

THE WAR OF THE TWO PEDROS (1356-1366): ARAGON'S SUCCESSFUL ADMINISTRATIVE STRATEGY OF ASYMMETRICAL DEFENSE

DONALD J. KAGAY
ALBANY STATE UNIVERSITY
USA

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ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the general strategy of defense developed by the Aragonese king, Pere III "the Cerimonious" during the War of the Two Pedros (1356-1366) between the Crown of Aragon and Castile ruled by Pedro I "the Cruel". By an asymmetrical form of defense using feudal and mercenary troops, Pere was able to wait out his "principal adversary" and bring the war to a successful conclusion: survival. Pere's crisis military administration and financing ultimately pointed to institutional changes that would come into full existence with the "united" Spain of the later fifteenth century.¹

KEY WORDS

Pere III of Aragon, Crown of Aragon, medieval military strategy.

CAPITALIA VERBA

Petrus III Aragonum Rex, Corona Aragoniae, Scientia belli Medii Aevi.

1. I would like to thank the anonymous readers of this paper whose insightful and often quite frank comments have helped materially in bringing it to publication. Used abbreviations: ACA, Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó.

According to the principal military theorist of the nineteenth century, Carl von Clausewitz, war should never be viewed as having a life of its own, separate from the state. It should rather be understood as a “continuation of [state] policy with other means².” Contemporary intelligence analyst, Robert O’Connell, would agree, assuring us that “war is not simply armed violence... [but rather] a specific institution premeditated and directed by some form of governmental structure.”³

In theory, most writers on military affairs in the medieval era would accept the truth of these statements. Honoré Bonet, for one, firmly believed that “no man should, or may, bear arms without the permission of the prince⁴”. On the other hand, Bonet and his kind were only too aware of the decentralized military realities of their own day which often seemed to have more in common with blood feud and riot than organized, state-directed military operations.⁵ At the end of the medieval period, the great Florentine humanist and historian, Niccolò Machiavelli, also recognized the chaotic and futile nature of much medieval warfare which he disdainfully characterized as a “rapacious, fraudulent, and cruel [regime conducted] by those... who make a trade of war.”⁶

The chaos exhibited in medieval warfare has often led modern scholars to downplay or even ignore the administrative scaffolding for war set up by rulers of all sorts across Europe, men whom Gerald Harriss classified as both “warriors and justiciars.”⁷ To assess both the methods and effectiveness of the state in what one historian has called “the organization of war,”⁸ this paper will focus on the long conflict of the mid-fourteenth century called by later historians the War of the Two Pedros (1356-1366).⁹ This disastrous struggle was fought between

2. von Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Michael Howard, Peter Paret, eds. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984: 69-102; Paret, Peter. *Clausewitz and the State: The Man His Theories and His Times*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976: 382-383; Howard, Michael. *Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983: 36 (reprint in 2002).

3. O’Connell, Robert L. *Ride of the Second Horsemen: The Birth and Death of War*. New York: Diane Pub Company, 1995: 225.

4. *The Tree of Battles of Honoré Bonet*, ed. George William. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1949: 129; Kaeuper, Richard W. *Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999: 98.

5. *Tree of Battles of Honoré Bonet...*: 189; Kaeuper, Richard W. *Chivalry and Violence...*: 185; Wright, Nicholas. *Knights and Peasants: The Hundred Years War in the French Countryside*. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1998: 9-11.

6. Machiavelli, Niccolò. *The Art of War*, Ellis Farnsworth, ed. New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1965: I, 15; Viroli, Maurizio. *Machiavelli*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998: 54.

7. Harriss, Gerald. “Political Society and the Growth of Government in Late Medieval England”. *Past and Present*, 138 (1993): 32.

8. Hewitt, Herbert J. “The Organisation of War”, *The Hundred Years War*, Kenneth Fowler, ed. London: Macmillan, 1971: 75-95.

9. The recent historiography on the War of the Two Pedros is immense. Major works on the strategical and tactical developments associated with the conflict include: Máximo, Diago Hernando. “El final de la guerra de los dos Pedros y sus efectos sobre el escenario político regional soriano en la segunda mitad del siglo XIV”. *Celtiberia*, 48/92 (1998): 125-56; Lafuente, Mario. “Que parezca que ciudad es: la fortificación de Zaragoza en la guerra de los Dos Pedros (1356-1366)”, *Construir la ciudad en la Edad Media*, Beatriz Ariaga, Jesús Ángel Solórzano, coords. Logroño: Instituto de Estudios Riojanos, 2010:



two very different sovereigns, Pedro I of Castile (1350-1366/69), a brutal warrior comparable in skill with his re-conquest predecessors,¹⁰ and Pere III of Aragon (1336-1387), whose minimal achievements on the battlefield were far outweighed by his accomplishments as a military executive¹¹.

571-600; Pont, Antonio Ramón. "El infante don Fernando, señor de Orihuela en la guerra de los dos Pedros (1356-1363)". *Anales de la Universidad de Alicante. Historia medieval*, 2 (1983): 63-92; Sáiz, Jorge. "Una clientela militar entre la Corona de Aragón y Castilla a fines del siglo XIV: caballeros de casa y vasallos de Alfons d'Aragó, conde de Denia y marqués de Villena". *En la España Medieval*, 29 (2006): 97-134; Sánchez, Manuel. "Un episodio de la Guerra de los Dos Pedros: la defensa costera de Cataluña en el verano de 1365". *Poder y sociedad en la Baja Media hispánica: Estudios en homenaje al profesor Luis Vicente Díaz Martín*, Carlos Manuel Reglero, ed. Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 2002: I, 273-288; Zuco, Luis. "La guerra de los dos Pedros: Castilla contra Aragón". *Arqueología, historia y viajes sobre el mundo medieval*, 33 (2009): 30-41. Works concerning the Iberian diplomacy of the period include: Becerra, Manuel. "La corona de Aragón y Granada durante la Guerra de los dos Pedros, 1356-1366. El corso", *IV coloquio de historia medieval andaluza: Relaciones exteriores del reino de Granada*, Cristina Segura, ed. Almería: Instituto de Estudios Almerienses, 1988: 307-321; Becerra, Manuel. "Las relaciones diplomáticas entre la Corona de Aragón y Granada durante la Guerra de los Dos Pedros: desde 1356 hasta 1359". *Acta historica et archaeologica mediaevalia*, 9 (1988): 243-260; Muñoz, María. "Preliminares de la guerra de los dos Pedros en el reino de Valencia (1356)". *Anales de la Universidad de Alicante. Historia medieval*, 1 (1982): 117-134; Zabalo, Francisco Javier. "Participación navarra en la guerra de los dos Pedros: la expedición a Murviedro de 1363". *Príncipe de Viana*, 2-3 (1986): 777-784. Works concerning the effect of the decade of conflicts on the region's economies include: Cabezuelo, José Vicente. "Un ejemplo de reactivación económicas en tierras valencianas tras la Guerra de los Dos Pedros: la concesión de una feria al Alcoy en 1366". *Alebus: Cuadernos de estudios históricos del Valle de Elda*, 1 (1991): 125-136; López, María Dolores. "Las repercusiones económicas de la guerra de los dos Pedros en las aljamas musulmanas aragonesas: el caso de Escatrón y Alborge". *De mudéjares a moriscos: una conversión forzada*, 1 (2003): 211-228; Lafuente, Mario; Martínez, Sergio. "Ejército y fiscalidad en la encomienda santiaguista de Montalbán (Aragón durante la guerra de los dos Pedros (1356-1366))". *Espacio, tiempo y forma. Serie III, Historia medieval*, 24 (2011): 109-142; Sarasa, Esteban. "La financiación de las tropas castellanas de Don Enrique de Trastámara en su intervención en favor del Rey de Aragón en la guerra de los dos Pedros", *Estudios en homenaje a Don Claudio Sánchez Albornoz en sus 90 años*. Buenos Aires: Instituto de Historia de España, 1983: IV, 529-534. Works concerning the effect of the decade of conflicts on the region's society include: Cabezuelo, José Vicente. "Las comunidades judías del mediodía valenciano en el siglo XIV. De la vitalidad a la supervivencia". *Miscelánea medieval murciana*, 29-30 (2005-2006): 75-104; Campón, Júlia. "Consecuencia de la Guerra de los Dos Pedros en el Condado de Denia". *Anales de la Universidad de Alicante. Historia medieval*, 8 (1990-1991): 57-68; Lafuente, Mario. "Aproximación a las condiciones de vida en Daroca y su entorno durante la Guerra de los Dos Pedros (1356-1366)". *Studium: Revista de humanidades*, 15 (2009): 53-87; Lafuente, Mario. "Comportamientos sociales ante la violencia bélica en Aragón durante las guerras con Castilla (1356-1375)". *Historia, instituciones, documentos*, 35 (2008): 241-68.

10. Estow, Clara. *Pedro the Cruel of Castile, 1350-1369*. Leiden: Brill, 1995; Villalon, Andrew. "Pedro the Cruel: Portrait of a Royal Failure", *Medieval Iberia: Essays on the History and Literature of Medieval Spain*, Donald J. Kagay, Joseph T. Snow, eds. New York: Peter Lang, 1997: 201-216.

11. Tasis, Rafael. *Pere el Cerimoniós i els seus fills*. Barcelona: Vicens Vives, 1957; Cohen, David A. "Secular Pragmatism and Thinking About War in Some Court Writings of Pere III el Cerimoniós", *Crusaders, Condottieri, and Cannon: Medieval Warfare Around the Mediterranean*, Donald J. Kagay, Andrew Villalon, ed. Leiden: Brill, 2003: 19-56.



I

The geographical environment in which these two Iberian kings faced off against each other would test their skills as both military commanders and survivors. The two principal arenas of the Iberian war—the Valencian frontier opposite Murcia and the Aragonese borderland across from Cuenca—was some of the bleakest scrub land in the Peninsula¹². Though Castilian armies raided this flat and open territory with great frequency during the war, they showed little real interest in annexing it. The real focus of the invaders was rather the urban “oases” formed by such prosperous cities as Calatayud, Teruel, Elche, Orihuela, and Alicante as well as the myriad of “hamlets” (*aldeas*) that clustered around them.¹³

A military contest fought on such barren frontiers for the capture or defense of such municipalities becomes understandable if the Iberian attachment to these sites is taken into consideration. As Helen Nader has observed, very few Castilians lived outside urban centers and even those who farmed for a living “lived in towns and walked to their fields.”¹⁴ Much the same could be said of Aragon and the southern districts of Valencia which Teófilo Ruiz has described as “semi-urban islands in a sea of rural communities.”¹⁵ This same attachment to urban centers would become apparent in Spain's capture of the Americas. Thus though crossing vast distances, the first wave of *conquistadores* took their principal mission to be both the subjugation of Indian settlements and the foundation of permanent, organized towns.¹⁶

When armies massed on either side of the Iberian frontiers, they were commanded by the monarch himself or by a trusted “lieutenant” (*locumtenens*, *lugarteniente*), normally one of the princes. In Catalonia, at least, a military intermediary, the *seneschal*, relayed orders to the troops and drew them up in the proper formation.¹⁷ A number of parliamentary texts dated between 1356 and 1363 discuss the composition of the Aragonese forces. They reveal that military units throughout the Crown of Aragon during the Castilian war were divided between “heavy cavalry” (*cavall armat*, *caballo armado*) and “light

12. Ford, Richard. *A Hand-Book for Travellers in Spain and Readers at Home*. Ian Robertson, ed. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1966: II, 606-608; Fisher, William Bayne; Bowen-Jones, Howard. *Spain: An Introductory Geography*. New York: Praeger, 1966; Kagay, Donald J. “The Defense of the Crown of Aragon during the War of the Two Pedros (1356-1366)”. *The Journal of Military History*, 71 (2007): 18.

13. Cox, Josiah. *Medieval Regions and their Cities*. Newton Abbot: David & Charles PLC, 1972: 168-69; Kagay, Donald J. “Two Towns Where There Was Once One: The ‘Aldea’ in Medieval Aragon”. *Journal of the Rocky Mountain Medieval and Renaissance Association*, 14 (1993): 33-43; Cabazuelo, José Vicente. *La guerra de los dos Pedros en las tierras alicantinas*. Alicante: Instituto de Cultura Juan Gil-Albert-Diputación Provincial de Alicante, 1991: 32-36; Fisher, William Bayne; Bowen-Jones, Howard. *Spain: An Introductory Geography*...: 156.

14. Nader, Helen. *Liberty in Absolutist Spain: The Habsburg Sale of Towns, 1516-1700*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990: 27.

