SELF-FULLFILLING PROPHECIES:
PROPAGANDA AND POLITICAL MODELS BETWEEN CUBA, SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

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"From the Pyrenees on down, I am not interested in,
nor do I know anything about, the southern portion of the world."
Henry Kissinger, circa 1974[1]

Much of what historians take as an analytic framework for the interpretation of any given political context depends nearly always on an inherited perspective derived from the ideological crossfire of the time: in other words, propaganda becomes dignified with the passage of time and apostheosized into analysis and elucidation, to a large extent, by dint of mere repetition and scant exploration of more than a few standard sources. Thus, no matter how limited in focus, many ideas become codified as "History", in an especially perverse expression of the self-fulfilling prophecy: unable to withstand the pressure of events, such ideological concepts are nonetheless realized after death, as it were, whereupon ensconsced, they define such an imaginary past as they were incapable of determining when it was still the present. Despite all the attention given in recent years to the avoidance of reification, little self-criticism has been applied by historians to the narrowness of the notional structures they transmit to other social disciplines, where they are taken up, in turn uncritically, and used to construct all sorts of ideational edifices. This is especially true of political areas that are peripheral to central concerns and which are therefore entrusted to local historiographies. These are almost universally mere sounding boards for those ideological preoccupations at the heart of local conflict. Their interests, bound up in all manner of moral justification, are passed up the scientific feeding-chain, where they work their way into such ideological reformulation as the lastest academic convention or craze interacts with the evolution of political patterns. To be most concrete, we are suggesting that the Cuban-Spanish-U.S. triangle is a perfect example of such an evolution. The terms in which propaganda between factions surrounding the independence of the Caribbean island was formulated literally became self-fulfilling prophecy, that is, the way behavior would eventually politically judged over time, perceived in quite rigid ways.

THE CONTINUITY OF CUBAN NATIONALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY

Some of these background conflicts in nationalist discourse can be seen in a recent work, which promises to be influential in the somewhat narrow field of English-language Cuban studies. Louis A. Pérez Jr. is probably the most outstanding historian of Cuban history, with a considerable corpus of work at his back and an exhaustive knowledge of Cuban and United States' sources on the last hundred years of the greatest of the Antilles. Pérez's latest book is an

[1] Cited in N.W.A. (1974), p. 45.

impassioned denunciation of the wicked and manipulative interplay between U.S. perceptions, U.S. imperial needs, and subsequent Americanist historiography, traditionally notorious for its scant interest in other social realities beyond its borders.[2] The net sum, in Pérez's vision, is most painful to Cuban sensibility. Pérez's book has been greeted with the claim that it represents a bold "deconstruction" of both short and longterm U.S. perceptions about the Cuban War of 1895-1898 and its outcome. Nevertheless, Pérez's argument is substantially that of Cuban nationalist historiography that bloomed after the 1933 revolution, as exemplified by Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring.

Let us examine with more attention the Cuban nationalist thesis, as it developed from Roig to Pérez. In 1945, Roig enumerated thirteen "conclusions" referring to the revolutionary process in Cuba throughout the Nineteenth Century.[3] Without following them in detail, for lack of space, these can be fairly summarized as follows. The Cuban independence movement was a continuum from its inception to the defeat of Spain, marked by a prolonged thirty-year-long conflict up to 1898. If the 1868 War was led from above, by the bourgeosie, the 1895 conflict, which closed the struggle, was impelled from below, and determined by Martí's farsighted ideological perceptions, which called (among many other things) for a fight without hatred for Spaniards in Cuba, but with implacable hostility towards those responsible for oppression, in faraway Spain. Autonomists were spokesmen for a small minority and a lost cause, if not worse. The Cuban nationalist movement, therefore, literally was Cuba, and represented her fully, with articulated underground institutions and effectively waged guerrilla warfare.[4] The Spanish forces, with no recourse but terrorism (Weyler's "reconcentration" policy), were already basically defeated when the United States -which had long contemplated the island with the intent of establishing its control, and which by the end of the century had reduced it to a virtual economic colony- stepped into the conflict.[5] As is to be expected, the covetous attention of a long list of presidents and other American public officials in acquiring the prize of the Caribbean from Spain was a central theme of Cuban historiography, as nationalism surged with ever greater intensity after the frustrations of the 1933 revolution and the maintenance of U.S. involvement in Cuban affairs continued despite the formal abrogation of the protectorate.[6]

In 1950, Roig de Leuchsenring also made his thesis more explicit in book form.[7] He stressed the working nature of the infrastructure of revolt, both military and political, despite its somewhat tatty appearance. At the same time, this signified the effective defeat of opposing Spanish forces, which he documents mostly with Spanish sources, from contemporary essays and journalism (like Morote), to more reflexive, early historiographic materials from the pre-1936 years (from Ortega Rubio to Romanones or Gabriel Maura). The overbearing U.S. presence, followed in narrative detail from Jefferson onwards, merely certified the degree to which the nothern neighbor had become the true enemy of Cuban self-determination. Logically, the literature of the Castro revolution took over such argumentation wholsesale, but that has not meant that exile commentary has in any way abandoned a similar viewpoint, which remains firmly anchored in the verities of the Nineteenth-Century liberation struggle, with Martí as everyone's saintly apostle. In fact, the 9th National Congress of History in Cuba (cited at the end

[2] L.A. Pérez Jr. (1998).

[3] E. Roig de Leuchsenring (1945).

[4] E. Roig de Leuchsenring (1945); Roig did a 1947 study of Weyler -*Weyler en Cuba, un precursor de la barbarie fascista*- which I have not been able to obtain.

[5] H. Portell Vilá (1937-1941); E. Roig de Leuchsenring (1949).

[6] E. Roig de Leuchsenring (1945).

[7] E. Roig de Leuchsenring (1960).

of the 1960 third edition of Roig's essay) formally decided to recommend to the Minister of Education "that the programs and texts of our Patriotic History [*Historia Patria*] be accordingly revised so that they might show clearly the fact demostrated by Doctor Roig de Leuchsenring that *Cuba does not owe her independence to the United States* [italics in the original]."[8]

Pérez has picked up where Roig left off, with the advantage of a much greater spread of sources, especially of U.S. historiography, which becomes the central thrust of his study. In short, Pérez presents the all but triumph of the Cuban independentist cause and the withering away of Spanish offensive capacity. Accordingly, U.S. intervention was an external "coup de grâce", basically unnecessary at best and most ungenerous at worst. Basically, Pérez argues, the Americans deceived themselves to their own advantage. The evolution of their sentiments quickly congealed into a hard, historiographic verity, which has been endlessly reiterated by U.S. history texts thereafter. This is, no doubt, quite true.

