according to which immigration leads to ethnic diversity, which again tends to undermine trust and solidarity, and thus the social basis for redistribution. According to this argument, immigration should be severely restricted. And second, I consider the suggestion that, in response to worries about immigration, states should promote a shared identity in their citizenry. I argue that the effects of immigration on social cohesion need not compromise social justice, and that core principles of liberty and equality not only form the normative basis for just policies of immigration and integration but, as a matter of empirical fact, are also the values that, if shared, are most likely to produce the social cohesion among community members that provides the social basis for implementing justice.

In her comments on my book, Lenard suggests that I overlook a particular condition for egalitarian redistribution in diverse societies, namely the role of national identity for the political inclusion of minorities. Duarte argues that I overlook certain obstacles to sustaining the welfare state which pertain to existing power asymmetries. Parekh likewise argues that I neglect an obstacle to equality, albeit this time global equality, namely structural racism and the risk of a backlash against equality-promoting liberal immigration policies. Finally, focusing more on the normative than on the empirical limits to my project, Miklosi scrutinizes my claim that liberal states are entitled to promote (shared) liberal values in the citizenry in the pursuit of social cohesion and equality. In the following, I reply to these concerns and objections in turn.

2. NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL INCLUSION: REPLY TO LENARD

In the third part of the book, I consider various political doctrines that differ in their account of the shared identity that best promotes social cohesion and egalitarian distribution, including nationalism, liberalism, and multiculturalism. Against nationalism, I argue at the normative level that we do not have stronger egalitarian obligations towards nationals than towards non-nationals, and furthermore that nationalist nation-building policies are in tension with basic commitments to liberty and equality. More importantly for present purposes, I critically engage at the empirical level with the so-called "national identity argument", according to which national identity promotes social cohesion in the form of generalized trust and solidarity, which again facilitates the implementation of egalitarian justice. The idea is that when people identify with other members of society on the basis of a shared national identity, they will also be more inclined to trust them and exhibit solidarity towards them. I argue, based on a survey of empirical studies, that there is no evidence that the cultural nation fosters social cohesion or redistribution.

However, Lenard suggests that in my discussion of the national identity argument, I neglect or at least play down the significance of national identity and social cohesion for political inclusion. Thus: "Holtug's rejection of the nationalist perspective—and choice to focus only on the role that trust plays in sustaining social welfare policies—ignores the fact that, for nationalists, the democratic benefit and the welfare state benefit travel together." More specifically, Lenard offers several arguments for why the political inclusion of minorities (political equality) is essential for support for welfare state policies and equal opportunities. Basically,

minorities can only fully advocate and secure their rights and claims to opportunities if they are able to participate in politics on equal terms, and only on these terms are they able to have (full) political agency, rather than (at best) being passive recipients of majority beneficence and good will. Indeed, as a matter of fact, it is only when minorities (and their allies) mobilize for accommodation, including multicultural accommodation, that progress is made in terms of equality for minorities.

According to Lenard, then, the case for claiming that national identity is a requirement for, or at least facilitates, a welfare state and egalitarian distribution consists not just in arguing that national identity promotes trust and support for redistribution, but also in arguing that by promoting trust it facilitates political inclusion, which again is important for the political negotiation of opportunities for minorities.

Importantly, the causal mechanisms involved in these two paths to equal opportunities are different. While they both involve the claim that national identity promotes trust, they then branch off, one proposing that trust and solidarity promote equal opportunities, the other proposing that trust facilitates political inclusion and thereby equal opportunities. Actually, perhaps the latter should not be thought of as a single path, but rather as several, because at times Lenard seems to focus on the impact of democratic input on *political negotiations and decisions* (for example: "minority citizens and residents can only fully advocate for the protection of their rights and privileges if they are included on equal terms in political decision-making"), and at other times she seems to focus on the impact of political inclusion on *attitudes* (including majority attitudes) towards redistribution (for example: "This story, which locates the source of the willingness to support welfare state policies in inclusive, democratic, politics, is absent from Holtug's book").

As Lenard anticipates, I agree and sympathize with many of the claims she makes. Thus I completely agree that (full) political inclusion, minority political agency, and multicultural accommodation are important concerns of justice. Since I spend long stretches of the book arguing for multiculturalism, let me here say a few words about political inclusion (and thus about agency). Lenard argues that in my conception of equal opportunities, I pay little or no attention to *political* opportunities. Now, for reasons I will return to, it is true that my main focus in the book is not on political participation, but I do in fact, as Lenard notes, include political opportunities in my conception of equality of opportunity, which I specify as concerning people's "equal opportunities for acquiring a range of goods, including offices and positions, income, education, health care, and for practicing their religion and culture" (Holtug 2021: 90). This covers political

offices and positions. Likewise, I argue that immigrants should have easy access to citizenship, not least because this is required for them to have full democratic rights (205-6).