15. Ruiz, Teófilo. *Spanish Society, 1400-1600*. Harlow: Longman, 2001: 42.

16. Nader, Helen. *Liberty in Absolutist Spain*...: 41.

17. García, Luis. *Curso de historia de las instituciones españolas: de los orígenes al final de la Edad Media*. Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1968: 619.



cavalry" (*cavall alforrat*, *caballo desarmado*). A unit of heavy cavalry consisted of a heavily-armored knights with war horses, accompanied by a mounted squire, and two footmen. A light cavalry unit included a lightly-armored knight and two footmen.¹⁸ Royal law mandated that the knights of the first class should possess a "padded doublet" (*perpunt*), "chain mail" (*loriga*), and "other knightly weapons"; those of the second class had to be equipped with a "breast plate" (*cuyrase*), a "mail shirt" (*camisol*), "helmet" (*bacinet*), "leather shield" (*darga de scut*) and a "lance" (*atzagaya*, *lança*).¹⁹ All members of these units were paid a daily wage, were compensated for the injury or loss of their horses, and were free of all tolls and taxes during their military service.²⁰ By the end of the Castilian conflict, the heavy cavalry, at least, had begun to acquire a new name, the "lance" (*lança*, *lanza*).²¹

While the War of the Two Pedros did feature a few episodes of major campaigning that pitted sizeable forces against each other²², the vast majority of the decade-long conflict (1356-1366) was fought around the fortresses that clustered on both sides of the Castilian frontiers with Aragon and Valencia. In these border districts, Pedro named a "governor general" (*adelantado mayor*) who commanded sizeable swaths of frontier land as well as "captains of the frontier" (*capitanes de la frontera*) to garrison the castles that were built along the borders, and utilized townsmen as a type of border militia.²³ On the Aragonese and Valencian side of the frontier, Pere put the wall of fortresses under the command of "frontier captains" (*capitaniae*; *frontalers*)

18. *Colección de documentos inéditos del archivo general de la Corona de Aragón*, ed. Francesco Casula. Barcelona: Tipográfica y litográfica de J.E. Monfort 1982: XLVIII, 84, 119, 135 (arts. 5, 13, 18); Kagay, Donald J. "A Government Besieged by Conflict: The Parliament of Monzón (1362-1363) as Military Financier", *The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus*, Andrew Villalon, Donald J. Kagay, eds. Leiden: Brill, 2005: 141.

19. *Colección de documentos inéditos del archivo general de la Corona de Aragón...*: 48, 135, art. 18; Kagay, Donald J. "Government Besieged by Conflict...": 143; For a description of these weapons and equipment, see: de Riquer, Martí. *L'Arnès del Cavaller: Armes i armadures catalans medievals*. Barcelona: Edicions Ariel, 1968.

20. *Colección de las cortes de los antiguos reinos de Aragón y de Valencia, y el principado de Cataluña*, ed. Fidel Fita, Bienvenido Oliver. Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1896: I, 2: 591; Ferrer, María Teresa. "La organización militar en Cataluña en la Edad Media". *Revista de Historia Militar*, 1 (2000): 169.

21. Ferrer, María Teresa. "La organización militar en Cataluña...": 169-170.

22. Between 1358 and 1359, Pere commanded small and ineffective operations along the Castilian borderlands with Aragon. Between 1363 and 1365, the king led large armies of over 1,700 knights into Valencia, but never forced his Castilian adversary to the battlefield. *Chronicle of Pere III of Catalonia (Pedro IV of Aragon)* ed. Mary Hillgarth, Jocelyn N. Hillgarth. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1980: II, 521, 548, 564; Pere III of Catalonia. *Chronicle...*: VI: 21, 40, 52; López, Pero. *Coronica del rey Pedro*. Constance L. Wilkins, Heanon M. Wilkins, eds. Madison: Hispanic Seminary of Medieval Studies, 1985: 142-143, 145 (15 year: iii, vii; 16 year: ii); Kagay, Dolnald J. "The Defense of the Crown of Aragon...": 29.

23. Palomeque, Antonio. "Contribución al estudio del ejército en los estados de la reconquista". *Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español*, 15 (1944): 342-344; Ferrer, María Teresa. "La organización militar en Cataluña...": 176; García, Luis. *Curso de Historia de las Instituciones Españolas...*: 510.



either directly or through administrative intermediaries.²⁴ He used urban troops for “raids” (*cabalcadas*) and to help man castles and fortified watchtowers.²⁵

The requirements and expectations of these commanders were very similar on both sides of the contested frontiers and were clearly reflected in the legal masterwork of the era, the *Siete Partidas*. In general, such leaders could only gain military success by coupling intelligence with experience, courage, and prudence. If, as Alfonso X's work claims, these qualities were essential for the management of a civilian life during peacetime, how much more were they necessary during war when a captain held so many lives in his hands.²⁶ The dangers of military life were clearly intensified when a person accepted responsibility for the command of a castle. Bound by such mundane, yet crucial duties as the maintenance and repair of walls, towers, and moats,²⁷ the recruitment and disciplining of garrisons,²⁸ as well as the purchase and storage of supplies within the fortress,²⁹ the castle commander carried a heavy yoke of responsibility. According to both the *Siete Partidas* and the *Costum d'Espanya*, a generally-accepted rule of castle tenure in Castile and the Crown of Aragon,³⁰ a person in charge of a castle had to defend it “until death,” even if his loved ones were threatened with torture or death to force his surrender. Such a surrender was tantamount to treason which itself was considered equivalent to causing “the death of... [one's] lord.”³¹ Castellans were thus urged by the very culture in which they lived “to leave a glorious name rather than exhibit downright cowardice.”³² In the real world of siege and castle defense, both sides of the dyad of selfless bravery and self-preservation are all too obvious in the Iberian battle accounts of the thirteenth century.³³

24. Kagay, Donald J. “The Defense of the Crown of Aragon...”: 25; Ferrer, Maria Teresa. “La organización militar en Cataluña...”: 174.

25. Powers, James F. *A Society Organized for War: The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000-1284*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988: 138-139.

26. Alfonso X de Castilla. *Las Siete Partidas*, ed. Samuel Parsons, Robert Ignatius Burns. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001: II, 433-434, 441-442 (titles XXII-XXIII, laws 2-4).

27. Ferrer, Maria Teresa. “La tiença a costum d'Espanya en els castells de la frontera meridional valenciana (Segle XIV)”. *Miscel·lània de Textos Medievals*, 4 (1988): 68 (doc. n° 27); Kagay, Donald J. “A Shattered Circle: Eastern Spanish Fortifications and their Repair during the ‘Calamitous Fourteenth Century’”, *War, Government, and Society in the Medieval Crown of Aragon*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007: III, 130-131.

28. Alfonso X de Castilla. *Las Siete Partidas...*: II, 388-389 (title XVIII, law 12).

29. Alfonso X de Castilla. *Las Siete Partidas...*: II, 384 (title XVIII, law 6); Kagay, Donald J. “A Shattered Circle...”: 124; Ferrer, Maria Teresa. “La organización militar de Cataluña...”: 151.

30. Ferrer, Maria Teresa. “La Tinença a costum d'Espanya...”: 5-6; Ferrer, Maria Teresa. “La organización militar de Cataluña...”: 139-44.

31. Alfonso X de Castilla. *Las Siete Partidas...*: II, 384 (title XVIII, law 6).

32. Alfonso X de Castilla. *Las Siete Partidas...*: III, 388 (title XVIII, law 2).

33. The great Catalan chronicles of the thirteenth century provide very clear examples of “good” and “bad” castellans from their behavior in the testing ground of war. In 1220, King Jaume I (1213-1276), who had been called on to regain a castle for one of his barons, encountered the redoubtable castellan, Pedro Gomez, who fought on, standing in the breach of the fortress wall “up to his knees” in rubble, awaiting there “death rather than life.” Another captain, a Castilian named Nicolas Peris who held the



Because of the jurisdictional ambiguities of holding a castle for a distant lord (especially one as punctilious and self-seeking as Pere III), the office of castellan or frontier captain was a particularly dangerous one. Placed in the often-hopeless situation of undergoing "great famine and tribulation" during a siege, the castle commander could suffer every bit as much by surrendering the fortress to the enemy, thus becoming a traitor in the eyes of his own sovereign. Though occasionally offering a vague promise to raise the siege that entangled them, the king could seldom offer his beleaguered castellans much real hope of being delivered from danger, despite his insistence that they maintain "firm hope" in him as a "Christian and Catholic king."³⁴ Even so, at times, Pere had to acknowledge just how hollow were his effusive promises of support by freeing his besieged castellans from their feudal ties to him and allowing them to surrender to the Castilian enemy.³⁵ Without this permission, any castle commander who surrendered became in the eyes of the king "villainous" by reason of his "evil treason."³⁶ Besides a loss of reputation, such castellans would have their fiefs and chattels confiscated and their titles abrogated. In fact, they could count themselves fortunate at not incurring the Crown's judicial wrath.³⁷ Ironically, much of the money raised from the sale of confiscated property was granted to future castellans or used for the repair of their fortresses.³⁸ Instances did arise, however, in which castellans did not risk ruin with the surrender of their castles. Mitigating circumstances, such as active treason among the garrison, might influence Pere to formally absolve a royal servant of blame for the fall of a fortress. Even with these official acts of royal forgiveness, Pere never again fully trusted the men he had pardoned and often charged them for refitting of the castles they had surrendered if these fortresses were recaptured from the enemy.³⁹ Whether

fortress of Alicante, bravely fell fighting the Aragonese king, Jaume II (1291-1327). Instead of honoring his brave defense in which "he was cut to pieces," Jaume looked on him as a traitor to the Castilian king and, rather than giving him a Christian burial, "had his body thrown to the dogs." *The Book of Deeds of James I of Aragon*, Damian Smith, Helena Buffery, ed. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003: 30-31 (chapter 15); *The Chronicle of Muntaner Translated from the Catalan*, Lady Henrietta Margaret Goodenough, ed. New York: The Hakluyt Society, 1921: II, 451-54 (chapter 188).

34. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1211, f. 95v-96; Ferrer, Maria Teresa. "La Tinença a costum d'Espanya...": 66-67 (doc. n° 25); Alfonso X de Castilla. *Las Siete Partidas...: II*, 390-391 (title XVIII, law 16).

35. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1210. f. 115; Ferrer, Maria Teresa "La Tinença a costum d'Espanya...": 67-68 (doc. n° 26).

36. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1569, f. 22v-23; Registro 172, f. 2; Ferrer, Maria Teresa. "La Tinença a costum d'Espanya...": 60, 63 (docs. n° 16, 21).

37. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 910, f. 112v-113; Registro 911, f. 4-5, 7r-7v; Registro 1192, f. 72r-72v; Registro 1198, f. 234v; Registro 1220, f. 32v; Ferrer, Maria Teresa. "La frontera meridional valenciana durant la guerra amb Castella dita dels Dos Peres," *Pere el Cerimoniós i la seva època*, Maria Teresa Ferrer, ed. Barcelona: Institució Milà i Fontanals, 1989: 292, 295, 297-298; Kagay, Donald J. "Defending the Western and Southern Frontiers in the War of the Two Pedros: An Experiment in Nation-Building". *Journal of the Georgia Association of Historians*, 23 (2002): 89.

38. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1199, f. 403r-403v; Registro 1572, f. 2; Ferrer, Maria Teresa. "La Tinença a costum d'Espanya...": 63, 65 (docs. n° 23, 25).

39. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 914, f. 226v-227; Registro 1199, f. 404; Ferrer, Maria Teresa. "La Tinença a costum d'Espanya...": 66, 71-72 (docs. n° 24, 32).



victorious or defeated in a siege, Aragonese and Valencian castellans in “the Castilian war” would agree with the chronicler, Ramón Muntaner’s conclusion that “one of the greatest dangers in the world is to hold a castle for a lord.”⁴⁰

2

According to Robert I. Burns, S.J., “Iberia was a packet of various allied frontiers, variously evolving.”⁴¹ The same description applies to Pere III’s “system” of defense that emerged from one military crisis after another, all of them connected and yet each somehow unique. With a surprise Castilian raid into regions of his realms not yet caught up in the war, Pere relied on the general levy to put a great number of men into the field quickly and to hold up the enemy advance by the massing of troops if not by the gathering of a great deal of military talent.