More specifically, Pérez shows how the initial enthusiasm for the "poor Cuban Patriots", which called forth many American volunteers and helped spread idealistic war fever, was a sympathetic call for justice, combining Cuban appeals for self-determination with the will to avenge U.S. victims ("Remember the Maine!"). As soon as American troops landed in Cuba, however, their ingenuous affection in the abstract for the Patriot cause began to wither: they found the ragtag Cubans unattractive, with an attitude problem, insofar as they were not willing to assume the role of faithful helpers that the Americans had allotted to them. Obviously, although Pérez does not underline the point, the racial divide was cutting on both sides of the cross-cultural meeting. Furthermore, and quite unsurprisingly, Cuban guerrilla forces, however much they might claim to be the regular army of a formal, if insurgent, government, had little punctuality and scant coordination, except on their own terms.[9] At the same time, their armed pressure on Spanish columns, of major indirect effectiveness to the U.S. campaign on the island, was not very visible to American forces. So American irritation quickly turned to disdain: U.S. troopers allegedly were doing all the work and all the fighting for slovenly, shifty ingrates who "turned tail" at their convenience. As Pérez indicates, such sentiments rapidly turned even more sour, eventually becoming the claim to an exclusive American victory, and, therefore, the justification for U.S. military occupation, non-recognition of Patriot revolutionary political institutions and political claims, and, in the last instance, for the imposition of a disguised protectorate together with a granted independence. Finally, as Pérez demostrates with abundant quotes, U.S. national historiography has since endlessly repeated the same final judgements, which have become conventional wisdom.

Pérez is right to stress the degree to which Spanish war effort was worn out by the combination of disease and guerrillas (a point stressed by Roig), but, despite some interesting contemporary sources, he does not some much demostrate, as baldly state the old nationalist thesis that Cuban nationalists had *won* the war. There is a difference between one side losing a war and the other winning it, and nothing is presented to show that Spanish forces would not have been able to hold a stalemate in both conflicts -Cuba and the Philippines- for a considerablely longer period of time without the cut-off of an American intervention, in fact, as long as Spain could hold the ports and control maritime access to the island, without having insular civil war spread to peninsular politics. But naval defeat meant the automatic collapse of any war effort.

As numerous well-known examples in a colonial or neo-colonial context have shown throughout the Twentieth Century, guerrilla wars tend to be won politically rather than mili-

[8] E. Roig de Leuchsenring (1960), p. 155.
[9] Col. E. Bujac (n. d.).

tarily. In Algeria, for example, French forces imposed themselves in the physical battle against the nationalist combat units and could even face a campaign of withering terrorism, but the retentionist cause could not politically sustain the strain that this effort demanded of metropolitan society, and, after successive jolts to mainland institutions, De Gaulle eventually opted for peace, at the expense of Pro-French opinion in the territory.[10] Seen in this light, the determining point of Cuban victory (and Filipino triumph) was not to be found in the islands themselves, but in peninsular Spanish society. Nevertheless, in 1898, there was still no massive opposition to a war policy overseas, a fact which meant that the society as a whole could still withstand the cost. On the contrary, generalized discontent over "national goals" unachieved and systematic protest came afterwards, as the result of a humiliating "disaster" at U.S., not Cuban, hands.

Pérez exhibits a certain nationalist bitterness for the lack of recognition of belligerent rights to the Cuban Junta, but the fact was that the Cuban rebels did not control any cities, a standard expression of indisputable control of territory, and such a legal rebuff has been one of the repeated side-effects of successful guerrilla campaigns throughout the Twentieth Century. The probable fact that the Spanish authorities ceased to control much of the interior for long decades after 1868, somewhat unfairly perhaps, was not a comparable criterion: no colonial empire at that time had effective sway in all of its "bush" and, in consequence, interstate relations diplomatically avoided such a prickly question (a situation that would later benefit independent Cuban governments).[11] Pérez does, however, make a good point -not found in Roig- to the effect that the establishment of autonomy cut the heart out of the españolistas and weakened Spanish combat morale in general, but his evident nationalist distaste for the loyalist side keeps him from exploring this further (quite the opposite, as would be expected, of Spanish historians, who, given the present reorganization of Spain in regional autonomies, have suddenly found all manner of approaches to the Cuban and Puerto Rican "autonomistas").[12] In fact, to measure the degree of Pérez's nationalism, one should remark on his complete indifference to Spain (not even included as an entry in the index or given attention in the bibliographical essay), which remains, in his argument, a mere presence, trotted-out quite briefly to be dismissed, a backdrop to the major subject, which is the U.S. betrayal of Cuban hopes and even of its own momentary idealism.[13] This viewpoint has other costs. His general lack of interest in the Philippines means that the far greater humiliations suffered by Filipino nationalism in all respects are never used as an element of comparison which might counterbalance more comparatively his presentation of American moral mistreatment of the Cuban cause.[14]

All in all, most of this boils down to the sum of abuses that a great Power can impose upon a minor neighbor, seen through the eyes of the latter. Pérez even ends his argument with a purely nominalist demand, once again inherited from Roig de Leuchsenring: the conflict of 1898 should be properly called the "Spanish-Cuban-American War" (or even "Spanish-Cuban-Filipino-American"), rather than the plain, old and exclusive "Spanish-American" label. But, once in a nominalist terrain, he has no problem with the notion of "America" as synonymous with the United States, rather than as a geographical concept by which all North and South Ameri-

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[10] J. Talbott (1980); B. Droz & E. Lever (1982).

[11] See L.A. Pérez Jr. (1989).

[12] With no pretence to exhaustivity, nor alluding exclusively to Spanish historians: J. Durnerin (1978); B. Cores (1984); A. Marimon i Riutort (1994); M. Mena Múgica & S. Hernández Vicente (1994); F. Lambert (1996).

[13] In fairness, it should be stressed that recent Spanish historiography paid relatively scant attention to Cuba and to the 1898 War, until the centennial has produced an almost indigestible bloom, which, of course, Pérez could not anticipate.