In the rest of this section, I focus on three issues on which Lenard and I disagree (or at least I think we disagree). First, while this is perhaps the least interesting of the three, I think we differ on the significance that political inclusion is usually ascribed in the national identity argument. I do not have the space to go into this discussion here, but for illustration, in their presentation of the argument in "Testing the National Identity Argument", David Miller and Sundas Ali (2014: 239-41; cf. Miller 2017: 73-4) do not invoke political inclusion as part of the mechanism that takes us from national identity to a redistributive welfare state.[1]

Second, and more importantly, I think Lenard and I disagree about what the main obstacles to equal opportunities for immigrants are. Lenard stresses that "political inclusion is nearly always a prerequisite for achieving the kind of equality that Holtug defends". I agree that political inclusion is important, both for this reason and in its own right. Nevertheless, note that in contemporary liberal democracies, immigrant minorities are not absent from political life. They participate, make demands, run for office, are elected, engage in coalitions, etc. Clearly, they often face various obstacles to full participation, and the fact that this is so points to a grave injustice. Nevertheless, claims are made, coalitions are formed, etc., and they become part of the democratic process. But in many cases, majorities are unwilling to accommodate such claims that would further equal opportunities, whether they pertain to, say, religious symbols in the public sphere, family reunification, or social benefits for refugees. Even if immigrants were to achieve full political inclusion, I suspect that majorities would oftentimes deny them just accommodation, and being majorities, they would often have the power to do so.

Arguably, when majorities lack solidarity with immigrant minorities this is because, to a significant extent, they do not consider them part of their national in-group (Holtug 2021: chs. 3, 5, 7; Holtug and Uslaner 2021). Indeed, this is also a reason why majorities may be disinclined to allow them (full) political rights in the first place. When majorities consider minorities to be outsiders, who do not really or fully belong, they are also less likely to find them deserving and entitled to various forms of accommodation (Holtug 2021: 52-5; Larsen 2013; van Oorschott 2006). This is especially so insofar as the relevant minorities tend to be disproportionately located at the bottom of society, which may strengthen

1 Nevertheless, it is only fair to mention that Lenard (2012) has in her own work elaborated in considerable detail on the relation between national identity, trust, and democracy.

the impression of their out-group status, and also the perception that they are a threat to national majorities (Larsen 2013: 208-9, 215). Along such lines, even though African Americans have actively campaigned and mobilized for equal opportunities over the years, there is considerable white resistance to social welfare in the US, especially when it is perceived as going (disproportionately) to blacks (Gilens 1999). Many white Americans with a strong sense of national identity tend to construe Americans as white, Christian, English-speaking and native born, which leaves out African Americans, who are held to be undeserving (Theiss-Morse 2009).

Thus it seems to me that national in-group bias is perhaps a more important driver of inequality for immigrants than lack of political inclusion (important as this is).[2] Indeed, the former is a root cause of both immigrant inequality *and* political exclusion. In part, this is also why I focus more on the impact of national identity on trust and solidarity than on its impact on political inclusion; and why, in later chapters, I focus on the impact of societal identities that are more inclusive than nationalism. That said, I do agree with Lenard that minority inclusion in politics is important for the implementation of social justice (in addition to being required by such justice in the first place).

My third disagreement with Lenard concerns whether national identity does in fact tend to promote trust, solidarity, political inclusion, and egalitarian distributions. Lenard suggests that in the national identity argument, political inclusion and distributive equality "travel together". I have given some reasons to think that they involve importantly different causal mechanisms. Nevertheless, my argument in the book implies that they *fall* together. Both of the proposed causal paths rely on the claim that national identity promotes trust and, as stated above, I argue that the available empirical evidence does not support this claim. Rather, insofar as there is an effect of national identity on either trust or solidarity, it seems

2 Lenard mentions some examples of successful multicultural minority accommodation driven by minority political mobilization, but it is interesting that these are from countries that have (or at the time had) fully or partially embraced multiculturalism as part of their national narrative (Canada and the UK). As I argue in my book, a multicultural national narrative makes it easier for immigrants to be perceived as members of the national in-group, and therefore to have their claims for minority rights accommodated. In other countries, where national narratives are more exclusionary, political mobilization for minority accommodation is less likely to be successful, everything else being equal. (In Chapter 2 of the book this is illustrated with a comparison of Canada and the UK with Denmark, where nation-building is based on a combination of conservative nationalism and liberalism and multicultural policies have been adopted to a very limited degree. Thus, in 2010, Denmark scored 0.0 on Banting and Kymlicka's Multiculturalism Policy Index regarding immigrants.)

to be negative.[3] However, I shall not pursue this argument further here, as Lenard does not engage with the empirical evidence in her contribution to this volume.