In Catalonia, the general array was connected to the *Usatges* article, *Princeps namque*, that commanded all men to aid their sovereign when “a certain king or prince... [came] against him to wage war.”⁴² Not surprisingly with the Catalan sense of separateness from the other Iberian regions, Pere found *Princeps namque* a difficult article to enforce and one larded with legal exceptions.⁴³

In Aragon, Valencia, and the Pyrenean counties of Roussillon and Cerdanya, by contrast, Pere normally called out the various grades of nobility to beat back enemy surprise attacks.⁴⁴ All nobles thus contacted were to bring a customary number of horsemen to a designated rendezvous with the king.⁴⁵ Pere often used this site as an initial base camp from which he would “seek battle” with a rapidly-closing Castilian force. If his nobles failed to answer the royal call for support, the Aragonese king assured them that he would take legal proceedings against their persons and

40. *The Chronicle of Muntaner...*: II, 453 (chapter 188).

41. Burns, Robert Ignatius. “The Significance of the Frontier in the Middle Ages”, *Medieval Frontier Societies*, Robert Bartlett, Angus MacKay, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989: 315.

42. Donald J. Kagay, ed. *The Usatges of Barcelona: The Fundamental Law of Catalonia*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994: 80, article 64; Kagay, Donald J. “The National Defense Clause and the Emergence of the Catalan State: ‘Princeps Namque’ Revisited”, *Crusaders, Condottieri, and Cannon: Medieval Warfare in Societies around the Mediterranean*, Andrew Villalon, Donald J. Kagay, eds. Leiden: Brill, 2003: 57-58.

43. Donald J. Kagay, ed. *The Customs of Catalonia between Lords and Vassals by the Barcelona Canon, Pere Albert: A Practical Guide to Castle Feudalism in Medieval Spain*. Tempe: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2002: 36-37, article 37; de Socarrats, Johannes. *Tractatum Petri Alberti canonici barchinonensis de consuetudines Cataloniae inter dominos et vassallos ac nonnulli aliis que commemorationes Petri Alberti appellantur*. Barcelona: apud Antonium Vicentium, 1551, 385-386, 390, 395; Sánchez, Manuel. “The Invocation of ‘Princeps namque’ in 1368 and its Repercussions for the City of Barcelona”, *Hundred Years War...*: 297-329; Kagay, Donald J. “The National Defense Clause...”: 84-90.

44. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1382, f. 186-89; Registro 1384, f. 5v-6; Registro 1387, f. 119v-120.

45. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1382, f. 184-185; 198v-199.



property just as he might legally prosecute all “those [persons] disobedient to our commands, the *fuero*, and good reason.”⁴⁶

Since the units of nobles and knights were often summoned to serve in emergency conditions, they were occasionally required to transport under guard crucial supplies to the front. To help facilitate their journey, they would be specifically exempted from all tolls and taxes they might encounter on the road.⁴⁷ To help assure that these complicated operations would be successfully carried out, Pere normally instructed trusted officials of his household to collect muster lists from each of the summoned nobles and to see that all the members of their companies received the proper pay.⁴⁸

While general levies did plug emergency breaches in his territorial defense, Pere accomplished much the same objectives on a regular basis by arranging with individual nobles and the agents of towns and military orders to provide small companies of between 60 and 150 horsemen or crossbowmen to garrison individual castles.⁴⁹ All of these men demanded and received a daily wage, an expense that the king was quick to curtail whenever a truce with Castile loomed.⁵⁰ Throughout the conflict, Pere manifested concern over the behavior of all salaried defenders, not only in fighting the Castilian enemy, but also toward his own subjects. He was, however, especially anxious about the units raised by nobles whom he repeatedly urged to act as if each phase of their service had a direct bearing “on our honor and yours.”⁵¹ By contrast, in regard to the companies drawn from communal sources, his concern centered on the varying quality of troops sent to the front. In 1361, he chided the prioress of the Hospitaller house of Sigena not to send into his service “the old, powerless, and poor,” but rather “an army of select persons.”⁵² The king saw the effect of sub-standard soldiers in 1367 when urban defenders of Alicante “were greatly disturbed by the terror of the enemy” who threatened the lives of their families back in their home villages, outposts that lay squarely in the path of the Castilian invaders. To restore the “daring and firm courage” of these garrison troops, the king allowed them to bring their loved ones to Alicante's walled safety, provided their commander had removed any men in the garrison unfit for combat.⁵³

46. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 118v.

47. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1382, f. 82; Registro 1387, f. 113r-113v.

48. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1381, f. 123r-123v, 181; Registro 1383, f. 221v-222v; Registro 1387, f. 113.

49. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1382, f. 89, 96v; 137v-138; 176r-176v; Registro 1383, f. 235v-236; Registro 1387, f. 110v.

50. *Chronicle of Pere III of Catalonia...*: II, 532; VI: 30. For similar actions in the northern campaigns of the Hundred Years War, see: Fowler, Kenneth. “Truces”, *Hundred Years War...*: 190-191.

51. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 113v.

52. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1384, f. 3.

53. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 148.



3

Because the “autonomous towns” acted as “the cells of the body politic” in both Castile and the Crown of Aragon⁵⁴, urban attack and defense became a prime feature in the mid-fourteenth-century struggle between the two states. The conflict was not only played out against the principal symbol of medieval life (the circuit of city walls),⁵⁵ but also across the vast “territory” (*territorium, tierra*) which surrounded and was included within the jurisdiction exercised by settlements of all sizes.⁵⁶ While Pere's capitals, Barcelona, Majorca, and Valencia were attacked on several occasions,⁵⁷ the frontier towns of Calatayud, Daroca, Elche, and Teruel bore the brunt of sizeable Castilian assaults and intermittent raids.

To assure that towns and the hamlets subject to them were well-defended, Pere initially relied on the people and institutions that ruled them.⁵⁸ When Pedro led surprise attacks across Pere's borders or bands of “free companies” crossed the Pyrenees in search of plunder and employment, the Aragonese king relied on the town militias to stem the initial tide. “Hauling up...[their] banners... [and] ringing the [church] bells,” town fathers would gather all men of fighting age and proceed to the assembly point set by the king. Such units fought under their own commanders or those appointed by the sovereign. Failure to answer a royal summons could brand an entire community with treason and provide a reason for blaming a campaign's failure on this urban default in service.⁵⁹

The principal duty each municipal official owed his own town during wartime consisted in overhauling of its fortifications. With the successful completion of the great reconquest in the thirteenth century, many an Aragonese and Valencian settlement once on the “cutting edge” of the war with Iberian Islam had very quickly slipped into a “virtual backwater.”⁶⁰ As a result, castles and curtain walls fell into disrepair and, with the Castilian threat of the fourteenth century, had to be restored

54. Nader, Helen. *Liberty in Absolutist Spain...*: 207.

55. Pirenne, Henri. *Medieval Cities*. Frank D. Halsey, ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1925: 107; Frugoni, Chiara. *A Distant City: Images of Urban Experience in the Medieval World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991: 13-14 (translation by William McCuaig).

56. Kagay, Donald J. “Two Towns Where There...”: 35.

57. Barcelona and Majorca were threatened in the spring of 1359 when Pedro brought a large fleet up the Catalan litoral and then directed it toward the Balearics. In the end, he withdrew with little to show for his efforts. In the summer of 1364, Pedro unleashed a large attack against Valencia and, though retaining troops for over a year in the vicinity of the southern capital, he never captured it. *Chronicle of Pere III of Catalonia...*: II, 523-526, 544-553; VI: 22-26, 40-44.

58. Catalan, Majorcan, and Valencian municipalities were ruled by a town council (*consell*) staffed by “councilors” (*consellers*), “good men” (*proomes*), “peacekeepers” (*pahers*), “sworn men” (*jurats*). Aragonese municipalities were ruled by a town council staffed by “sworn men” (*jurados*) and assisted by the “mayor” (*alcalde*) and the “justice” (*justicia*). García, Luis. *Curso de Historia de las Instituciones Españolas...*: 552-53.

59. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1385, f. 127v; Registro 1387, f. 9v; 97; Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-aragonesa desde Jaime II a Pedro el Ceremonioso*. Barcelona: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1994: II, 530-531 (doc. n° 232 and 154).

60. Kagay, Donald J. “Two Towns Where There...”: 40.



in very short order to their pristine state.⁶¹ Municipal governments thus had to shoulder the onerous duty of repairing and extending the circuit of walls or the widely despised obligation of destroying structures on either side of the town wall that might give aid to a besieging enemy or obstruct a harried defender.⁶² Though these actions were supposedly carried out for the survival of an entire town, they often pitted one class against another.⁶³ Since all such urban projects intimately affected the war effort, they were closely watched by regular royal officials and extraordinary appointees who traced the expenditure of royal funds in municipal defense works and insisted on proper accounting practices to trace these outlays.⁶⁴

Since the Aragonese and Valencian frontier towns that suffered the most from Castilian attack were surrounded by as many as a hundred hamlets with varying kinds of allegiance to them,⁶⁵ the relationship of town and hamlet populations during the Castilian conflict proved as essential as it was stormy. The mutual duty of town to hamlet and *viceversa* during this period was that of protection. Hamlets unfortunate enough to be in the path of an enemy invasion were commanded to move their families and goods inside the town they were subservient to. This protection was scarcely free, however, since a good portion of hamlet goods could be confiscated by the town fathers to reinforce the network of urban walls that stood between the "hamlet residents" (*aldeanos*) and a Castilian enemy often bolstered by greatly-feared, Muslim auxiliaries. Citizens of the outlying communities were often called on to help "block the iniquitous plans" of the Castilian king, but seldom served under their own banners and commanders. They were rather part of a militia whose main aim was to hold the frontier against Pedro's troops, thus assuring that the local town emerged from the fray unscathed.⁶⁶ Many hamlets were not as fortunate, however, and could be left depopulated or partially ruined by countless Castilian raids. With a long history of seeking ever-greater autonomy from the neighboring towns, the hamlets bitterly resisted the transfer of their wealth to defend the larger urban centers and even occasionally gained the right to form a

61. Kagay, Donald J. "A Shattered Circle: eastern...": 123-127.

62. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 134v-135.

63. In 1367, a town council at Jaca was forced to take the unprecedented step of forcing nobles to work along with other citizens in the crucial task of wall construction. In the same year at Tarazona, however, the upper classes firmly objected to war preparations which required all inhabitants of the town's suburb to permanently resettle within the area closed off by the town's new circuit of walls. Despite the appointment of royal commissioners to carry out this mandate, the upper clergy and nobles were unwilling to give up portions of their urban property to accommodate their fellow citizens and eventually had to be forced into compliance by royal agents. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 127r-127v; 172.

64. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 162.

65. Kagay, Donald J. "Two Towns Where There...": 39.

66. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 109v-110, 128v, 139; Powers, James F. "Two Warrior-Kings and their Municipal Militias: The Townsman-Soldier in Law and Life", *The Worlds of Alfonso the Learned and James the Conqueror: Intellect and Force in the Middle Ages*, Robert Ignatius Burns, ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985: 117-118; Caruana, Jaime. *Indice de los pergaminos y documentos insertos en ellos, existentes en el Archivo de la Ciudad de Teruel*. Madrid: Cuerpo Facultativo de Archiveros, Bibliotecarios y Arqueólogos, 1950, 34, 37-38.



“brotherhood” (*germanitas*) to raise troops and defend their fellow citizens engaged in bringing in harvests.⁶⁷

Because of the social and political differences that divided urban classes as well as larger and smaller municipalities along Pere's embattled frontiers, the Aragonese king increasingly turned to a single military authority for the command of an entire municipal district. The city captain, like his Italian counterpart of the same period, the *podestà*,⁶⁸ exercised broad military powers that routinely brought both urban officials and the town's economic well being under his control. A document of 1360 is typical of all captaincy appointments Pere made during the Castilian war.

Since it is fitting for our honor and the utility of the republic, the Aragonese king, who cannot be everywhere in his realms at once, has designated strong men...to defend against the attacks of the enemy.⁶⁹

This transfer of authority was made to both clerics and laymen with two outstanding qualifications: (1) they “had sweated in...[royal] service” and (2) they were “strong, youthful and experienced warriors.”⁷⁰ These appointees held civil and criminal jurisdiction over all inhabitants in the principal town and throughout the municipal district subordinated to it.⁷¹ The town fathers, residents, and billeted troops all had to accept the captain's orders exactly as if they had been issued by the king.⁷² Those who refused to submit to his authority could be “condemned and punished as the captain saw fit.”⁷³ His power in military matters extended over all civilian property of the town and of the surrounding hamlets. He also controlled, with few exceptions, the money allocated to pay his troops by the town government, the parliament (*corts, cortes*), or the crown.⁷⁴ He could also compel labor and money from the town population to refit the fortresses and could also force them to undertake garrison duty.⁷⁵

Even with this broad statement of jurisdictional authority, urban captains were limited by their relationship to the legal precedents set by previous town captains.⁷⁶ When more than one captain was appointed to a single community, they had to carefully respect each other's rights and communicate the intricacies of their relationship to the forces they commanded.⁷⁷ While in the midst of the Castilian war, Pere normally endowed his captains with power for as long as they saw fit to

67. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 139v, 160, 174-175.