[14] G.A. May (1991).

cans would be covered. This is a traditional Latin American point of protest as regards U.S. hegemony and its cultural carelessness, and serves to indicate the narrowness of Pérez's nationalist critique.[15]

Clearly, Pérez is writing to confront what he feels should be a guilty U.S. conscience. Specifically, he chides Americanists for having systematically ignored Cuban historiography.[16] U.S. historians, when presenting the evolution of internal American politics for an American audience, are accustomed to a conventional tone of nationalism (or "patriotism", nationalism being a non-word in U.S. politics); this is so habitual as to be taken for granted, needless to say, especially when writing schoolbooks that make a profit when approved by usually conservative local educational committees for large-scale use. Admittedly, this may be changing in a multiculturalist line, however much debated.[17] Nevertheless, the sacralization of a peculiar sense of national mission remains an abiding trend in U.S. historiography, long criticized, at least in private, by non-Americanist professionals, such as Europeanists. Accordingly, U.S. historians writing textbooks should be compared to Cuban historians writing the same, and we could accordingly find similar laudatory and self-justificatory discourses. Insofar as Pérez represents the continuity of Cuban nationalist historiography, he, as a direct consequence, objects to the continuity of Amercanist (or U.S. nationalist) historiography.

Going further, however, if we look backward at the presuppositions of the last hundred years of "yanqui bullying" in the Caribbean Basin, we can see how the confidence born of the combination of economic and cultural power, based on the possession of a political system which, for reasons both messianic and convenient, has become the prime global model, can produce the worst sort of presumptuous sense of superiority. In other words, sad to say, civic culture plus geopolitics equals racism, with a push and a justification. Thus, if the arrogance of a major power is a blatantly nationalist discourse, then the hyper-defensiveness of a minority nationalism made good, achieving independence only to discover that such is not nearly enough, will lead down an even more exalted path. If we push such "deconstruction" further, however, we shall soon reach a hall of mirrors in which the culturally-sustained insecurities of each society -in addition interactive, in this case- can be broken down and analyzed indefinitely.

Beyond this point, however, all things are not equal. Put in terms of the so-called "realist tradition" in interpretating power politics, Pérez's view suffers from the presumption that all States carry the same weight, or, at least, should be made to act as if such equality were in fact true. But the needs of a major power are not the same as those of a minor state, nor should they be. As Pérez himself unwittingly shows, there are important differences in frames of reference (such as geographical reach) and, therefore, in levels of discourse. With 1898 as a jump-off point, U. S. historians often reflect a macropolitical strategic vision of a world-scale player, however clumsy, but certainly derisive of more "parochial" needs. In marked opposition, those who assume the perspective of Cuban nationalism equally must carry the burden of a clearly megalomaniac self-importance (Castro's Cuba has shown the weight of this self-important nationalist tradition by embarking on imperial revolutionary adventures in Africa and throughout the

[15] Admittedly, there is a dearth of synonyms, made worse by the fact that transcultural usage can often be offensive (say the term "yanqui", or "North American" to Canadians) or untranslatable (like "estadoundiense"), which I would prefer to deal with by accepting standard, polite usage, with all its contradictions, as does Pérez quite sensibly. The sense of the observation, however, is that nominalism is usually a one-way street, deriving meaning from a given cultural context. To become exercised over a nominal question, finding in it a slur, or pretending to correct, on a matter of dispute, the historical fantasy of one society with the values of another, is, simply put, the purest expression of nationalism.

[16] Despite the efforts of, for example, D.C. Corbitt (1963).

[17] See A. Stille (1998) (with a Hispanic howler ["Bartolomeo Gomez" for Esteban Gómez] on p. 14).

Americas for as long as the international balance of power permitted such exercises).[18] Finally, in a similar if even less relevant frame of mind, Spanish historians are situated by the same event of 1898 in a paranoid perspective: that of an ex-super power, long ago burnt out and become mentally almost a minority nationalism in itself, buried by the bias of history and unable to come to grips with the fact and the consequent prejudice.

Pérez presents his case in terms of "discourse": what U.S. sources said as events unfolded during 1898, and what they have repeated since then. But there are serious historiographic problems with this sort of revisionism as a working hypothesis, despite the claims of contemporary literary theory. By placing the onus of interpretation on the notion of "discourse", everything is suddenly up in the air, as light as relativity can make it. Undoubtedly our heads work this way, but we do also bump our noses on hard *things* if we let relativity become our only guide; as is more than well known, philosophers have been struggling with this conundrum in one way or another since the early Eighteenth Century, although historians -especially on the French-American axis- seem to have discovered the potential of such reflexion only in the last twenty-five years. Undoubtedly, all "discourses" in some sense do sort of float in the Zeitgeist and freely interact, forming patterns which historians can interpret, but the jump from one sphere of writing to another is not necessarily automatic. Thus, to cite historians as a jumble, however impressive the sourcing, with little or no contextualization, proves scarcely more than the fact of reiteration. Americanists have had major historiographic debates in the Twentieth Century, to a large degree around the significance of the U.S. as a world power. Was the surge of 1898 the result of capitalist pressures, as H.U. Faulkner, Charles A. Beard and the progressives asserted in the 1910s and 1920s?[19] Or, rather, was it a cultural phenomenon, as Pratt replied in the 1930s?[20] Was it a "press war", set off by the rise of the sensationalist "yellow journalism" on the way to a mass media society?[21] Perhaps such discussion was "internal", oriented towards the inner parameters of U.S. politics, but later historiographic tumbles have been aimed at doubting the verities of foreign wars: this reticence on the isolationist/internationalist front affects even Mills in the interwar years, and from him to William Appleman Williams, Ernest May or even Kolko up to and during the Vietnam intervention, as well as the attention periodically given to dissent from expansionist unanimity.[22] The conceptual center of the ongoing, century-long discussion, sometimes quite bitter, between Americanist historians reverts directly to Pérez's thesis. The point may be summarized as a question: was (or is) the United States brutally imperialistic, indistinguishable in fact from Germany, or is decolonization the "American way" in international affairs?[23]

Surely, U.S. Americanist historiography has been markedly nationalist, in a tradition strongly built and sustained by civic religion.[24] Even more, it has been argued that the end of the Nineteenth Century was characterized by a broad-scale "discovery of History" in the United States, even if not especially due to the War in Cuba.[25] In the Old South, however, there was no doubt that the return to the national mainstream was due directly to a short and successful foreign war, waged for a traditional Southern geopolitical objective, which permitted former Con-

[18] H. Seton-Watson (1978); also J.G. Castañeda (1995).
[19] H.U. Faulkner (1924), chap. XXV; C. A. Beard (1934).
[20] J.W. Pratt (1935); J.W. Pratt (n. d.).
[21] M. M. Wilkerson (1967); J. E. Wisan (1934).
[22] W. Mills (1989); W.A. Williams (n. d.); E.R. May (1991); G. Kolko (1969). See also: E.P. Crapol (1992).
[23] As exemplified, say, by the confrontation of G. Selser (1974) and J.W. Pratt (1958); J.W. Pratt (1950).
[24] W. Zelinsky (1988); H. Kohn (1966).
[25] M. Kammen (1991).

federates literally to "rally 'round the flag".[26] Such ideological reaffirmations -and specifically the sequence established by Pérez- may serve to point up lines of U.S. diplomatic interest, but, in and of itself, they are not a "plot". To trace the interaction of contemporary opinion, political legitimation, historical reelaboration, and, finally, repetition in textbooks as having more intent than happenstance, until it seems virtually malign, implies this. And, if the bias is accidental, then it must be structural, forming a broader part of the culture as a whole, beyond the circumscribed territory of U.S.-Cuban nationalist confrontation, into more important issues: anti-Catholicism, anti-Hispanism, anti-Afro-American racism, which overwhelm and incorporate the lesser, more specific Cuban-U.S. dispute.