Before I end this section, let me briefly comment on two further points that Lenard makes. The first is that in my discussion of the national identity argument, I treat immigrants as though they "are mere passive recipients of beneficence or largesse, and not political actors in their own right". However, my point is not that majorities should extend their solidarity towards and include immigrant minorities as a matter of beneficence or "largesse". Rather, they wrong immigrants and violate some basic requirements of justice if they don't. Lenard's second point is that I focus on minority integration and have little to say about claims for separation, which she attributes, at least in part, to my being concerned with immigrants as "newcomers". And indeed, the focus of my book is on the challenges that contemporary societies face, or the experience that they face, because of current patterns of immigration, where such immigrants generally aim for inclusion, not separation.

3. LIBERALISM AND PUBLIC REASON: REPLY TO MIKLOSI

In the book, I defend a version of liberal egalitarianism, and argue that it is on this basis that we should normatively assess both immigration and integration policies. Furthermore, I consider the impact of liberal institutions, distributions, and values on social cohesion (again, on generalized trust and solidarity in particular), and thus on the social basis for implementing egalitarian justice. As regards values, liberals tend to argue that a shared commitment to core liberal principles of liberty and equality provides an identity thick enough to sustain the level of social cohesion that is required to uphold a redistributive welfare state.

Based on, among other things, welfare regime theory and social capital theory, as well as available empirical studies, I argue that liberal institutions (and universal, social democratic welfare states in particular), egalitarian distributions, and shared liberal and multicultural values all tend to promote social cohesion. As regards shared liberal values, I suggest that these values, in virtue of their inclusive nature, have positive "boundary effects", where those who share them are more inclined to include immigrants and other minorities in their in-group.

3 Incidentally, in their own assessment of the available evidence, David Miller and Sundas Ali (2014: 257) conclude that "we have not been able to show that societies whose members have liberalized national identities are more likely to pursue redistributive policies and to have strong welfare states".

This raises the question of whether liberal states are entitled to pursue policies to maintain or raise the level of liberal values in the citizenry. In the book, I (briefly) raise the question of whether liberal democracies should abstain from promoting liberal values on the basis that, in a liberal society, people are free to form their own political views and should not be interfered with by the state in so doing (224). As Miklosi points out, I quickly dismiss such abstinence on the part of the state, suggesting that the state is entitled to promote liberal values such as "democracy, gender equality, religious toleration, equal opportunities for gays and ethnic minorities, for example in the educational system". However, as Miklosi argues, my dismissal may be too swift, not least in light of the concerns about state communication and policy justification raised by political liberals.

There are (at least) two kinds of restrictions that may be imposed on liberal states as regards their promotion of liberal values among their citizens. These pertain to, respectively, means and content. Liberals of all stripes will be skeptical of at least some of the means that could be employed to boost liberal values, and in particular insofar as they involve coercion or manipulation. However, liberals are more divided on the issue of content restrictions. In particular, *political* liberals may believe that any such activity would have to cater to reasonable pluralism, where people are wronged insofar as the state uses its power to promote values that are incompatible with their reasonable comprehensive doctrines. As Miklosi puts it:

> If the constellation of reasonable viewpoints that emerges under free institutions enjoys some normatively privileged status, as suggested by public reason liberalism, then it may be morally problematic to attempt to shift the balance of opinions towards one particular viewpoint through the (communicative) activities of the state.

For example, reasonable citizens will be divided over the extent to which justice requires egalitarian redistribution, and so (some) political liberals may consider it illegitimate for the state to promote (substantively) egalitarian values.[4]

Miklosi argues that a plausible form of public reason liberalism would not altogether abstain from the rational persuasion of citizens, as "it is not disrespectful to reasonable people, and it takes reasonable pluralism seriously, to engage with their evaluative viewpoints, at least if this is done in a certain manner". Nevertheless, he proposes a number of constraints

4 The qualification "some" is motivated by the thought that many political liberals may not consider this illegitimate, e.g. because they hold that the relevant content restriction does not apply to the promotion of values, or because they hold that it only applies to certain aspects of the political structure (as Rawls (1993) believed that it applies only to constitutional essentials).

on state promotion of values, including: (1) advocacy which involves emotional appeals rather than arguments and does not allow fair conditions for (proponents of) alternative viewpoints; (2) negative persuasion, which involves attempts to undermine alternative viewpoints; and (3) criticism of agents rather than the ideas they put forward.