68. Waley, Daniel. *The Italian City-Republics*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969: 67-74; Martines, Lauro. *Power and Imagination: City-States in Renaissance Italy*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973: 41-44; *I podestà dell'Italia comunale*, Jean-Claude Marie Viguier, ed. Rome: École Française de Rome, 2000.

69. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1383, f. 132r-132v.

70. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 140v-141.

71. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 148v-149v.

72. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1382, f. 132r-132v.

73. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 120v, 166v-167.

74. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 18r-18v.

75. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 19, 143v.

76. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 166v.

77. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 14v.



hold it. Those appointed under emergency conditions when Castilian troops or “free companies” threatened to overrun undefended districts saw their power and the money used to support it removed once the emergency had passed.⁷⁸

In most instances, urban captains carried out virtually the same civil duties as did the town councils and municipal officials. In regard to military matters, however, they acted quite differently. They marshaled and commanded municipal troops (both horsemen and crossbowmen), leading them on expeditions far from their home bases.⁷⁹ When their urban headquarters fell under heavy attack by Castilian raiders, captains, who were occasionally given some advance warning of the invasion by Pere's spy network, were expected to make all requisite preparations. This included supplying nearby castles with artillery, shot, and supplies, refitting damaged fortress walls, and destroying buildings outside of castles or urban walls that could aid an enemy siege. In effect, the captain was to do everything possible to safeguard the territory under his control.⁸⁰

One of the urban captain's prime duties involved moving much of the population from surrounding hamlets into his urban headquarters and storing their goods and animals within the circuit of walls. The protection the captain extended was never free, however, for he often confiscated a portion of the food the *aldeanos* brought with them to feed the garrison when the town came under siege. The hamlet residents were also used as a unpaid work force in readying the town to resist enemy attack.⁸¹

As the king's military representative in the town, the urban captain faced pressure from all quarters. The ultimate command he could scarcely afford to disregard was the oft-repeated royal directive: “never surrender” since in capitulating he had more to fear from his own sovereign than from a Castilian victor.⁸² Since urban captains often hailed from other parts of the Crown of Aragon or were members of a military order, they were often received as “foreigners” by the townsmen they commanded.⁸³ Thus bitterly opposed on occasion by their urban constituents, the only real support they could depend on was the company of horsemen/retainers they brought with them. Even this backing was conditional, however, for the troops had to be paid and if their salaries were in arrears from the king or one of his parliaments, they simply deserted. Since many an urban commander had grown used to constraining the property of the *aldeanos* to make up shortfalls in military salaries, the hamlets became increasingly distrustful of the local commander and asked the king to prevent his “illegal” activities.⁸⁴ Because of the porous boundaries

78. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 171, 195v.

79. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1383, f. 50r-v; 174v-175; Registro 1387, f. 178r-178v.

80. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 11v, 19r-v, 151v.

81. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 127v, 128v, 129v, 140r-v, 144, 168v-169.

82. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1383, f. 179v.

83. For the linguistic and cultural differences between the various realms of the Crown of Aragon, see: Kagay, Donald J. “The Institutional Blue Print of a Crusader Land: The Case of the Medieval Crown of Aragon”. *Journal of the Georgia Association of Historians*, 24 (2003): 32-33.

84. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 150r-150v, 191.



between captaincies, bitter disputes also flared among urban commanders over manpower and revenues. To rein in these extraordinary agents within the towns, villages, and hamlets of frontier Aragon and Valencia, Pere invariably fell back on his officials who, in controlling the military purse strings, qualified as extraordinarily persuasive arbiters between feuding captains.⁸⁵

4

Despite a long tradition of the Middle Ages that assigned to clergy the duty of prayer in leading their lay charges “to the path of salvation,” rulers across western Europe frequently disregarded canon law's ban against clerical participation in warfare and used their clergy as paymasters, administrators, and even soldiers in wars large and small, foreign and domestic.⁸⁶ In Christian Spain as in the Latin East, clerical organizations, later known as the military or crusading orders, came into being during the international conflict with Islam. On the Iberian Peninsula, the international orders of the Hospitallers and the Templars were soon joined by the Castilian fraternities of Calatrava, Alcántara, and Santiago as well as the Catalan and Valencian orders of San Jorge de Alfama and Montesa.⁸⁷ Though initially utilized to keep constant pressure on Muslim *Hispania*, the military clergy soon proved invaluable to Aragonese and Castilian sovereigns who quickly realized that the administrative districts in which military orders divided their land holdings were ready-made for raising war financing and rapidly putting experienced warriors into the field.⁸⁸ Though the targets of many later expeditions were not Muslims, but fellow Christians, the members of the military orders had taken “oaths of homage” to serve their king “in the defense of his realms.”⁸⁹ Though the Castilian orders remained focused on the last Muslim outpost in Granada, those of the Crown of

85. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1381, f. 226; Registro 1383, f. 16r-16v; Gutiérrez, Antonio. “La contraofensiva aragonesa en la guerra de los Dos Pedros: Actitud militar y diplomática de Pedro IV el Ceremonioso (años 1358 a 1362)”. *Cuadernos de Historia “Jerónimo Zurita”*, 14-15 (1963): 15.

86. Duby, Georges. *The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980: 78-79; Brundage, James A. *Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969: 28-29; Brundage, James A. “Holy War and the Medieval Lawyers”, *The Holy War*, Thomas Patrick Murphy, ed. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976: 99-140.

87. Forey, Alan John. *The Templars in the Crown of Aragon*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973; Ledesma, María Luisa. *Templarios y hospitalarios en el reino de Aragón*. Zaragoza: Guara, 1982; Lomax, Derek. *La Orden de Santiago (1170-1275)*. Madrid: Escuela de Estudios Medievales, 1965; O’Callaghan, Joseph F. *The Spanish Military Order of Calatrava and its Affiliates*. London: Variorum Reprints, 1975; Sáinz Lasoli, Regina. “Military Orders”, *Medieval Iberia: An Encyclopedia*, E. Michael Gerli, ed. London: Routledge, 2003: 566-568; Sáinz, Regina. *La orden de San Jorge de Alfama: Aproximación a su historia*. Barcelona: Institució Milà i Fontanals, 1990.

88. Forey, Alan John. *The Military Orders from the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Centuries*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992: 148-203.

89. Sáinz, Regina. *La orden de San Jorge de Alfama...: 61, 259-260 (doc. n° 43)*; Ferrer, Maria Teresa. “La organización militar de Cataluña...”: 187.



Aragon served royal military ventures across the Mediterranean from Majorca to Sardinia.⁹⁰ The strict command of one thirteenth-century, Castilian king to the order of Calatrava is easily applicable to all military orders: "You are always to make war... and peace whenever and with whomsoever I command."⁹¹

With the dangers and discord inherent in ten long years of combat that continually inflamed his frontiers and endangered the churches and monasteries located there, Pere occasionally felt moved to exercise his duty of "protection" for clerical institutions and their property.⁹² This royal action was seldom brought about by imminent danger to any specific clerical institution, but rather by its importance to the Crown. In 1369, when the Castilian civil war still raged and Pere's frontiers were far from safe, the king moved to have Poblet, a Catalan monastery "conspicuous for the clarity of its piety" and for a long history of royal endowment, surrounded by "walls and moats." This expensive project was supported by royal funds, but its supervision was conducted by a clerical agent acting for the king and the extensive labor it required was provided by the monks themselves.⁹³

For Pere, then, war could not be compartmentalized. His clergy and laymen alike were exposed to the threat of Castilian invasion and were equally expected to devote themselves to the defense of the homeland. As real battlefield leaders, however, the king relied on talented administrators such as Archbishop Lope of Zaragoza⁹⁴ as well as the experienced officer corps and troops provided by the military orders. He acted to block "the iniquitous and wicked plans" of his Castilian adversary by summoning individual commanders and small companies of horsemen to garrison, arm, and supply castles for up to four months.⁹⁵ When the enemy threat was sufficiently grave, Pere activated the entire service network of the military orders by sending summons for participation in his military expeditions to their masters or commanders general. These leaders would then notify their secondary commanders and, in short order, much of the organization's warrior corps would be on its way

90. Sáinz, Regina. *La orden de San Jorge de Alfama...*: 58-60.

91. Forey, Alan John. *The Military Orders from the...*: 50.

92. Kennelly, Karen. "Catalan Peace and Truce Assemblies". *Studies in Medieval Culture*, 5 (1975): 44-45; Kagay, Donald J. "Violence Management in Twelfth-Century Catalonia and Aragon", *Margined Groups in Spanish and Portuguese History*, William D. Phillips, Carla Rahn Phillips, eds. Minneapolis: Society for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies, 1989: 12-15.

93. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1217, f. 106; Registro 1223, f. 43, 77; *Colección de documentos inéditos del archivo general de la Corona de Aragón*, ed. Próspero de Bofarull. Barcelona: Tipográfica y litográfica de J.E. Monfort, 1847: 6: 351-355 (docs. 104-105); Altisent, Agustí. *Història de Poblet*. Poblet: Abadía de Poblet, 1974: 296-313; Domenech, Luís. *Historia y arquitectura del monasterio de Poblet*. Barcelona: Montaner y Simón, 1927: 33-34.

94. Archbishop Lope's presence was so "very profitable and necessary," Pere requested the Pope to release him from service as a nuncio in Italy so he might return to direct the defense of the Aragonese capital. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1187, f. 156v; *Documenta Selecta mutuas civitatis Arago-Cathalaunicae et ecclesiae relationes illustrantia*, ed. Johannes Vincke. Barcelona: Biblioteca Balmes, 1936: 454-55 (doc. n° 599).

95. ACA, Cancillería real, Registro 1387, f. 53v, 109v-110, 111v, 142v, 145.



to the rendezvous designated by the Crown.⁹⁶ Like other units joining a major royal force, these clerical warriors received official safeguards from the payment of tolls or taxes and were indemnified from any “crimes, excesses, or debts” they themselves might be accused of.⁹⁷

Clerical officers and men were paid a daily wage and were reimbursed for horses killed or maimed in military action. In the first years of the war, this money came from the royal treasury, but as the conflict dragged on, most of Pere’s warriors—both clerical and secular—were paid from large parliamentary subsidies raised from a “household tax” (*fogatge*) imposed on urban residents, some of whom were feudally tied to the very military orders called on to serve.⁹⁸ Like other royal captains, those of the military orders had to turn over muster lists with the names of their soldiers to receive pay vouchers which could take a very long time to be paid in full.⁹⁹ More than once, clerical commanders complained of suffering at the hands of arrogant officials whose actions “abounded in infamy and shame.”¹⁰⁰

Despite these problems, Pere found the military orders invaluable purveyors of money, supplies, and troops whose training and discipline seldom failed him.

5

From the very first months of the Castilian war, Pere was quick to realize that, though urban and clerical captains were essential in mounting the day-to-day defense the continual Castilian pressure often imposed on him, he had need of a much larger force led by thoroughly professional commanders. The Aragonese king

96. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1384, f. 9v-10; Registro 1387, f. 90; Sáinz, Regina. *La orden de San Jorge de Alfama...*: 61-62, 277-279 (doc. n° 53).

97. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 982, f. 191v-192v; Sáinz, Regina. *La orden de San Jorge de Alfama...*: 274-276 (doc. n° 51).

98. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 982, f. 184-187; Registro 1173, f. 125r-125v; Sáinz, Regina. *La orden de San Jorge de Alfama...*: 270-271, 276-277 (doc. n° 50 and 52). For the Catalan household tax (*fogatge*) and that of Aragon (*fogaje*) and France (*fouage*), see: Smith, Robert. “Fourteenth-Century Population Records of Catalonia”. *Speculum*, 19 (1944): 494-495; Pons, José María. “Un fogajament desconegut de l’any 1358”. *Boletín de la Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona*, 30 (1963-1964): 323-498; Ainaga, María Teresa. “El fogaje aragonés de 1362: Aportación a la demografía de Zaragoza en el siglo XIV”. *Aragón en la Edad Media*, 8 (1989): 33-59; Bell, John. *Royal Taxation in Fourteenth Century France: The Development of War Financing 1322-1356*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971: 4-5, 211-215, 255-259, 281-283; García, Luis. *Curso de Historia de las Instituciones Españolas...*: 305-306.