Without question the great central debate in Americanist historiography has been about the Turner "Frontier thesis", posed for the first time in 1893.[27] After much discussion, the long-discredited proposition has come back into consideration, in large measure though "Culture Studies" and the overwhelming interest in understanding American racism and violence that has dominated the last decades in the United States.[28] While the Turner thesis was being downplayed among U.S. historians, between the 1940s and 1960s, the idea of a the frontier as a border, separating the almost missionary expansion of "White Anglo-Saxon Protestant" (or so-called WASP) attitudes from the Hispanic world caught the attention of many Spanish-language academic essayists, from, for example, the Spanish literary critic (resident in New York) Angel del Río to the Venezuelan Mariano Picón-Salas to the Cuban Jorge Mañach, often using more systematic studies of North-South interaction by U.S. researchers, such as Harry Bernstein or S.T. Williams.[29] Clearly, the awakening discussion of Afro-American racial oppression in the United States seemed relevant to Mexican-American or even simply Mexican realities, as well as, notoriously, the treatment meted out to Native Americans.[30] Furthermore, from a broad Hispanic perspective, it was easy to place such renewed perception in a "longue durée" mode, rather than in an immediatist or short-term viewpoint.[31] And, finally, until the triumph of "ethnic politics" and the alleged end of the WASP ascendancy (usually identified with the Kennedy election in 1960), White Protestants were not thought of (and certainly did not tend ot think of themselves) as anything other than the defining group of American citizens.[32] The resulting trend in Amercanist historiography still may be relegated to the Colonial past or the period of the early Republic and may be too narrowly defined as "Spanish" (or "Mexican"), but it nevertheless is present.[33] The rest of this essay will attempt to situate the themes underlined by Pérez, and which have made up the tradition of Cuban nationalist historiography, in this broader context.

NATIONALISMS AND PARADIGMS

About forty years ago, in a quickly reknowned article, the U.S. sociologist Robert K. Merton codified the concept of the self-fulfilling prophecy.[34] Combining psychoanalytic in-

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[26] G.M. Foster (1987).

[27] F.J. Turner (1994); F.J. Turner (1960).

[28] R. Drinnon (1990); R. Slotkin (1993); R. Slotkin (1996).

[29] A. del Río (1965); M. Picón-Salas (1952); J. Mañach (1970); H. Bernstein (1965); S.T. Williams (1955). An implicit warning by an Americanist historian to what he obviously considered misinterpretation, even abuse, of the "Turner thesis" by Hispanic authors: R.E. Reigel (1952).

[30] R.W. Johannsen (1985); A.G. Pettit (1980).

[31] J.A. Ortega y Medina (1989).

[32] C.H. Anderson (1970).

[33] D.J. Weber (1992).

[34] R.K. Merton (1968), ps. 475-490.

sight (as was fashionable in the 1950s) with the schematic patterning of social behavior established by Talcott Parsons, Merton defined such patterns of behavior: "The self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a *false* defintion of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the originally false conception become true." He continued: "The specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of error. For the prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that he was right from the beginning." He then went on to add that a misleading starting point could actually create "the very conditions of its fulfillment".[35] Given the clarity of the observation, the term became almost immediately a common term in popular English-language usage, but, surprisingly, there was considerable reticence in more scientific circles. Not that anyone particularly denied the value of such a notion. Simply, that political analysts -especially historians, always almost gleefully disdainful of sociological formulation- did not find any useful application and consequently did not use the idea. Quite on the contrary, this paper will attempt to show that such abstinence has a high analytic cost.

The shrewd reader will have noticed the effort so far made by the author to elude any Kuhnian formulation, given the relative discredit that patent abuse has made of his model of intellectual behavior, in particular the concept of "paradigm" being scandalously reified as a generic fact when it is only a debatable hypothesis about the sociology of scientific communities.[36] In fact, as I write, I can contemplate an advertisement in a slick international magazine in which a parrot prattles on about "paradigmatic change"; it would be difficult to imagine a still acceptable sociological term in poorer repute. Nevertheless, it is worth remembering what is the ultimate measure of success with ideas: the ongoing evolution of social life tends to devour sociological concepts by moving them out of the purer realms of academic debate and incorporating them by way of journalism into the daily rough-and-tumble, till their value is so debased by common appropriation as to render them unattractive to the sophisticated. Unattractive, however, does not mean unusuable, and the point I am trying to make with Merton could just as easily -and perhaps more clearly- be made with Kuhn.

In sum, my argument, in four steps: first, longstanding conflict, especially civil war, generates reiterative propaganda within a determined politically-defined community (or communities), which embodies both the ideals of a cause and its concrete war objectives, which may or may not be the same. Second, such partisan positions are worked out, by their very repetition, to appeal simultaneously to the emotions and to rationalization, to home clientele that must withstand the struggle and to foreign audiences whose opinion may prove decisive to the outcome. Third, the resolution of armed conflict usually means that whatever final result is normally perceived in terms of the polarized propaganda dinned over and over during the years of battle; if there is significant disillusion in any of the major audiences of one of the principal war messages, this opinion will swing over to the other, opposing theme of propaganda, now seen as a corrective, when before it was perceived as filthy lies, bereft of all credibility. In this sense, I am speaking of propaganda discourse as being a self-fulfilling prophecy, as defined by Merton. Finally, four, when historians -usually at some distance, and thus with the liberating ignorance that time brings- stumble over the political literature of such a conflict, they tend to gravitate to a particular propaganda polarity led by their own ideological prejudices. Since the repetition of argument is outstanding, the diligent researcher can find much proof to butress his position. Accordingly, he or she is acting within a paradigm, happily measuring detail under the warm glow of a received idea, which is, after all, what Kuhn was talking about.

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[35] R.K. Merton (1968), p. 477.
[36] T.S. Kuhn (1967).