I appreciate Miklosi's point that more needs to be said about the legitimacy of state promotion of values to underpin justice and social cohesion, in particular in response to political liberalism. Let me here just briefly provide two responses. First, as Miklosi points out himself, there may be aspects of liberalism that any comprehensive doctrine would have to comply with in order to qualify as reasonable. For example, it is arguable that any such doctrine would have to accept that persons, in an appropriate sense, have equal moral standing. Now, it may be suggested that this is a very minimal claim (and of course it is), but it may nevertheless play a role in social cohesion. As argued by Eric Uslaner (2002: 2-3), "trust is a fundamentally egalitarian ideal", and part of that ideal is the ideal of equal moral status. Individuals who consider other people their equals will also be more likely to trust them, and indeed to exhibit solidarity towards them. Therefore, even if we think that political liberalism imposes content restrictions on state promotion of liberal values, there may be (important) liberal values that are untouched by such restrictions.

However, it is also clear that some liberal values are not shared by all reasonable doctrines, including egalitarian distributive values. Furthermore, these may be important for social cohesion. Arguably, while a commitment to equal status expresses an inclusive attitude towards other people, a commitment to egalitarian redistribution expresses an even more inclusive attitude (I not only hold you to be my equal, I am also willing to share my resources with you if you are poor or even just worse off than I am). And insofar as the direct value effects of liberalism are due, wholly or in part, to the inclusiveness of these values (as indeed I argue in my book, 230-6), egalitarian distributive values can be expected to contribute to social cohesion.

Miklosi restricts his discussion to direct value effects, taking for granted that it is legitimate for liberal states to pursue liberal institutions and distributions. But note that the promotion of liberal values may also be important for institutional and distributional effects on social cohesion (Holtug 2021: 227-30). That is, liberal institutions and distributions can only be stably implemented in a democratic society insofar as liberal values are endorsed by a sufficient proportion of the electorate. Therefore liberal content restrictions may not only limit a state's capacity for promoting social cohesion and redistribution through value effects, but also through

institutional and distributional effects.

However, and this is my second response to Miklosi's challenge, my liberal inclinations are more towards robust (or comprehensive) liberalism than political liberalism. One reason for this can be explained by invoking what Miklosi calls the "public reason paradox". Consider a situation in which there will only be sufficient support for liberal policies if the state persuades some (otherwise skeptical) citizens of the virtues of certain liberal values, but where the values in question are ones over which there is reasonable disagreement. Suppose also that these policies are required for the state to treat its citizens justly—perhaps a sizeable proportion of the citizenry will otherwise (through no responsibility of their own) plunge into poverty. Given the public reason constraint, the state is then not morally permitted to do what is necessary to treat its citizens justly. My concern here is not so much with the "paradoxical" nature of the constraint, but with the people whose claim to justice will have to be sacrificed to uphold it. Indeed, assuming that the state could secure sufficient support without engaging in coercion or other illegitimate means, but simply by, say, the prime minister arguing rationally for the values in question, I fail to see much point in upholding the constraint.

Obviously, there is much more to be said here. Also, I am unsure how much Miklosi and I disagree. He does, after all, argue both that a liberal state is allowed (indeed required) to publicly state its reasons for its policies (including if they rely on controversial liberal egalitarian values), and that it is not disrespectful to reasonable people to engage with their views (provided that the above-mentioned restrictions are respected).

Nevertheless, let me very briefly mention another domain where comprehensive and political liberals tend to disagree, and where I believe the state is entitled to promote at least some liberal values on which reasonable people disagree, namely in the educational system.[5] Here, political liberals argue that citizenship education should include "promoting (in public schools and elsewhere) core liberal values" (Macedo 2000: 179), but these should be appropriately civic, respecting the fact of reasonable pluralism. Presumably, such values will include liberal toleration and mutual respect, where the latter may be cashed out as a form of "recognition respect", which is "owed to persons in virtue of their standing as free and equal citizens" (Neufeld 2013: 788).