99. Sáinz, Regina. *La orden de San Jorge de Alfama...*: 256-257 (docs. n° 40-41).

100. A particularly infamous example of the treatment of clerical commanders took place in 1358 when the master of San Jorge de Alfama, Brother Humbert Sescorts, was engaged in Valencia on royal business. He fell from his horse and was seriously injured. After spending six weeks recuperating in Valencia, he not only found that he could not recover the monetary losses incurred by the damage to his horse, but also soon discovered that a large amount of the order’s tax revenues in Valencia had been auctioned off by royal officials—supposedly without Pere’s knowledge. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 694, f. 65v; Registro 1201, f. 26v; Sáinz, Regina. *La Orden de San Jorge de Alfama...*: 269-270, 281-282 (docs. n° 49 and 56).



was determined to find military allies who could defeat Pedro and, in so doing, would guarantee that a good deal of the contested border land between Castile and the Crown of Aragon would pass into his eager hands. He found such an avid and effective cat's-paw in the bastard son of the Castilian king, Alfonso XI (1312-1350), Count Enrique of Trastámara (1333-1369), who had barely escaped the lethal machinations of his cruel half-brother, Pedro I, in 1356. Though entering the service of the French ruler, Jean II (1350-1369), in the same year, he was tempted into Aragonese employment in August, 1356 by the prospect of gaining vengeance against his royal relative.¹⁰¹ Narrowly escaping the fate of his erstwhile French master who within a month went down to defeat at the battle of Poitiers (September 19, 1356),¹⁰² Trastámara gathered many of his Castilian retainers and crossed the Pyrenees in the late fall.¹⁰³

After lengthy negotiations, the count of Trastámara rendered homage to Pere "by hand and mouth" in November, 1356, promising further that he would not renew his feudal ties to Pedro without his new lord's permission.¹⁰⁴ Some six months later on August 30, 1357, the two parties fleshed out their agreement with an extremely detailed contract. The count accepted Pere as his "true prince founded on the truth of whole faith." For his part, the Aragonese king swore he would protect Enrique "as a good king and lord must defend his good subject and natural lord." The promises exchanged between the new lord and vassal were unenforceable and political. Pere assured the count and his retainers that he would shield them from Castilian charges and somehow prevent their holdings in Castile from being confiscated by their enraged former lord who was still seeking to punish them for treason. In regard to salary arrangements, however, Pere was very specific in delineating how much he would compensate Enrique's party of retainers as well as his war band. If Trastámara violated his pact in any way, he would be guilty of treason according to the *custom d'Espanya* and, as such, would not be able to legitimately defend himself "with or without weapons."¹⁰⁵

Though Enrique's role, like that of other frontier captains, was primarily defensive, his desire for vengeance against his half-brother and the very real possibility of gaining the Castilian throne for himself led Trastámara to engage in daring raids across the Aragonese frontier into his former homeland, one of which in 1360 almost

101. Zurita, Jerónimo. *Anales de la Corona de Aragón*, Ángel Canellas López, ed. Zaragoza: Institución Fernando el Católico, 1967-1985: IV, 306-307; O'Callaghan, Joseph F. *A History of Medieval Spain*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1975: 422-423.

102. For Castilian involvement in French forces of Hundred Years War, see: Nicolle, David. *French Armies of the Hundred Years War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000: 5-6.

103. *Chronicle of Pere III of Catalonia...*: II, 510; VI: 8.

104. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1543, f. 21r-21v.

105. ACA. Cancillería real. Varia. Registro 68, f. 69-74; Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...*: II, 444-451 (doc. n° 213/78 bis). These terms were renewed in July, 1364, ACA. Cancillería real. Varia. Registro 68, f. 69v; Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...*: II, 533-536 (doc. n° 233/162).



claimed Pedro's life.¹⁰⁶ Soon realizing the geopolitical possibilities that his Castilian captain represented, Pere attempted in 1363 and 1366 to profit from Trastámara's hatred. Though the first venture was not carried out, it clearly laid out the terms for the second which ultimately aided in making Enrique the Castilian king. To assure that this expedition had some possibility of success, Pere guaranteed Enrique the salaries of 1,000 knights and 1,000 infantry for two months. He allowed the counts of Denia and Foix to pledge another 1,000 horse and 2,000 foot to the adventure. If Trastámara proved successful, the Aragonese king expected to be repaid with a "perpetual grant" of the realm of Murcia and a long list of Castilian frontier towns. Trastámara also promised to return to his lord all of the Aragonese and Valencian towns Pedro had captured. These transfers were to be only the first step towards "a confederation of love" symbolized by the marriage of Trastámara's son, Juan, to Pere's daughter, Leonore. These new peaceful relations would be reinforced by Enrique's promise of non-aggression against the Crown of Aragon if he gained the Castilian crown.¹⁰⁷

Though the men who "loved and followed" Trastámara from their Castilian homeland into the Crown of Aragon served their new master "for a wage," the count himself was amply rewarded with lands and titles.¹⁰⁸ Ironically, many of these holdings had belonged to Pere's own hated half-brother, Prince Ferran, marquis of Tortosa, who had first taken refuge in the Castilian court in 1348.¹⁰⁹ The core of this land transfer was, quite naturally, a number of Catalan, Aragonese and Valencian towns.¹¹⁰ Trastámara held these sites "in pure and mixed ownership and with every jurisdiction high and low," controlling all the Christians, Jews, and Saracens who lived there and who had rendered homage and fealty to him.¹¹¹ Though Castilians, the count and his retainers were bound to observe all the "fueros, privileges, usages, ordinances...[and] constitutions" of their new lands. In exchange for his new landed status in the Crown of Aragon, the count had to lead his war band against persons of any "estate or rank" the Aragonese king commanded him to. His Castilian troops

106. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1383, f. 179v-180; Cabezuero, José Vicente. *La Guerra de los dos Pedros...*: 71-76. In this first battle at Nájera (Araviana), the master of Calatrava, several great nobles, and 150 Castilian knights were killed.

107. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1543, f. 66v, 70; Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...*: II, 531-533, 541-545 (docs. n° 233,169, 237,181); Zurita, Jerónimo. *Anales de la Corona de Aragón...*: IV, 457; IX: xlv. Pere and Enrique engaged in several marriage arrangements between 1366 and 1369 which attempted to tie the Castilian princess, Juana, to the Castilian nobleman, Felipe de Castro, as well as Trastámara's son, Juan, to Pere's daughter, Leonore. In the first, Enrique attempted to use one or more of his holdings in the Crown of Aragon for his daughter's dowry, but in the second demanded the princely sum of 200,000 florins. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1543, f. 62r-62v, 68v-69.

108. *Chronicle of Pere III of Catalonia...*: II, 510; VI: 8.

109. O'Callaghan, Joseph F. *A History of Medieval Spain...*: 410-411.

110. *Chronicle of Pere III of Catalonia ...*: II, 510; VI: 8. In Catalonia, Enrique held Montblanch, Tarraga, and Vilagrassa; in Aragon, Tamarite de Litera, Ricla, and Epila; and in Valencia, Castellon de Burriana and Villareal.

111. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1543, f. 33.



could be supplemented with the addition of town troops who were required to accept him as feudal lord under the penalty of high or low treason.¹¹²

Unlike others of Pere's captains, who might control a good deal of clerical or urban property, Trastámara commanded a veritable army of companies that stretched across the Crown of Aragon's most exposed realms. To pay these troops and compensate them for the damages suffered by their horses on the battlefield, the Aragonese king repeatedly affirmed the huge debt he owed his Castilian mercenaries and proceeded to slowly pay it off on the installment plan.¹¹³ Enrique proved extremely adaptable in acquiring this essential financing and in directing it to his Castilian troops. Like other urban captains, he could confiscate all customary revenues associated with the towns he held in full ownership, but this never proved sufficient to fill Trastámara's coffers for more than a few months.¹¹⁴ Pere thus occasionally allowed his captain to draw revenues from towns he did not even own and to appoint bailiffs in these outposts to collect and transfer these monies back to Trastámara headquarters.¹¹⁵ When his Castilian captain was in sore need of seed money to finance large expeditions into Pedro's borderlands, Pere permitted him to sell off future revenues in the Aragonese, Catalan, and Valencian towns he held or even to auction these very sites to the highest bidder.¹¹⁶

Since Trastámara had little time to function as his own paymaster, he increasingly relied on Pere and the extraordinary committees of his several parliaments to provide intermittent grants for his "good service."¹¹⁷ To assure that these payments were promptly turned over to his principal captain, Pere could command a number of his larger towns to send a small party of their prominent citizens to be held as hostages by Trastámara until he received money promised him by the parliament.¹¹⁸ The Aragonese king was not even adverse to speculation in the Mediterranean grain market to see that his most important warrior was paid. "Wishing to duly avoid the great peril" of making grain deliveries down the Catalan-Valencian litoral into water patrolled by Pedro's multi-national fleet, Pere had wheat bought in Majorca and then sold by royal agents at Tarragona or Tortosa for a handsome profit. Once the

112. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1543, f. 3-5, 7r-7v, 10-16v, 31v; Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...*: II, 268-69.

113. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1543, f. 48; Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...*: II, 553-554 (doc. n° 238/186).

114. For the road, bridge, and trade imposts exacted by Spanish towns as lords of their surrounding territory, see: García, Luís. *Curso de Historia de las Instituciones Españolas...*: 606-607; Ladero, Miguel Ángel. *Fiscalidad y poder real en Castilla (1252-1369)*. Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1993: 131-174.

115. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 154, f. 32r-32v.

116. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1543, f. 40v-42, 49-50v.

117. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1380, f. 170v-171. For the executive committees (*diputaciones*) that permanently carried out the fiscal responsibilities of the various parliaments of the Crown of Aragon, see: Sesma, José Ángel; Armillas, José Antonio. *La Diputación de Aragón: El gobierno aragonés del Reino a la Comunidad Autónoma*. Zaragoza: Ediciones Oroel, 1991: 17-23; Ryder, Alan. "The Role of the 'Catalan Courts' in the later Middle Ages". *The English Historical Review*, 351 (1974): 248-251; Myers, Alec Reginald. *Parliaments and Estates in Europe to 1789*. London: Thames and Hudson, 1975: 64-65.

118. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 99v, 104v-105.



administrative costs were deducted, the remainder would be sent to Trastámara “so the said count might help himself.”¹¹⁹

Despite his many efforts at maintaining Trastámara's companies as a buffer against Castilian invasion, Pere soon found that paying one foreign force to resist another had mounting political costs. While he insisted for the historical record that the count had maintained his holdings in the Crown of Aragon “peacefully and without question” until the beginning of the Castilian civil war in 1366, he elsewhere admitted that Trastámara had left his service after the peace of Murviedro in 1363 and only after the pact had been violated in the same year did he send agents to France to bring back his Castilian captain and a hardened company of 2,000 horse and foot.¹²⁰

With little intention of becoming yet another mercenary captain in war-ravaged France, the count of Trastámara gratefully returned to Pere's service, but did so with full knowledge of the limitation it placed on his political and military ambitions. He had already experienced first-hand the distrust of the Aragonese and Valencians when his companies were stationed to frontier duty.¹²¹ Since his companies often proved more dangerous than the enemy to the townsmen and villagers they were paid to protect, the count found this population, which should have been his natural clients, a kind of fifth-column, ever ready to complain to Pere about the behavior of his Castilian companies.¹²² This often-stormy relationship exacerbated the count's efforts at having his troops paid and fed. As the years of low-level border war took their effect on the municipalities designated as the prime sources of Trastámara's main financial support, he increasingly found his urban vassals plagued with a deep “weariness... [due to] the unbearable damage from supporting so many troops for so long.”¹²³ The realization of how deep this malaise actually was must have dawned on the count in 1361 when Pere insisted that he, as an extensive landholder in Aragon, contribute to the extraordinary military subsidy voted by the Aragonese *cortes* and thus to effectively pay his own salary.¹²⁴

Through his entire tenure as Pere's captain, however, Trastámara found one problem more serious than all the rest: the reception of aristocrats and townsmen

119. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 90v-91v, 96. For the trading triangle between Majorca, Catalonia, and Valencia, see: Abulafia, David. *A Mediterranean Emporium: The Catalan Kingdom of Majorca*. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 1994: 150-164; Abulafia, David. “The Commerce of Medieval Majorca, 1150-1450”, *Medieval Spain and the Western Mediterranean*, Paul E. Chevedden, Donald J. Kagay, Paul G. Padilla, Larry J. Simon, eds. Leiden: Brill, 1994: II, 345-378.