If we look at the Cuban-Spanish-U.S. triangle, such a pattern of intellectual reaction remains firmly in place, especially since the triangulation remains to a large extent unresolved. A hundred years after deliverance from Spain, Cuba remains an exceptional political system within Latin America, stuck in a bitter, ritualized confrontation with the United States. Internally, Cuba has not achieved a minimum longterm stability during the Twentieth Century: the republican regime stumbled from revolution to revolution, and, after forty years, Communist rule is being watched internationally in daily expectance of its downfall. As a function of such political experience, pro-Castro partisans and the anti-Castro exiles are both fervent nationalists, sharing a civic religion that worships at the same patriotic shrines and burns incense to the same national saints, beginning with the sinless and outstanding José Martí. In turn, Cuban historiography is universally nationalist, whatever other disagreement might divide historians, be it Marxism or documentary detail. The obeisance to inherited symbology, of course, is justified by the maintenance of a political culture of civil war. Any deviation would be treason, accepting the enemy, working for Castro or selling-out to the "yanqui" dollar, and so forth.[37] It is in this nationalist continuity that the reaffirmation by L.A. Pérez Jr. of Roig de Leuchsenring should be placed.

The political and intellectual evolution of Spain, of course, is not much better. No need to emphasize the incapacity of any representative and integrative political system to take hold in Spanish society throughout the Twentieth Century, given the notoriety the Civil War of 1936-1939. Nor is it necessary to stress the degree to which that conflict was a formidable symbolic spectacle for vicarious expiation, which moved Protestants, Jews and Catholics worldwide, and presented the international battle of angels and devils according to the taste of the 1930s, in the adjustable guise of popularfrontists and fascists (or even Soviet sympathizers and anti-Stalinists).[38] The "Spanish model" of democratic transition from dictatorship astounded global opinion, and was cited as an example in both Latin America and the Eastern bloc simply because Spaniards did not descend into bitter civil fray at the physical end of the Franco dictatorship. Nevertheless, the extent to which the current Spanish political system can survive remains to be seen, given the considerable national divisions that persist or even today prevail, formulated in regional-nationalist terms rival to a traditional, central State nationalism. The situation, thus, is quite paradoxical, because, although there is a considerable unitary Spanish sentiment directed outwards, towards Europe, Latin America or the international scene in general, there is scant agreement internally as to just what being "Spanish" means or should mean. The obvious result is an intensely nationalist, if contradictory, political culture, still burdened by the subtle remnants of an almost two-hundred-year-long civil war tradition. This, of course, spills over into the historiography, which burns with nationalist fervor in various disputatious directions. Political affinity and historical reference are still almost impossible to separate: as one observer of the political scene concluded acutely not too long ago, the main traits that unite the warring clans of the Spanish left are the professed sympathy for the Castro regime and for the rebels of the Western Sahara, both reminders of Spain's last two colonial struggles in Cuba and Morocco.[39]

In contrast, naturally, the modelic stability of the United States' political system, which -together with that of the United Kingdom- has been used as the basic guideline by which to measure the evolution of all other democratic-representative institutions throughout the world

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[37] The problem of such immobilism in: M. Pérez Stable (1998).

[38] E. Ucelay-Da Cal (1999a).

[39] J. Valenzuela (1996).

during the Twentieth Century.[40] From time to time, contrarian and revisionist argument has challenged such a confident view of "American civic culture", insisting in the role played by civil wars (both the struggle for independence and the mid-Nineteenth Century contest) in defining U.S. democracy, as well as in the permanent pressure of structural violence as a cleavage at social levels other than the institutional, and, naturally, in the pervasive racism underlying American egalitarianism and reasonableness.[41] The result is, in retrospect, a double discourse. On the one hand, American self-pride is so intense as to make "nationalism" (a term in and out of use since 1812) a taboo word, while the presumption is that all citizens are "patriotic", identify with the values of the Constitution, salute the flag that symbolizes it and feel morally superior to others unable to share in "American values". Such an evasion is consequent with the basically ideological adherence implicit in U.S. citizenship, and the interaction of representation-participation in the political system, as has long been pointed out, especially by foreign political scientists.[42] On the other hand, however, there remains a nagging doubt, a persistent and somewhat puritan guilt that the "American people" has failed in achieving true unity and has not been up to the demands of its moral task in the world. Instead of fulfilling its "revolutionary message", U.S. society has "failed", has been internally a citadel of organized injustice (against "Native Americans" and "Afro-Americans"), while externally abusing other societies - especially "Hispanic" - in the name of anti-imperialism. As can be easily inferred, Cuba has provided ample ammunition for both the feeling of superiority, as an expression of a U.S. nationalist attitude (among recent historiography on the matter, say O'Toole), and of guilt, expressed by assuming Cuban nationalism (say Foner).[43]

Such ideological continuity serves to make historical divulgation more appealing to the general reader as well as timely, according to the comings and goings of political fashion or the needs of factional debate. Insofar as geopolitical facts tend to be stable over great lengths of time ("Cuba is 90 nautical miles from the Continental United States" or "Guantanamo Bay is a permanent occupation of Cuban territory"), diplomatic confrontations tend to have reiterative subtexts, which are the heart of most nationalist argumentation.[44] When a periodic "crisis" (whatever that meaningless word may signify) raises the relevance of a particular geopolitical setting, academic publications appear to take advantage of the market opening, directed at both a broad consumer audience (to make money) or to specialized publics in government or cultural entities (for promotion). This would explain the cyclical nature of so much historical writing, which logically feeds off opportunity. But the high cost of such a dependency on accidental factors remains methodologically unexplored. For this accidentalism encourages a subordination of analysis to political sympathy, which in turn makes communication so much easier (it being a great convenience to have readership already aware of the "correct" position, in possession of the answer and only waiting for the right question, especially that which might show up the structured falsehood of all opponents). And what are such alignments of the "politically committed" (or the Spanish *"comprometidos políticamente"*) but a variant of the Kuhnian paradigm, and a debased one at that, insofar as market factors intrude sufficiently to impede the breakthrough to a new mindset, which is the optimistic part of Kuhn's model?

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[40] G. Almond & S. Verba (1970).

[41] For example: H. Zinn (1980) (on active ignorance of Cuban rebels by Amercanist historians: p. 302).

[42] This is a clear perception of French sociology of the United States, from Tocqueville on, through F. Roz, in the early Twentieth Century, to such present-day specialists as A. Kaspi and E. Marienstras.

[43] O'Toole (1984); P. S. Foner (1973), vol. 2.