Consider a case in which gay and lesbian teenagers are exposed to

5 To be fair, it is contested exactly how different comprehensive and political liberalism are in this regard (Macedo 2000; Neufeld 2013; Rawls 1993: 200).

shaming, defamation, and stereotyping in schools.[6] Toleration and recognition respect are important, but they do not preclude school children from harboring homophobic attitudes. And insofar as they do hold such attitudes, they will be more likely to engage in various forms of bullying. To get to the root of the problem, I believe that schools are justified in promoting more positive (or eliminating negative) attitudes towards gays and lesbians, and thus in promoting esteem recognition. Unlike recognition respect, esteem recognition involves increasing the appreciation of some undervalued group identities (and so not devaluing students *qua* gays and lesbians). This is so even if it would involve values on which, according to political liberals, there is reasonable disagreement (values that are, for example, rejected by some "reasonable" religious groups). These are values that go beyond tolerating sexual minorities.

To conclude this section, I believe there are ways in which liberal states can legitimately promote liberal values, and that they are more often justified in doing so than political liberals tend to think.

4. POWER RELATIONS AND SOCIAL COHESION: REPLY TO DUARTE

In the book, I consider the so-called "progressive's dilemma" in some detail. Very briefly (see sec. 3 of my Précis in this volume for greater detail), according to the relevant version of the progressive's dilemma, immigration leads to ethnic diversity, which reduces social cohesion (generalized trust and solidarity in particular) and thus undermines the social basis for egalitarian redistribution. On this basis, some conclude that immigration should be (severely) restricted. I critically examine two important premises in this argument, one empirical and the other normative. The first of these premises is the claim that ethnic diversity drives down generalized trust and solidarity. On the basis of a survey of empirical studies of the impact of diversity on social cohesion, I point out that the evidence for negative effects is inconclusive. Furthermore, I argue that there are certain factors that moderate the relationship between diversity and social cohesion, namely "contact, equality, public discourses, institutional design, nation-building, and various policies related to integration" (154). These are factors that, to a considerable extent, are under the control of the state and so can be used to limit any negative effects on social cohesion that

6 Studies suggest that LGBTQ+ youths experience elevated levels of "emotional distress, symptoms related to mood and anxiety disorders, self-harm, suicidal ideation, and suicidal behavior", which is related to the presence of "chronic stressors related to their stigmatized identities, including victimization, prejudice, and discrimination" (Russell and Fish 2016).

immigration might otherwise have had.

The second premise of the argument I consider is that equality has domestic scope only. Against this, I argue that, in fact, equality has global scope. And I argue that more open borders have a role to play in the promotion of global equality. Thus I question two crucial premises in the anti-immigration argument under consideration.

Duarte challenges my response to the progressive's dilemma. In particular, she argues that "Holtug risks overlooking the influence of existing social hierarchies and power imbalances in affecting how social cohesion is shaped and maintained", which is construed as a problem for the "framework" I employ to address the dilemma. In fact, I agree with Duarte that fighting social hierarchies of various kinds, including power hierarchies, is highly important for social cohesion and social justice. Indeed, as also pointed out in my response to Miklosi, I argue that social cohesion is dependent on a conception of the equal status of persons, which is opposed to social hierarchies of various kinds. Viewing other members of society as one's equals precludes believing that one is entitled to power, or to opportunities for power, that they can legitimately be denied. More generally, I argue for liberal values that reject morally arbitrary distinctions between groups as a basis for unequal advantages and seek to equalize opportunities between them, and furthermore argue that these are also the values that, if shared, are most conducive to social cohesion.

Before I get into the details of Duarte's argument, I want to point to a couple of ways in which she slightly misrepresents my position, which may lead to confusion about what my argument is. First, according to Duarte, my "solution" to the progressive's dilemma "consists in the promotion of an overarching identity transcending national identities that is based on shared liberal values". While I do indeed argue, based on empirical studies, that building a communal identity on liberal and multicultural values can be expected to have a positive impact on trust and solidarity, I also argue that, as stated above, the evidence for negative impacts of diversity on trust and solidarity is inconclusive, and that, apart from liberal and multicultural community values, other factors such as institutional designs (and in particular universal welfare states), socioeconomic equality, out-group contact, public discourses, and integration policies are important for social cohesion in diverse societies. Thus shared communal values are by no means supposed to do all the work in my argument that Duarte ascribes to them.

Second, Duarte describes me as belonging to a Tocquevillian tradition of social capital research, of which Robert Putnam (2000) is the best-known

contemporary member, whereas in the book I explain why I do not find this a particularly plausible approach to social cohesion (55-6). Rather, my account relies to a considerable degree on what I call the "institutional model" of trust and solidarity, as transpires from my emphasis on institutional designs above (57-8, 62-5, 138-9, 146-7, 227-9), as well as on the significance of socioeconomic equality and out-group contact.