120. *Chronicle of Pere III of Catalonia...*: II, 510, 536-537; VI: 8, 30. For the peace of Terrer (1361) and Murviedro (1363), see: Ferrer, María Teresa. *Entre la paz y la guerra. La corona catalano-aragonesa y Castilla en la Baja Edad Media*. Barcelona: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2005: 396-399, 409-410; Ferrer, María Teresa. “La frontera medieval valenciana...”: 275-277, 285-286; Cabezuelo, José Vicente. *La Guerra de los dos Pedros...*: 77-78, 83-84.

121. As the Aragonese chronicler, Jeronimo Zurita, observed, “it was difficult [for Pere] to maintain Castilians on frontier duty since they could not be distinguished from the enemy.” Zurita, Jerónimo. *Anales de la Corona de Aragón...*: IV, 322; IX: ix.

122. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1381, f. 33v-34.

123. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 107.

124. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1382, f. 173.



throughout the Crown of Aragon into his command or his lordship over them. From the announcement of his appointment as Pere's principal commander in March, 1359,¹²⁵ the king's other captains increasingly refused to serve under the count and, over the next year, this slowly flattened the command structure into a coterie of military leaders who operated beyond Trastámara's direct command, even though the count still retained the office of captain general of Aragon.¹²⁶

This development was largely accomplished without violence, but the same could not be said of Trastámara's relationship with his urban vassals. In Montblanch and his other Catalan holdings, the count's agents were met with such "injurious and threatening words of death" that they were afraid even to enter the town limits.¹²⁷ In the Valencian town of Castellon de la Plana, the citizens refused to render homage to Trastámara, even when Pere claimed that this action was for "the evident necessity and utility of our crown and public good of our lands and... realms."¹²⁸ Enraged that these townsmen, instead of "tendering a confiding faith" to their captain,¹²⁹ had absolutely refused to accept him as their lord, Pere, known for his flights of enraged bombast, promised the disobedient citizens that we will come personally to you and... inflict such a state of punishment that for all time it will be... an example to others who are disobedient to our commands.¹³⁰

In reality, however, the king relied on royal agents who were allowed to raise a small military force of their own to constrain the rebellious townsmen personally and financially. To add even further pressure for the punishment of "this repetition of superabundant deceit," Pere ordered his officials to arrest the ringleaders and submit them to the workings of royal justice.¹³¹ Few arrests took place, however, and most of the rebellious urban centers accepted the count's leadership in a perfunctory way. Their violent reactions to their foreign lord, however, scarred the relationship, leading Trastámara to view his towns more as centers of economic exploitation than of military or political support.¹³²

Despite his stormy relationship with his Aragonese, Catalan, and Valencian towns, Trastámara retained his right in them until 1366 when he initially won the Castilian

125. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1381, f. 205v-207.

126. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1381, f. 226; Registro 1382, f. 61; Registro 1383, f. 16r-16v; Gutiérrez, Antonio. "La Contraofensiva aragonesa...": 158. Pere mentions the command divisions often in 1359 and 1360, begging his captains "to be obedient to the great men" for "by such disobedience and disorder of the lesser men, damages, dangers, and confusion [comes] to the greater men." He begged them to maintain their companies on the frontier "as good and loyal retainers customarily do" and a promised a full discussion and settlement of the issues in a way agreeable to all.

127. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1543, f. 35, 36.

128. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 25v-26; Registro 1543, f. 26v.

129. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1543, f. 37.

130. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1543, f. 26r-26v, 36v-37, 38.

131. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1543, f. 26v, 38v.

132. In some ways, Trastámara's approach to the towns of the Crown of Aragon set the stage for the *mercedes enriqueñas*, the massive grants or urban territory that he made, once he had consolidated the Castilian Crown. Valdeón, Julio. *Enrique II*. Palencia: Diputación Provincial de Palencia-Editorial la Olmeda, 1996: 275-276; Valdeón, Julio. "Enrique II, King of Castile", *Medieval Iberia...*: 304.



Crown, even claiming these urban jurisdictions for several years afterwards. For his part, Pere resorted to legal casuistry in transforming the “perpetual” grants made to the count in 1357 into conditional donations that would revert back to the Aragonese crown if Trastámara himself “arrived at a royal rank.” Since “the then-count and now-king” initially accomplished this feat in the spring of 1366, Pere argued that the urban grants had reverted back to their “former state” and, as a result, the feudal oaths of the town residents to Trastámara were effectively abrogated.¹³³ To claim back what was rightfully his, Pere ordered his officials and representatives, including Queen Elionor, to take “physical possession” of the towns, expelling all of King Enrique's agents in the process.¹³⁴ Since the new Castilian sovereign had used one of these sites as a part of a dowry for his daughter, Juana, the nature of the urban grants became the subject of a lawsuit between Pere and Enrique's intended son-in-law, Felipe de Castro, but was ultimately settled out of court.¹³⁵

The shaky bond between Pere and his Castilian captain grew even more complicated when Pedro, who had been forced from Castile in the fall of 1366, returned with a mercenary army led by Edward, the Black Prince, and soundly defeated Enrique at Nájera (April 3, 1367).¹³⁶ In much the same way as he had unilaterally abrogated all the land grants when the count of Trastámara became the king of Castile, Pere concluded a truce with his Castilian adversary late in 1367 without even informing his former captain, who was by then a fugitive in France.¹³⁷ When Enrique quickly recovered from his defeat and formed yet another army, Pere now looked on him as an invader rather than a paid defender. Taking great pains to stop Enrique's march through the Pyrenean passes and across the Ebro into Castile because of the letter of the agreement he had made with Pedro,¹³⁸ Pere's efforts proved futile and he was forced to engage in a waiting game for which he had not set the rules and could not control. The road to Pedro's death and Enrique's ultimate victory at Montiel in 1369 now led away from the Aragonese king who could only watch these events from afar.¹³⁹

133. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1543, f. 58-60; Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...*: II, 555-556 (doc. 240/198).

134. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1543, f. 60, 64.

135. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1543, f. 61.

136. Estow, Clara. *Pedro the Cruel of Castile...*: 233-241; Valdeon, Julio. *Enrique II...*: 149-160; Castillo, Fernando. “Análisis de una batalla: Nájera (1367)”. *Cuadernos de Historia de España*, 73 (1991): 105-146; Fowler, Kenneth. *Medieval Mercenaries-volume 1: The Great Companies*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001: 199-221; Lerena, Tomás. “La batalla de Nájera (1367)”, *La Guerra en la Edad Media. XVII Semana de Estudios Medievales. Nájera, del 31 de Julio al 4 de Agosto de 2006*, José Ignacio de la Iglesia, ed. Logroño: Instituto de Estudios Riojanos, 2007: 345-378; Villalon, Andrew. “Spanish Involvement in the Hundred Years War and the Battle of Nájera”, *Hundred Years War...*: 2-70.

137. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 183v-184.

138. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 184v-185, 186-187, 198.

139. Lopez, Pero. *Coronica del rey Pedro...*: 195-96 (3rd year, chapter vi); Estow, Clara. *Pedro the Cruel of Castile...*: 257-59; Villalon, Andrew. “Pedro the Cruel...”: 201.



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Unlike his relationship with his other captains, Pere's bond to Enrique de Trastámara grew ever more complicated between 1357 and 1369 with the count's steady transition in status from royal contender to legitimate king. His relationship to his other great captain, Prince Ferran, marquis of Tortosa, was even more complicated and contentious. Born in 1329 to the Aragonese king, Alfonso IV (Alfons III) (1327-1336) and the Castilian princess, Leonore, Ferran soon proved a direct threat to Pere as presumptive heir. The queen and her Castilian advisers "devised many... persecutions" for Pere while influencing Alfons to settle on his second son a huge inheritance within the kingdom of Valencia.¹⁴⁰ Even before the Aragonese king's death in 1336, Leonore and her sons, Ferran and Juan, fearing Pere's desire for vengeance, fled to the court of her brother, the Castilian king, Alfonso XI (1312-1350). According to Pere, this unhappy event greatly damaged the Crown of Aragon.¹⁴¹ Leonore's meddling soon brought her a great and implacable enemy in the Castilian court itself in the person of her brother's bastard, the count of Trastámara.¹⁴² Even with their honored and stable base of operations in Castile, the widowed queen and her sons remained persistent rivals to the Aragonese sovereign. They pushed him to the limit of political persistence by throwing in their lot with a broad-based baronial rebellion, the *Unión*, which swept across Aragon and Valencia in 1346-1348.¹⁴³ Besieged by enemies on all sides, Pere had little option but to mend fences with his step-mother and half-brothers. With no male heir of his own at the time, Pere was forced by a raucous Valencian *Unión* to accept Ferran as his successor in the Crown of Aragon.¹⁴⁴ Even after his first son was born in 1351, he attempted to maintain good relations with his Castilian relatives by reaffirming their titles to Valencian lands, swearing that he would carry out "neither deceit nor trickery" against Leonore or her sons, and allowing them to pass unimpeded between their Castilian and Valencian holdings.¹⁴⁵

140. Ferran's claim to these regions were immediately contested by the Valencians themselves who refused to accept a Castilian lord and "were not kept in subjection as are the people of Castile". *Chronicle of Pere III of Catalonia...*: 174-179; I: 43-48; Miron, E. L. *The Queens of Aragon: Their Lives and Times*. London: S. Paul, 1913: 170-176; Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...*: I, 25-26; O'Callaghan, Joseph F. *A History of Medieval Spain...*: 410-11.

141. *Chronicle of Pere III of Catalonia...*: I, 186; I: 54.

142. Estow, Clara. *Pedro the Cruel of Castile...*: 182; Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...*: I, 232.

143. For the Aragonese and Valencian *uniones*, see: Tasis, Rafael. *Les Unions de nobles i el Rey del punyalet*. Barcelona: Rafael Dalmau Editors, 1960; Snneidman, Jerome Lee. *The Rise of the Aragonese-Catalan Empire, 1200-1350*. New York: New York University Press, 1970: II, 486-503.

144. *Chronicle of Pere III of Catalonia...*: I, 206-211; II, 26-28; Estow, Clara. *Pedro the Cruel...*: 182.

145. Pere claimed that "as nothing had been taken from the prince [Ferran] there was nothing to return to him." ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1532, f. 47; *Chronicle of Pere III of Catalonia...*: I, 211; II, 29; Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...*: I, 233 (doc. n° 194); II, 362 (doc. n° 194); II, 369-383 (doc. n° 199/7).



In spite of this temporary thawing in relations, Ferran stood with his Castilian cousin and against his Aragonese half-brother when war loomed in 1356. Bringing a large company of horse and foot into southern Valencia in early fall, he soon failed in attracting to his cause former allies from the kingdom's *Unión* and, after less than a year in Pedro's service, lost the crucial port city of Alicante.¹⁴⁶ Fearing the vicious and unpredictable temper of his cousin that would eventually claim the lives of his mother and brother and following a general trend of defection among the Castilian barony within the first year of the war,¹⁴⁷ Ferran, despite Pere's repeated proclamations of his relative's manifest treason during the war's first year, took the road of reconciliation with Aragon before 1357 ended.¹⁴⁸ After secret negotiations with Pere's trusted adviser, Bernat de Cabrera, in the late fall of 1357, Ferran came before the Aragonese king at Xativa early in 1358 "as one who wished to serve... [him] in everything."¹⁴⁹ The agreement they concluded, however, was hardly one-sided. In exchange for formally making peace with certain of his enemies among the Aragonese barony, including the counts of Trastámara and Luna, Ferran was made governor-general of Valencia and formally received title to cities and castles that had been taken from his family at the start of the Castilian war.¹⁵⁰

During his first years in Aragonese service, Ferran had little opportunity for offensive operations, and in the few raids he was involved in—forays against Murcia and Cartagena in the summer of 1358 and against southern Valencian castles in the next year—he showed himself to be an extremely cautious soldier.¹⁵¹ Indeed, much of his career as an administrator/captain was marked by the frustration and envy that led to his ultimate break with his half-brother. From the great number of royal communiques that came to him, the prince must have seen Pere as a micro-manager who seemed at least as interested in the types of battle banners his soldiers carried and in the responsibility his commanders had in providing salaries for isolated ancillary units as he did in laying out a general strategy to defeat Pedro.¹⁵²

146. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 889, f. 154v-155; Registro 1148, f. 124v; *Epistolari de Pere III*, Ramon Gubern, ed. Barcelona: Editorial Barcino, 1955: 129-132 (doc. nº 118); Zurita, Jerónimo. *Anales de la Corona de Aragón...*: IV, 310; IX: vi; Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...*: I, 255.