[44] J. Alvarez Díaz, A. Arredondo, R.M. Shelton, J. Vizcaíno (1964); J. Mañach (1970).

If the context determines opportunity and alignments remain stable, then the analysis of interactions between strands of ideology is almost impossible. The nasty aspect of the paradigms of the "politically committed" is that they are invisible as such to their users, being reified. Any given viewpoint is much like a design for lighting a given *décor*. The metaphors implicit in descriptive language show this easily: aspects are "focussed" or "highlighted" or "obscured". This means that all axioms have a cost-benefit basis, making certain relationships visible while hiding others. The stability of "politically committed" and nationalistic positions signify that many ideological interactions are never found missing. They cannot be seen from the trenches.

CARIBBEAN CULTURAL INTERACTIONS

Historically, the Caribbean basin has acted as a major crucible of cultures between various continents. It is commonplace to remark on the African influence on the Americas.[45] But the role of Antillean feedback to Africa -though wellknown to specialists- is far less commented.[46] Equally the enormous stimulation that Afro-American culture in the U.S. has received from beyond the Gulf of Mexico is often not acknowledged, although, again, it is a well studied phenomenon. Even *"Négritude"* is largely a Caribbean invention, extending to the U.S. or to France and Great Britain, and from there, "back to Africa": Nkrumah was, at least in part, a self-avowed disciple of Garvey, Sénghor of Césaire; one can even remember the role of Fanon in generating the discourse of Third-World oppression.[47] But also European culture was subject to a complex blowback effect from the Antilles, including such U.S. notions as came through a tropical route: there is, for example, a good case that Nineteenth-Century European racism was to a very large degree -often unobserved by Europeanists- an American import.[48] On a more sympathetic note, the circular interaction of modernity in plastic arts and music, usually reduced to an Atlantic bridge between Paris and New York, with some condescending glimpses of Africa- is equally incomprehensible without the Caribbean. In other words, if the Caribbean gave birth to the "taste revolution" (sweets, distilled alcohol and tobacco) of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries in Europe, thereby firmly establishing the process of industrialization and, ultimately, of the mass consumer society, its role as one of the major crossroads of cultural information surrounding modernity is unchallengeable.[49] The "Islands in the sun" might themselves remain bywaters and even "economic basket-cases", to use a famous category of Henry Kissinger's.[50] But their role as a criss-cross transmission belt, going in multiple directions and carrying all sorts of mixed-up information is largely unexplored and more than important.

Spain was a central presence in the Caribbean until 1898, and Cuba will remain a connecting line, back and forth, between the Peninsula and the variety of Latin America. But, in addition, the Caribbean was and is notoriously the United States' backyard. Accordingly, throughout the Nineteenth Century, Cuba served as an unwitting bridge for the entry of Protestant political thought into Catholic Spain. Much more than anything coming in through Gibraltar and certainly comparable to the academic input carried by Spaniards studying in Ger-

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[45] For example: S. Stuckey (1987), chap. 1.

[46] As an example: B. Edgar (1976).

[47] J.A. Langley (1974), ps. 402-413; also B. Davidson (1989), ps. 28-40; L.S. Sénghor (1964). Influence is understood here as an interaction, not as consensus: for the bitter division between Garvey and Du Bois, see: A. Rampersad (1990), ps. 147-155.

[48] R. Horsman (1985); on the ulterior influence of U.S. eugenics on the German Nazi movement: S. Kühl (1994).

[49] Sidney W. Mintz (1985); W. Schivelbusch (1992).

[50] See E. Williams (1984), chap. 29; also G.K. Lewis (1969).

man universities, the link to the U.S. through Cuba served to introduce rereadings of Neo-Classical discourse in democratic garb in other than the lastest French cut of fashion, as well as to sustain the interaction between fundamental debates on political structure, such as the discussion between federalism and unitarism, contraposing the South American republics to the experience of the senior republic of the hemisphere. Accordingly, all the lessons learned in Cuba from Southern U.S. sources -about self-determination as a fundamental right, about nullification as an advanced interpretation of federal practice- ultimately made their way to metropolitan politics in peninsular Spain.[51] The Cuban-U.S. link was also a complex exchange, richer and deeper over time than is often realized. Beyond the principle of "Athenian democracy" exercised by citizens above slaves, the most extreme Southern doctrines - of alleged *"noblesse oblige"* and, most especially, of the cult of "duello" and "punctillio"- had a distinctly Hispanic turn.[52] South Carolina, notoriously the heart of Southern "fire-eating" doctrine, had in fact been dominated from its inception by colonists from British Barbados, who established a social pattern based on the English rereading of old Spanish slavecowner rules.[53] Now, in yet another layer of the Caribbean palimpsest and exchange, these ideas returned to Cuba as advanced social theory, a dream of agrarian access to capitalism and the world market, in which were equally mixed both an aristocratic pretension, with its admiration for the individual literally "of good breeding" or "good stock", and an aggressive individualism born in North America of the revolutionary marriage of eclectic Protestantism, participatory institutions of worship and government, and the *"homo economicus"* of unfettered economic trade. Heady stuff, which took off in all directions, leading to the dreams for "lone-star" annexation to the U.S. on the Texan pattern or, at worst, for a "special relationship" to the Deep South.[54] After the defeat of the Confederacy in 1865, Cuban separatism took a more opportunistic and, at the same time, a more idealistic turn, looking increasingly to Afro-Cuban support, while the rise of *"españolismo"* or *"incondicionalismo"* -the new Spanish nationalism of identity- found its social base in the immigrants from the Peninsula who were depriving the free Blacks of an economic role.[55]

Thus, the rise of Cuban separatism, whether annexationist or independentist, was directly built upon ideas received from "Dixie", and this included -as also happened in the U.S.- class interactions in which ideals of social behavior were crossed in surprising ways, not to be explored here.[56] The core message was the ideal of collective individualism, expressed as the inalienable right to self-determination, based on a racial and/or difference so serious as to be impossible to overcome without intolerable humilliation.[57] This was a positive message, with a sense of juridical doctrine, which travelled backwards, through the immigrant-*"indiano"* route-back to Spain, to set off the new nationalisms that arose between 1885 and 1895 in Catalonia, in the Basque Country, in the Canary Islands, in Galicia, and even among the Filipino students in the colonial metropolis (from whence to Pacific archipielago).[58]

Although the connection is only being now investigated, it is more than likely that future research will point to the major role played by Freemasonry in this sustained pattern of commu-

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[51] E. Ucelay-Da Cal (1997).

[52] For the idea of "Herrenvolk democracy": G.M. Frederickson (1981). In general: K.S. Greenberg (1985), especially chap. 1; H. Bernstein (1965).