In fleshing out her claim about my neglect of power asymmetries, Duarte distinguishes between two ways in which these are important for the discussion, namely "invisible contributions" and "asymmetric relations". Invisible contributions pertain to "marginalized immigrants contributing more to achieving common benefits, because their contributions might not be fully recognized or accounted for in a framework that conceives sharedness as external to their own premises".

I agree with Duarte that contributions to collective goals from marginalized groups, including immigrants, may often go unnoticed. The question is why this should be seen as a problem for my framework. One suggestion Duarte makes is that it may be problematic if "some groups are required (or allowed) to invest more than others to obtain the benefits available to everyone". However, it is difficult to see why this problem would be an implication of my framework. Rather, it is incompatible with it. This is because if some are required to work harder or "invest more" in order to achieve an equal level of advantages, then this seems to be a paradigmatic case of people having *unequal* opportunities.

Another suggestion Duarte makes, in analyzing invisible contributions, is that immigrants may be less likely to benefit "from a cohesive 'we' in ways that are proportionate". Here the focus is not so much on differences in the effort required, but more on inequality in shares of the advantages obtained. However, if people obtain unequal shares, the implication is that they do not have equal opportunities, everything else being equal. And so it is difficult to see how such "unproportionate benefits" could be an implication of my framework.

Duarte may suggest that even if my normative framework would not prescribe unequal opportunities, community-building based on shared liberal and multicultural values *would* lead to unequal opportunities, and so cannot be prescribed by my normative framework. The objection would then be that there is an internal tension in my account, namely between the normative framework I employ and (one of) the strategies proposed to implement it, namely community-building. In particular, shared liberal and multicultural values, or policies to promote them, would threaten equality and especially the standing or advantages of immigrants. Against this, in the book (chs. 8-9), I consider the available empirical evidence

regarding the impact of shared liberal and multicultural values on trust and solidarity in a great deal of detail, and find that they are conducive to social cohesion, *especially* trust in, and solidarity with, immigrants.

Nevertheless, Duarte may argue that the problem is not so much with liberal and multicultural values *per se*, but with the particular adaptation thereof that is likely in a society where power structures favor natives over, in particular, marginalized immigrants. Thus there is a real risk that in this process, liberal values will be tainted and applied in ways that benefit majorities at the expense of minorities. Of course, to some extent this has always been the case. When the Declaration of Independence was adopted, stating that "all men are created equal", this was taken to somehow not include Native Americans or African slaves. Indeed, as Charles Mills (2017: 10) puts it, liberalism "has historically been complicit with plutocracy, patriarchy, and white supremacy", although "this complicity is a contingent function of dominant group interests rather than the result of an immanent conceptual logic".

Obviously, I do not want to claim that *any* interpretation and institutional implementation of liberal and multicultural values will be equally favorable for natives and immigrants (but then, not all interpretations and implementations express these values equally well). And I agree with Duarte that an important aspect of how these values are cashed out and institutionalized pertains to the extent to which immigrants are included on an equal basis in political processes. In part, this is because immigrants' expressions of their interests and claims are important for securing that they are equally accommodated. Indeed, social cohesion is dependent on a conception of the equal status of persons, which is opposed to social hierarchies of various kinds.

Importantly, as pointed out in my response to Lenard, immigrants are a minority, and so even if they are included as equals in political processes there is no guarantee that their interests are going to be equally accommodated, including in the interpretation and implementation of liberal and multicultural values. Indeed, there is no set of values that we could appeal to that would guarantee that. Nevertheless, I do want to suggest that equal accommodation is more likely insofar as the values on which a community is based are ones that explicitly aim at such accommodation, such as those proposed in my book.

Another strand in Duarte's criticism, which is related to her claim about disproportionate benefits, pertains to my account of the currency of egalitarian justice. According to Duarte, my "focus is limited to cultural and religious resources and opportunities, and the neglect of power-driven relations … leads [me] to overlook possible inequitable outcomes in the

distribution of benefits of social capital to everyone outside this restricted scope". Actually, my focus is not restricted to cultural and religious resources and opportunities. As pointed out in my response to Lenard, in my discussion of equality of opportunity, I take this principle to concern individuals' opportunities for "acquiring a range of goods, including offices and positions, income, education, health care, and for practising their religion and culture" (90). In fact, in my discussion of the progressive's dilemma, I am primarily concerned with socioeconomic equality, simply because this is what, according to the dilemma, diversity is supposed to drive down. My discussion of the dilemma, then, does not reflect everything I think is important about justice. Rather, in a more limited way, I argue that diversity need not drive down solidarity or, for that reason, socioeconomic equality, contrary to what is claimed by those who invoke (the sociological version of) the dilemma.