147. *Chronicle of Pere III of Catalonia...*: II, 493-495; VI: 2; Zurita, Jerónimo. *Anales de la Corona de Aragón...*: IV, 318-320; IX: viii. For Pedro's mental disorders, see: Estow, Clara. *Pedro the Cruel of Castile...*; Moya, Gonzalo. *Don Pedro el Cruel. Biología, política y tradición literaria en la figura de Pedro I de Castilla*. Madrid: Ediciones Júcar, 1974.

148. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1532, f. 54v-55, 56-58.

149. Pere III of Catalonia. *Chronique...*: II, 517; VI: 17; Zurita, Jerónimo. *Anales de la Corona de Aragón...*: IV, 342-343; IX: xiv; Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...*: I, 270-271.

150. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1532, f. 60-63; Zurita, Jerónimo. *Anales de la Corona de Aragón...*: IV, 344-346; Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...*: I, 271-272; Sitges, Joan Bautista. *Las mujeres del rey Don Pedro I de Castilla*. Madrid: Est. Tipolitográfico "sucesores de Rivadeneyra", 1910: 108-109.

151. ACA. Cancillería real. Cartas Reales [Pedro IV], nº. 5744; Registro 1171, f. 42r-42v.

152. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1162, f. 136; Registro 1382, f. 95v-96; *Documents històrics catalans del segle XIV: Colecció de cartas familiars corresponents als regnats de Pere del Punyalet y Johan I*, ed. José Coroleu. Barcelona: Imprempta La Renaixensa, 1889: 63.



With the great number of vassals Ferran possessed in both Aragon and Valencia, he spent much of his time in seeing that his retainers/soldiers were paid a promised daily wage.¹⁵³ In this drive for monetary compensation, his relationship with the towns he held under direct jurisdiction became severely strained. As he brusquely asked sites such as Orihuela to increase their funding, the city fathers just as persistently complained that they were unable to do so because of the devastating effect of persistent, Castilian raiding on their shattered economy.¹⁵⁴ When these same town officials asked the Crown for the disbursement of war funds to their own citizens who had served alongside Ferran's troops, the prince seemed ready to break his ties to all southern Valencian towns.¹⁵⁵ The end-result of this petulant policy was Pere's increasing lack of confidence in his half-brother as a defender who disdained defensive operations and as a frontier commander with suspiciously close ties to many Castilian baronial families.¹⁵⁶ Ferran's arrogant lack of subservience to the Aragonese crown quickly led the prince to sue Pere to regain some of the Valencian properties once held by his deceased brother, Juan. The litigation was unsuccessful, but Ferran did manage to severely weaken his tenuous personal and military relationship with his half-brother.¹⁵⁷

Despite these very open differences, Pere never missed an opportunity to use Ferran as a pawn against the Castilian king. Throughout 1360 and 1361, he urged his sibling to mount an "invasion" (*entrada*) into Castilian territory.¹⁵⁸ Pere apparently had some confidence that Ferran, who was extremely popular with the Castilian *émigrés* in the Crown of Aragon,¹⁵⁹ could either hold Pedro at bay or seriously challenge him for his throne. Ever ready to expand his own realms through the efforts of others, Pere solidified his relationship with Ferran, who, like Enrique de Trastámara, might rapidly transform himself from a captain of defense to a foreign conqueror. On January 31, 1361, Pere, displaying little confidence in the negotiations that would ultimately lead to a peace instrument he concluded at Terrer with Pedro in May 14, 1361,¹⁶⁰ met with the prince before a distinguished assembly of clerics and magnates at Barcelona to arrange supposedly secret accords that would lead to the long hoped-for downfall of his Castilian adversary. To bring about this event, Pere guaranteed Ferran the salary of 2,500 horsemen and 500 crossbowmen for the next three months and that of 500 knights for the month of

153. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1382, f. 121r-121v.

154. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1181, f. 32r-32v.

155. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1158, f. 104; Registro 1180, f. 59r-59v.

156. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 982, f. 1210; Registro 1173, f. 55, 65v; Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...*: I, 279.

157. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1161, f. 42r-42v; Registro 1547, f. 7v-10v, 30-32v, 59v-61.

158. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1382, f. 131, 136v, 174v. Pere himself had already led small raids into Castile in 1358 and 1359, but had quickly broken off the forays "because of the scarcity of victuals" and since he encountered "no [enemy] force" on this bleak frontier. *Chronicle of Pere III of Catalonia...*: II, 521; VI: 21; Zurita, Jerónimo. *Anales de la Corona de Aragón...*: IV, 366; IX: xx.

159. Zurita, Jerónimo. *Anales de la Corona de Aragón...*: IV, 468-69; IX: xlvii.

160. Zurita, Jerónimo. *Anales de la Corona de Aragón...*: IV, 432-433; IX: xxxviii.



May if a mopping-up operation proved necessary. With this moderately-sized army by the standards of the War of the Two Pedros, Ferran was expected to militarily challenge his cousin, Pedro, in the Castilian heartlands. If the prince was successful in winning the Castilian crown, Pere expected to reap a handsome dividend from his investment by having transferred to his control the entire kingdom of Murcia and sixteen Castilian border towns “with all their castles, hamlets, kingdoms, and appurtenances.”¹⁶¹ More importantly for the future of his dynasty, the Aragonese king arranged for a marriage agreement between his heirs and those of Ferran. If the prince had no male descendants, his daughter would be married to one of Pere's legitimate successors, thus effectively uniting Castile and the Crown of Aragon under an Aragonese ruler.¹⁶²

As soon as Ferran began to carry out these grandiose plans in the spring of 1362, Pere's devious nature interceded. Writing his half brother on March 28, 1362, he sternly instructed him to return lands he had recently won from the city of Murcia, saying that his unwarranted action caused great “offense” to the sovereigns of both Castile and Aragon.¹⁶³ The secret agreement between Ferran and Pere had apparently been trumped by the Aragonese king's public agenda of maintaining the flagging peace of Terrer. The shifting nature of their relationship now entered a particularly dangerous phase that once more pitted the half-brothers not as lukewarm allies but as serious rivals.

As 1362 passed into 1363, Pere's relationship with his sibling/captain grew steadily worse and was complicated by the king's desire to maintain Trastámara's good will and to force Pedro back to peace negotiations. During the late summer of 1362, the Aragonese king utterly lost confidence in the prince who failed to react against a large Castilian offensive that quickly led to the capture of Calatayud on August 29.¹⁶⁴ Following a pattern well-established during his Aragonese service, Ferran largely ignored his half-brother's calls for help and allowed his southern Valencian towns and fortresses to remain under-manned and poorly supplied.¹⁶⁵

Even beyond Ferran's appearance of official “disservice,” Pere was faced with the far more serious problem of preventing the rivalry of his foreign captains from devolving into a civil war in its own right. The count of Trastámara grew increasingly alarmed as more and more of the Castilians in Aragonese service threw

161. ACA. Cancillería real. Pergaminos de Pedro IV, n.º. 2260; Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...*: I, 282-283, 291; II, 495-497 (doc. n.º 224); Zurita, Jerónimo. *Anales de la Corona de Aragón...*: IV, 407-408; IX: xxxi. The towns mentioned were: Requena, Moya, Cañete, Cuenca, Farizía, Salmerón, Valdeolivas, Alcocer, Escamiella, Beteta, Molina, Medinacelia, Almazán, Berlanga, Soria, Gomara, and Agreda.

162. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1293, f. 77v-78v; Sitges, Joan Bautista. *Las Mujeres del rey don Pedro...*: 110-114.

163. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1394; Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...*: II, 499-500 (doc. n.º 226).

164. Gutiérrez, Antonio. “Las fortalezas aragonesas ante la gran ofensiva castellana en la guerra de los Dos Pedros”. *Cuadernos de Historia Jerónimo Zurita*, 12-13 (1961): 9-15; Zurita, Jerónimo. *Anales de la Corona de Aragón...*: IV, 445-448; IX: xlii.

165. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1181, f. 73v-74.



in their lot with the prince as their natural lord. When his own brothers, Sancho and Tello, followed suit and transferred their allegiance to Ferran, the count forced his Aragonese master to choose which of his captains possessed superior authority.¹⁶⁶ Consistent with his dissembling way of politics, the Aragonese king gave no public indication of this change in official direction. The troubled stalemate was forced to a head when Castilian and Aragonese negotiators concluded yet another peace treaty, this time at Murviedro on July 2, 1363.¹⁶⁷ Seeing little future for himself in the Crown of Aragon, Ferran asked his half-brother for permission to take his Castilian companies across the Pyrenees where mercenary service had entered a growth spurt after the treaty of Bretigny in 1360.¹⁶⁸ Before he could escape the cockpit of Aragonese politics, however, Pedro threatened to reject the Murviedro pact unless Pere killed all the Castilians in his service.¹⁶⁹ Though Pedro was clearly referring to his own hated half-brother, Enrique de Trastámara, the military instability his actions caused would soon cost Ferran his life.

Though Pere spent much of the spring and summer of 1363 in defending the capital of Valencia, the treaty of Murviedro provided the king with a temporary respite from military concerns. Taking some rest in Burriana, the king moved his pared-down court to Castellon de la Plana on July 10. He dined with his half-brother on the following Sunday (July 16) and then, influenced by his counselors, Trastámara and Bernat de Cabrera, concluded that it was too dangerous to allow Ferran to remain in or leave Aragonese service. Considering the prince guilty of treason and dereliction of duty, Pere ordered him arrested. Accompanied by a sizeable body of Trastámara's and Cabrera's retainers, the arresting officer soon found that the prince ready "to die rather than to be a prisoner." Drawing their swords, Ferran and his followers held off the king's men and killed at least one of them. Eventually, however, royal numbers won out and the prince and his principal lieutenants were hacked to death, though several of his younger retainers escaped through a window.¹⁷⁰

While the prime mover in Ferran's death was clearly his fellow captain and rival, Enrique de Trastámara, Pere also had blood on his hands, but this hardly slowed his drive to profit from the situation.¹⁷¹ On the very day of Ferran's death (July 16, 1363), the king began the process of reclaiming the towns and fortresses formerly held by the prince. Informing the urban officials and castellans of these sites that Ferran, a proven traitor who had driven the king "to the point of losing his crown

166. Zurita, Jerónimo. *Anales de la Corona de Aragón...* IV, 469; IX: xlvii; Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...* I, 311-312.

167. López, Pero. *Coronica del rey Pedro...* 136-37 (14th year, chapter 5); Zurita, Jerónimo. *Anales de la Corona de Aragón...* IV, 464-467; IX: xlvi.

168. Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...* I, 312.

169. López, Pero. *Coronica del rey Pedro...* 137 (14th year, chapter 5).

170. *Chronicle of Pere III of Catalonia...* II, 537-541; VI: 34-36; López, Pero. *Coronica del rey Pedro...* 137-138 (14th year, chapter 6); Zurita, Jerónimo. *Anales de la Corona de Aragón...* IV, 473; IX: xlvii.

171. Zurita, Jerónimo. *Anales de la Corona de Aragón...* IV, 472-473; IX: xlvii; Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...* I, 313.



and realm," was now dead, Pere instructed these officials to turn over control of the sites to royal officials who would duly reclaim them for the crown.¹⁷² Even with the *fiat accompli* of Ferran's death, the prince's former vassals retained their allegiance to his wife, Princess Maria of Portugal, (who was rumored to be pregnant with his child), and did not formally renew feudal tied to the king for over a year.¹⁷³

While Ferran's death proved a victory of sorts for his half-brother, it displayed the many weaknesses of Enrique de Trastámara as Pere's principal foreign captain. Though bolstered by renewed feudal pact of February, 1364 in which the king swore to protect the count as a lord "must defend his good subject and natural vassal,"¹⁷⁴ Trastámara had lost the backing of his brothers and many other Castilian *émigrés*.¹⁷⁵ A crown was in Enrique's future, but it would hardly be gained with the support of his old retainers, but rather from the skill of foreign mercenaries. For Pere, Ferran's death was scarcely the sorrowful loss of "a brother of our own blood from the same father,"¹⁷⁶ but instead the elimination of a serious rival for royal power and a definitive step towards military and political survival.¹⁷⁷

7

Unlike the reconquest campaigns Jaume I (1214-1276) conducted against Majorca (1229-1232) and Valencia (1234-1238) that often brought together up to 15,000 troops in the field for long periods and featured war councils that aided but often frustrated the king in formulating long-range strategy,¹⁷⁸ Pere III's ten-year-long war against Castile was largely an asymmetrical conflict fought by extremely

172. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1188, f. 40; Registro 1189, f. 206v, 215; Registro 1190, f. 428, 429v, 430, 434.

173. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 911, f. 22r-22v; Registro 1190, f. 428v; Registro 1197, f. 1394v; Registro 1199, f. 503v.

174. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1543, f. 42-47v; Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...*: II, 501-509.

175. López, Pero. *Coronica del rey Pedro...*: 138 (14th year, chapter 7); Zurita, Jerónimo. *Anales de la Corona de Aragón...*: IV, 503; IX: liv.

176. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1190, f. 434.

177. Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...*: I, 312-313.

178. For army sizes in the Balearic and Valencian campaigns, see: Santamaria, Álvaro. "La expansión político-militar de la Corona de Aragón bajo la dirección de Jaime I: Baleares", *Jaime I y su época. X Congreso de Historia de la Corona de Aragón*. Zaragoza: Institución Fernando el Católico, 1979: 93-146, especially 122-123; Kagay, Donald J. "Army Mobilization, Royal Administration, and the Realm in the Thirteenth-Century Crown of Aragon", *Iberia and the Mediterranean World of the Middle Ages*, Paul E. Cheveden, Donald J. Kagay, Paul G. Padilla, Larry J. Simon, eds. Leiden: Brill, 1995-1996: I, 105; Rogers, Clifford J. *Soldiers' Lives through History: The Middle Ages*. Westport: Greenwood, 2007: 48-49. For the Conqueror's war councils during the Majorcan and Valencian campaigns, see: *The Book of Deeds of James I of Aragon...*: 85-86, 163-166, 171, 179, 187, 204-206, 218-219 (chapters 166-170, 180, 194, 206, 233, 237, 261-262); Kagay, Donald J. "Jaime I of Aragon: Child and Master of the Spanish Reconquest". *Journal of Medieval Military History*, 8 (2010): 99-100.



small parties of horse and foot around the castles that dominated the Crown of Aragon's eastern and southern frontiers.¹⁷⁹ Although depending on the advice of his uncles, Count Ramon Berenguer of Ampurias and Count Pere of Ribagorza during most of the Castilian war,¹⁸⁰ the Aragonese king seldom relied on councils of his army leaders, but rather as an absentee manager conducted a system of defense that utilized officials of all types to inform, direct, and even discipline aristocratic, urban, clerical, and foreign captains who held the exposed frontiers. Within the third year of the conflict, the parliaments of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia also assumed fiscal, logistical, and organizational functions which made them and their executive committees (*diputaciones, generalitats*) into a kind of a "shadow government" that vied with the crown to assume military responsibilities.¹⁸¹ Pere heavily relied on his own officials and those of the parliaments to pass orders to captains and bring communiques back to their royal master.¹⁸² Occasionally, these agents were called upon to make public announcements concerning the war to an entire community.¹⁸³ When the king's captains or subjects chose to ignore his commands, Pere used his magistrates to both cajole them by threatening to distrain their property and tempt them by offering fiscal or judicial inducements.¹⁸⁴

Since most of the Castilian conflict was fought over the possession of frontier castles, royal officials proved invaluable in seeing that captains, town councils and military orders carried out royal directives to repair castles or town fortifications.¹⁸⁵ They were also ordered to co-ordinate the supplying of such outposts with "food, firewood, weapons, stone shot, ... hemp, pitch, lime, and tallow."¹⁸⁶ This often required the expropriation of crops or manufactured goods and the confiscation of ships or mule trains to transport such supplies to the war zone.¹⁸⁷ Along with

179. Kagay, Donald J. "Defending the Western and Southern Frontier...": 77-107.

180. *Chronicle of Pere III of Catalonia...* I, 16-17.

181. Kagay, Donald J. "The Societal and Institutional Cost of Territorial Defense in Late-Medieval Catalonia". *Journal of the Georgia Association of Historians*, 25 (2004): 38-39; Kagay, Donald J. "A Government Besieged by Conflict: The Parliament of Monzón as Military Financier", *Hundred Years War...*: 134-140.

182. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1136, f. 120v; Registro 1180, f. 79v; Registro 1384, f. 74v; Registro 1387, f. 10v, 36v-38, 60v-61, 123, 189; *The Book of Deeds of James I of Aragon...*: 424 (doc. n° 559); Ainaga, María Teresa. "El fogaje aragonés de 1362: Aportación a la demografía de Zaragoza en el siglo XIV". *Aragón en la Edad Media*, 8 (1989): 36.

183. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1380, f. 159r-159v. One example of such announcements is sufficient:

"Here ye, now that the Lord King makes known to every knight, son of a knight, high-born person, honored townsman, villager, and others who customarily serve with a horse and weapons...that since the king of Castile has come into the frontiers of Aragon..., the [Aragonese] king wishes to engage in combat with him".

184. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1380, f. 27, 153; Registro 1381, f. 185; Registro 1382, f. 153-154; Registro 1383, f. 216v-217; Registro 1387, f. 25, 40v-41, 54v-56, 62r-v, 73r-v, 80v-81, 116v-117.

185. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1382, f. 107r-107v; Registro 1387, f. 83, 87r-v; 161v-162, 163v-164; Kagay, Donald J. "A Shattered Circle: eastern...": 128-129.

186. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1174, f. 55v; Registro 1380, f. 81v; Registro 1387, f. 35v; *Epistolari de Pere III...*: I, 167-168 (doc. n° 25); Kagay, Donald J. "A Shattered Circle: eastern...": 124.

187. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1382, f. 165v; Registro 1387, f. 69r-69v, 143v-144, 146v.



their counterparts in the parliamentary executive committees, royal officials were essential in the collection of funds needed for extending campaigning. The principal form of these extraordinary subsidies was the “household tax’ (*fogatge, fogaje*) that was exacted on every hearth (*foch*) of the cities, towns, villages, and hamlets in the realm in which these imposts were collected.¹⁸⁸ Parliamentary agents were normally in charge of gathering this money and transporting it to the front, but could never consider their task complete without an audit of their accounts by one of the king’s treasury officials.¹⁸⁹ Such functionaries were also essential for the smooth management of fiscal operations at the front by verifying “muster lists” (*mostras*), issuing “pay vouchers” (*alberani, albaras*), “letters of credit (*cartas de creença*), “receipts” (*apochas*), and “estimates of money needed” (*estimes*), and keeping a special account (*compte*) for each commander.¹⁹⁰ Beyond their service to the war effort, Pere’s functionaries, acting “in his stead,” routinely operated within the purview of their offices to settle disputes between captains, and to give them advice about terrain that was often based on first-hand intelligence.¹⁹¹ They were also called on to act as arbiters between captains and the governments of the towns and villages in which they were stationed.¹⁹² These two groups, though ostensibly natural constituents because of their complementary roles in the war, often viewed each other with as much distrust as they did the Castilian enemy.¹⁹³ To maintain the fragile peace in such settlements while fighting an external war, royal officials had to support the rights of frontier commanders to act as judges except in those cases in which the garrison had engaged in violent exchanges with townsmen. When this occurred, they stepped in and issued verdicts that bound both sides.¹⁹⁴

The thorniest problems faced by Pere’s magistrate’s during the long conflict had less to do with their relationship to the royal captains and more with their general duty to safeguard the Crown of Aragon’s rugged and ill-defined borders. Since a large Castilian population had entered Aragon and Valencia during the war either to escape Pedro’s cruelty or to seek fresh opportunity in Pere’s lands, the Aragonese king feared they might serve as a “fifth column” for their former royal overlord. To prevent this, Pere had his men maintain constant surveillance on Castilians in the Crown of Aragon and, after 1366, ordered them moved away from the border.¹⁹⁵

188. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1382, f. 146; Registro 1387, f. 10, 166.

189. Kagay, Donald J. “A Government Besieged by Conflict...”: 138.

190. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1381, f. 123r-123v, 192; Registro 1382, f. 180v-181; Registro 1383, f. 221v-222v; Kagay, Donald J. “A Government Besieged by Conflict...”: 138.

191. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 26, 132r-132v.

192. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1380, f. 111.

193. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1379, f. 117.

194. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1379, f. 123r-123v.

195. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 135, 144v. Pere, ever suspicious that Pedro’s great victories were caused by the treason and collaboration of his own people, dealt with the problem by moving suspected populations away from exposed frontiers. After the fall of the Aragonese city of Tarazona in 1357, the king, certain that the city had surrendered because of “the great treason and wickedness” of its citizens, would tolerate the presence of the Tarazona survivors on the Aragonese frontier any longer,



Between 1366 and 1369 when Pedro and Enrique were involved in a bloody struggle for the Castilian throne, Aragonese officials had to protect the exposed frontiers against both the army Enrique brought together in France after his defeat at Nájera¹⁹⁶ and the “free companies” under the command of the Black Prince and Bertran de Guesclin that began to stream over the Pyrenees seeking employment in the Castilian civil war.¹⁹⁷

8

The ten years of sometimes low-level, sometimes desperate border fighting associated with the War of the Two Pedros had truly accelerated the transformation of the Crown of Aragon into a set of nation-states.¹⁹⁸ The success of Pere's parliaments and their executive committees in paying for, recruiting, and deploying troops in an effort parallel to that of the royal administration represented, at least for a time, a virtual “governmental duality.”¹⁹⁹ One modern historian has characterized Pere's day-to-day political and military adaptation simply to survive the constant Castilian pressure on his borders as a loss of “initiative in policy and finance to his great assemblies.”²⁰⁰ This same era of weakened royal power and the parliaments' simultaneous discovery of their permanent voices has led another scholar to describe the years of the Castilian war as the natal period for the birth of “a new representative State [in the Crown of Aragon] before [the development of] the monarchical State.”²⁰¹

These assessments have some validity in a narrow sense, but they overlook the broader defensive structure that Pere developed in the long frontier duel with Pedro I. The asymmetrical union of captains and administrators, which had eventually prevented the Castilian capture of great swaths of Aragon and Valencia, also safeguarded the exposed Pyrenean borderlands of Catalonia, Cerdanya, and Ribagorza from the English and French mercenary bands who came south seeking martial opportunity after 1360. The amalgam of feudal, national emergency, and mercenary troops that Pere threw into the fray, however, can hardly be called a

moving them to the Catalan city of Manresa where they stayed for the rest of the war. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1149, f. 96v; *Epistolari de Pere III...*: 155-158 (doc. n° 21).

196. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 122, 125v, 129, 131; Registro 1543, f. 69v.

197. ACA. Cancillería real. Registro 1387, f. 126v, 150v, 172-173; Masiá, Ángeles. *Relación castellano-leonesa desde Jaime II...*: II, 554-555 (doc. 239/190).

198. Kagay, Donald J. “Defending the Western and Southern...”: 90-91.

199. Bisson, Thomas N. “Statebuilding in the Medieval Crown of Aragon”, *El poder real en la Corona de Aragón. XV Congreso de Historia de la Corona de Aragón (Siglos XIV-XVI)*. Zaragoza: Institución Fernando el Católico, 1993: I, 157-158.

200. Bisson, Thomas N. *The Medieval Crown of Aragon: A Short History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986: 118.

201. González, Luis. “Sobre ‘Poder y Sociedad’”, *El poder real en la Corona de Aragón...*: I, 309.



centralized army such as those developing in the early modern period.²⁰² The diffuse military force (or rather set of forces) that emerged under Pere's direction during the Castilian war was perfectly fitted to the defense of realms that were themselves imperfect and evolving compromises between a small but forward-looking royal center and a jealously-conservative aristocratic and feudal periphery. Companies of horse and foot serving under specially-appointed commanders became the standard of Iberian military organization for the next century. It was utilized in a fully urban setting when Barcelona defended itself with a complex arrangement of neighborhood captains and militias during the invasion of the French count of Armagnac in 1389²⁰³ and even constituted a prime aspect of Catholic Kings' epic war against Granada (1481-1492). The tension between the personal regime of such great captains as Gonzalo de Córdoba and Hernando Cortes and the royal government that paid them²⁰⁴ pointed in microcosm to the decentralized and centralized control which characterized the new Iberian state that flowered under Ferdinand and Isabela as "a reorganized and re-articulated medieval society."²⁰⁵

202. Hale, John Rigby. *War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985: 46-74; McNeill, William H. *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982: 125-143.

203. Marsá, Francisco. *Onomàstica Barcelonina del Segle XIV*. Barcelona: Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona, 1976; Ferrer, Maria Teresa. "La organización militar en Cataluña...": 189.

204. Stewart, Paul. "The Soldier, the Bureaucrat, and Fiscal Records in the Army of Ferdinand and Isabela". *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, 49 (1969): 288-292.

205. Elliott, John Huxtable. *Spain and its World, 1500-1700*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989: 28.