[53] F. Butterfield (1996), chaps. 1-2.

[54] T. Chaffin (1996).

[55] J. Casanovas (1998), chaps. 3-4; M. Moreno Fraginals (1995).

[56] E. Ucelay-Da Cal (1997); also L.A. Pérez Jr. (1997).

[57] See A. Cobban (1969).

[58] E. Ucelay-Da Cal (1997).

nication. European federalism (despite the idiosyncratic case of Switzerland), was essentially grounded in the "dynastic principle" rather than in the contrary "democratic" or "nationalist principle" (to use the political language of the 1840s and 1850s).[59] For purposes of partition or division sovreignty resided in the prince, rather than in the people, a major convenience for the establishment of divided sovreignties, such as marked the ongoing partition of the Ottoman Empire or the Unification of Germany. On the contrary, it was in the North American example that popular sovreignty had justified, emblematically in 1776, the separation of territories from their here-to-fore rule of king and parliament. This model had, in essence, determined the evolution of independent States broken off from the Spanish Crown from Mexico to the Argentine, despite the confusion with French constitutional language of similar content but differing form.[60] Jacobinism had the allure of its physical confrontation to the Roman Catholic tradition, but the real revolutionary practice in the whole of Latin America came justified from sources with a deeper enmity to Papist values, as traditionalists were not slow to argue.[61]

An easy route for teaching federalism, therefore, would be the practice of Freemasonry, anti-Catholic (even philo-Protestant), anti-monarchical, but much given the recognition of autonomies and such-like territorial relationships.[62] Certainly, within the Iberian Peninsula, the communication between Portuguese and Spanish lodges argueably was an outstanding instrument for dealing with the contradictions of rising and mutually hostile nationalisms and with the simultaneous doctrine of a common Iberian unity, separate but equal.[63] Spanish traditionalists had no doubts but that the "brotherhoods" were behind the downfall of the Mainland and had threatened the "Most Loyal Island" throughout the rest of the Nineteenth Century.[64] There would be no problem in "fraternal" relations between Cuban and U.S. masons. Although Freemasonry was strong in the federalist North, Confederate leadership also had an important Masonic following: witness "the Arkansas philosopher" Albert Pike, journalist, poet, and self-styled Sanskrit scholar, hooking up the Cherokee Six Nations in Oklahoma to the Southern cause using such a rhetorical line of diplomatic connection to Native American councils.[65] Logically, there was intense "fraternal" interaction between the lodges of the Antilles and the Peninsula, and, by extension, much to the scandal of rightwing catholic sympathizers in Spain, the rise of Filipino nationalism would have a consistent Masonic coloration, right down to the Katipunan.[66]

To sum up, self-determination -of individuals (i.e. democracy), and by extension, of a democratic territory with "special characteristics" that needed particularist definition as regarded representative institutions- came from the intense debate over slave territory and freesoil in United States to Cuba, and, from there, to European Spain. Freemasons, with their code stressing individual and collective rights, their hostility to everything represented by the Throne-

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[59] The most innovative Federalist thinker in Spain had quite clear the difference between the two models: V. Almirall (1884); V. Almirall (1886).

[60] C.J. Friedrich (1967), ps. 55-58; skepticism towards this idea is offered by: C. Véliz (1980), ps. 158-162 and *passim*; also J.I. Domínguez (1980), ps. 237-240.

[61] The debate on the degree of French influence in the process of South American independence is one of the hoariest in the Spanish-speaking world, making it abusive to cite sources.

[62] J.P. Bastian (comp.) (1990).

[63] I. Chato González (1997).

[64] S. de Madariaga (1979), *"parte tercera"*.

[65] E.M. Thomas (1979). For the context of reference: S. Williams (1991).

[66] There is no need to go beyond a contemporary Spanish source such as J.M. del Castillo y Jiménez (1897); see also J. Andrés Gallego (1971).

and-Altar alliance, and their ductility surrounding capitalism and its social forms, would have been an ideal transmission belt, and it is therefore not surprising that Catholics, traditionalists and rightists in Spain made a special point of denouncing their alleged sinister role as the "hidden hand" behind imperial downfall, no to mention revolution and the threat of "red" Republicanism at home.[67] That Spanish rightists became addicted to a conspiracy theory and offered little else by way of explanation does not mean, however, that they were necessarily mistaken in much of their tactical perception of their enemy, merely that their capacity of analysis and their imagination were quite limited, among other reasons, by their propaganda needs.

THE "WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY"

Moreover, in addition, the real political power content was not carried by the positive message of self-determination coming into (and out of) Cuba, but rather by the negative message. After all, the positive code only established the right to separate. It was the negative that carried the all-important reason for separation. This was a historical argument, often expressed more in literary or visual images, than in abstract terms. But it had what, at the time was considered a scientific formulation: what the English analyst of science and historiography Herbert Butterfield has famously and critically characterized as the "Whig interpretation of History".[68] Its exponents would be such outstanding (or notorious) examples of historical style and theory, as T.B. Macauley or Buckle, anxious to frame "English Civilization" in a comparative context. Their ideas were quickly picked and seconded by more popular British historians, such as Green. Arguing for an "Anglo-Saxon" community of values, others in the United States, such as Motley on the Dutch Revolution, or Bancroft and Parkman used the same framework extending it to the North American context.[69] From there, it was but a short step to the schoolbooks in both countries.[70] Briefly put, the "Whig interpretation of History" stated that the English had originated representative government, building upon Germanic habits, when the barons imposed parliament on King John with the "Magna Carta" at Runnymede.[71] The English Reformation, going beyond the accidental dynastic circumstances of the Tudors, had become a vast collective, even national, movement for representative government. Eventually, the parliamentary cause had even taken on the Crown, when Stuart kings mistakenly abused the fundamental rights of "free-born Englishmen"; the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 had been the culmination of such a process in the institutionalization of liberty. But this process was really something that pertained to all the "English-speaking peoples". The Scots had also lived their Reformation and had joined with the English to form a British union. The English (and Scot) colonists in North America had stood up for their rights with the same spirit and were thus a continuation of such a broad "Anglo-Saxon spirit of freedom". Even, to a lesser degress, the Dutch had something of the same fire, as it had been their struggle to be rid of Spanish oppression that had shown the way of the future, although modern Holland had not quite lived up to the racial promise exhibited in more glorious times by its people.[72]

Thus, the "Whig interpretation of History" effectively combined nationalism, pan-nationalism, religious patriotism with a historical vision, on a broad scale of the fall of feudalism, the