By implication, my focus is not so much on power imbalances or political justice when discussing the progressive's dilemma, but on distributive justice. This brings me to the second aspect of Duarte's criticism, which pertains to asymmetric relations. Duarte's point is that, whether or not immigrants share liberal values, "historically and contextually, these are values that they second and do not author". Thus, if community-building is based on them, "marginalized immigrants risk being permanently locked into a position of being apprentices of these values".

There is no reason to think that immigrants, including non-Western immigrants, are in general less supportive of liberal political values than are natives (see e.g. Breidahl 2019). And indeed, immigrants often make claims for accommodation on the basis of values such as freedom of religion and equality of opportunity. In fact, in such cases, natives are more likely than immigrants not to support the requirements of liberalism. However, Duarte's point may be not so much about the extent to which non-Western immigrants actually hold liberal values, but the extent to which they are seen to do so by natives and can see themselves as "authors" of them. Therefore a shared identity based on liberal and multicultural values may in reality tend to exclude rather than include immigrants, both from the perspective of natives and from the perspective of immigrants themselves.

It seems plausible that political inclusion on an equal footing in negotiating a societal identity is probably important for a sense of equal inclusion in that identity, along with the extent to which it equally caters to the interests of one's group. This, then, is a further reason why equal standing is conducive to social cohesion. When it comes to the perception,

among natives in a liberal democracy, that immigrants share a communal identity with them, such a perception is more likely insofar as the identity in question is an inclusive liberal one than if, say, it is a national identity that requires the sharing of a national culture. Furthermore, as pointed out above, there is empirical evidence suggesting that liberals and multiculturalists are more likely than others to see immigrants as part of their in-group. Additionally, policymakers may aim not only to promote shared liberal and multicultural values, but also to dismantle misconceptions about the extent to which such values are shared by immigrants. And finally, whatever exclusionary effects native perceptions of immigrant illiberalism may have, it is not clear that these are effects of community-building efforts based on liberal values, rather than simply of natives taking immigrants not to hold liberal values.

While I agree with Duarte that the full and equal political inclusion of immigrant minorities has an important role to play in the negotiation of communal identities, such inclusion does not come easily, for reasons I also referred to in my discussion of Lenard's contribution. In fact, the mechanisms that may, for example, taint the negotiation of liberal community values are also the very mechanisms that may obstruct the equal political inclusion of immigrant minorities. Thus political inclusion is not a "solution" to the problems at hand that bypass the obstacles faced by liberal community-building.

5. IMMIGRATION, GLOBAL EQUALITY, AND STRUCTURAL RACISM: REPLY TO PAREKH

As pointed out above, I argue that equality has global scope, and this is one of the ways in which I challenge (the sociological version of) the progressive's dilemma. This opens the door for liberal immigration policies. Since equality has global scope and, at least up to a point, migration tends to promote global equality, less restrictive immigration policies can be pursued without sacrificing the kind of equality that ultimately matters (indeed, it may *promote* such equality). However, Parekh argues that in my discussion of feasibility constraints pertaining to liberal immigration policies, I provide only a partial account of the roots of anti-immigration attitudes, and therefore I underestimate the problem of backlash. In particular, I neglect the significance of structural racism.

Before I address this objection, let me first point out that I am not quite as optimistic regarding the consequences of immigration and immigration policy for social cohesion and domestic and global equality as Parekh

suggests in her contribution. To explain this, let me first distinguish between three different versions of the progressive's dilemma:

> *Sociological version*. Immigration drives down social cohesion, in particular generalized trust and solidarity, and therefore the social basis for a welfare state and egalitarian redistribution.
>
> *Economic version*. Extensive welfare states tend to attract low-skilled immigrant labor, which is costly to the welfare state, thus diminishing levels of social benefits, healthcare, education, etc.
>
> *Political version*. Liberal immigration policies are unpopular with voters, and so any liberal government that tries to implement them will face a backlash, thus threatening both liberal immigration policies and liberal egalitarian social policies.

My concern in the book is primarily with the sociological version (it is, after all, a book about social cohesion), although I do have a bit to say about the two other versions as well. The first respect in which I am less optimistic than Parekh suggests is precisely that, even if I have tackled the sociological version, this still leaves the two other versions. And, in fact, economic and political concerns are part of the reason why I argue that there are limits to how much global equality can be promoted through immigration policies (thus requiring additional policies to promote this aim). Insofar as immigration becomes a net economic burden for a state, perhaps after significantly increasing its intake from its present level, a trade-off between immigration and other ways of promoting global equality is required. And there may be limits to how much immigration voters are willing to condone, even after institutional and other efforts have been made to secure support for immigration. That said, I nevertheless argue that immigration policy (more open borders) has a role to play in the promotion of global equality.

A second respect in which I am less optimistic than Parekh suggests is when she attributes to me the view that "diversity doesn't impact social cohesion, and may even have a positive impact". I actually don't deny that there are conditions under which diversity is likely to negatively affect social cohesion. Germany in the 1930s and 1940s and Rwanda in the 1990s are good examples of this. My claim is rather that the impact is contextual and that there are things that states can do to prevent or diminish any negative impact that diversity might otherwise have had.

The third respect in which I am less optimistic pertains to the impact of policies to promote more inclusive identities on social cohesion and attitudes to immigration. While I argue that inclusive identities do have a

positive impact, I don't make any precise judgments about the size of this impact. Nevertheless, as I also emphasize in my response to Duarte, shared values are by no means supposed to do all, or even most of the work of promoting social cohesion under conditions of diversity.

I turn now to Parekh's claim that I underestimate the feasibility constraint imposed by the problem of a backlash against immigrants, and specifically the claim that structural racism is an important driver of such a backlash. In fact, I agree with Parekh that backlash is a significant threat to liberal immigration policies, as illustrated by support for authoritarian populist parties, triggered by (among other things) anti-immigrant attitudes, and which has led, for example, to the election of Trump in the US in 2016 and 2024 (Norris and Inglehart 2019). I also agree that structural racism is an important driver of such backlash.

One reason I do not comprehensively address backlash against liberal immigration policies in the book is that my primary concern is the sociological rather than the political version of the progressive's dilemma. In the sociological version, the focus is not so much on whether native support for liberal immigration policies can be upheld over time, but on whether immigration drives down trust and the form of solidarity required for egalitarian redistribution in the welfare state.

Now, I believe that structural racism is important not just for attitudes to immigration but also for social cohesion. Parekh adopts a definition according to which structural racism refers to "social, economic, or political inequalities disproportionally affecting a racialized group". And indeed, structural racism is ingrained in economic and other forms of inequality, institutional designs, segregation, and perceptions of various attributes, including deservingness, work ethic, and proneness to crime. Parekh then argues that while identity may play a role in biases, the causal driver of racial inequality and the backlash against immigration is structural racism. Therefore "we cannot eliminate the negative attitudes that lead to backlash without also considering structural racism". In particular, community-building based on inclusive liberal and multicultural values will not suffice.

However, to reiterate, community-building by no means stands alone in my account of how to promote social cohesion and equality. I argue that institutions shape out-group relations, including trust and solidarity, and that, in particular, institutions that are (and are perceived to be) fair and impartial positively impact such relations (Holtug 2021: 57-8, 63-5, 138-9, 146-7; Larsen 2008; Rothstein and Stolle 2003). Thus institutions that harbor structural racism are detrimental to intergroup relations, including solidarity with immigrants.

Likewise, I argue that socioeconomic inequality is bad for out-group relations and is tied up with perceptions of race and diversity in ways that tend to reduce intergroup solidarity (52-3, 66-7, 137-8, 145-6). Furthermore, I argue that racial and ethnic segregation harms minorities and majority perceptions of racial and ethnic out-groups, because it reduces beneficial forms of contact between groups (57, 135-7, 145; cf. Anderson 2008). So when Parekh refers to segregation as "the lynchpin of structural racism", this does not point to a discrepancy in our respective accounts. Also, while I cannot go further into it here, I argue that public discourses and integration policies play a role. Incidentally, these factors will in many cases interact with patterns of in-group identification, and thus with social identity. For example, inequality and segregation are detrimental, both to the perception that racial and ethnic minorities are full members of the society in question, and to intergroup identification.

To sum up, I don't think there are any deep disagreements between Parekh and myself on the issues discussed above. A slight disagreement, perhaps, pertains to the causal primacy that Parekh attributes to structural racism over biases in explaining injustice and backlash ("racial bias is the *effect*, not the *cause*, of racial inequalities and injustices"). Here I am more inclined towards the view that these are factors that can mutually impact each other, and that different cases may require different types of causal explanations. Consider again, for example, the persistent inequality between African Americans and white Americans in the US. Arguably, part of the reason why these inequalities are allowed to persist is white resistance to welfare, especially welfare that is perceived as going disproportionately to African Americans, as well as other policies that may benefit Blacks (Gilens 1999). This resistance is again triggered, at least in part, by white in-group identification and bias (Jardina 2019), which is at least sometimes tied up with notions of American national identity being white (Theiss-Morse 2009).

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