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[67] J.A. Ferrer Benimeli (1982).
[68] H. Butterfield (1965).
[69] D. Levin (1959).
[70] R.M. Miller (1964), chap. 5.
[71] H. Butterfield (1969); C. Hill (1986), chap. 3: "The Norman Yoke".
[72] A.G. Roeber (1991).

rise of capitalism, and the healthy distance established by the defenders of civil rights between themselves and the bane of Romanism.[73] Originally, at the end of the Seventeenth Century, in the times of "good King Billy" and, later on, in the heyday of the Whig Establishment, the "Whig interpretation of History" was a delicate operation in ideological and historical manipulation, designed to help balance through propaganda the unsteady foundations of the English throne. But it became a useful tool for defining the British national cause against Bourbon (therefore Romanist France) and especially against the "pagan" revolutionaries and the militaristist threat of "Boney". The colonists in British North America happily used the same Whig repertoire to justify their self-determination; left without the French as an effective enemy by their elimination from Canada and Lousiana after 1763, their sense of the living presence of Papist tyranny became centered on Spain, which made up the major part of the new United States' terrestrial and maritime borders.[74] The longterm re-elaboration of such arguments was not difficult, as the "Whig interpretation of History" was eminently adaptable to the restrictive taste of Romanticism.

In fact, the starting point to such ideals lay already in early German Romanticism, in which both the young Goethe (*Egmont*) or Schiller (as playright *Don Carlos*, as historian, on the Thirty Years' War) expressed a similar viewpoint. In its English version, extensible, as we have seen, to North America and even to the Dutch, the "Whig interpretation of History" had established the national and religious enemy as Spain, identified with the hegemonic project of Philip II, with the Inquisition as a fearsome backdrop.[75] After all, seen in this perspective, the Spanish king had been the driving force behind the strident recatholization of his wife "Bloody Mary". Accordingly, the "battle of England" incarnate in the "Sea Rovers" and the defeat of the Great Armada was a moral deliverance from a bloodthirsty opponent who had already exhibited unwonted cruelty in the conquests of Mexico and Peru, and, with the Duke of Alba, had exported such brutality to the Low Countries, as was shown by the "rape of Antwerp". All lovers of liberty could not but celebrate the decadence of Spanish power, brought about no doubt by the exertions of the Americas, which weakened and ultimately exhausted the Spanish race in its overweening rush for world power. French propaganda, especially the school of libellists established by Cardinal Richelieu against Spanish power systematized and standardized what until then had been a sequence of disparate texts, from Las Casas on the *Destruction of the Indies* (especially in De Bry's illustrated version), to Foxe's *Book of Martyrs*, to Antonio Pérez or "Reginaldo González Montano" or Dutch war propaganda, notably the printbook of the illustrator Willem Baudart and the princely denunciations William of Nassau, all aimed against Philip II. The French poison pen specialists -perhaps in part as an expression of Hugonot patriotism in a collective, national cause- pulled together all the accusations, mixed racy incest with sexy sadomasochism, corruption with torture, rape with martyrdom, all bathed in a moral glow, and so effectively demonized Spanish absolutism.[76]

By the end of the reign of Louis XIV, although the propaganda pressure against Spain was no longer needed in France, the southern neighbor had become a standard metaphor for abusive government and the brutal exercise of repressive ideological warfare, and accordingly became the easy way for French polemicists to avoid censorship by the simple expedient of talking

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[73] L. Colley (1994).

[74] See B. Bailyn (1992); H. Bernstein (1965); also P.W. Powell (1971).

[75] In general: W.S. Maltby (1971); P.W. Powell (1971); C. Gibson (ed.) (1971).

[76] J.M. Jover (1949). More recently: M. Méchoulan (1985). V.I. Salavert (1990); M.A. Visceglia (1995). For context: J.K. Sawyer (1990).

about Spain where all readers understood French circumstances. The Enlightenment, in turn, radiating out from France, spread the identification of decadence with Spain throughout all cultured Europe, especially to places where it might not otherwise have reached.[77] In Great Britain or the Low Countries, the obvious continuity of metaphor through the Seventeenth Century into the Eighteenth required no further repetition. Thus Spain became consolidated in the ideological origin of modernity as the failed antagonist of all progress, effective as a dominant metaphor up to those areas that might prefer to use the "Great Turk" as a preferable execration of choice. The evident exceptions were, of course, Spain, but also Austria, since the discourse had had vigency in Northern Germany among opponents of the Habsburg cause through all the devastation of the Thirty Years' War and after, right through to the "Sturm und Drang", as indicated above.

Since the major continental opponent of the French Revolution was in fact Austria, and it was again the Habsburg which imposed a "Metternichian peace" on Europe after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, all Romantic protest, in the defense of both representative and constitutional government and of "the oppressed peoples", was above all directed against the dynasty. Such anti-Habsburg difamation could pick up the tradition of the young Goethe and Schiller and, in general, northern, Protestant, suspicions, of Southern, Catholic hegemony. But, for example, in the German Confederation, after the Carlsbad decrees in 1819, it became expedient to avoid explicit political discussion of Austrian or Habsburg interests.[78] Similarly, in the Italies, Austrian hegemony and shared anti-revolutionary interest on the part of other rulers, led to similar censorship. The "Whig interpretation of History" was thus tailor-made, since it offered appeals to freedom and representative, constitutional government, in line with the leadership of British empiricist historiography, which was specifically directed against the oppression of Habsburg Spain, a political entity out of existence for more than a century. German and Italian nationalist literature -not only historiography- was thus viciously anti-Habsburg, at Spanish expense: say, as an example, Manzoni, *I promessi sposi* (1827), but Verdi's grand opera *Don Carlos* (1867) denouncing Philip II for a multitude of crimes would stand as well.[79] The reference to Spanish odiousness was so standard a romantic recourse that the Belgian revolution of 1830 began after an opera performance which exalted the Neapolitan revolt against Spanish tyranny in 1640.[80] Belgian political culture was thereafter sustained by this symbolic loathing: the prime work, which set off Flemish literature, was Hendrik Conscience's *In't wonderjaar 1566* (1837); Charles de Coster began Belgian literature in French with *Les aventures de Till Eulenspeigel* (1859, full version 1867), full of cheerful references to *"l'araignée noir de l'Escurial"*.[81] Much of Spanish practice seemed to reaffirm in detail any such perspective of moral condemnation: how fitting, for example, given the degree to which abolitionism was a militant Protestant Evangelical cause, that Spain in Cuba should be nearly the last allegedly civilized country in the late Nineteenth Century (save Brazil) to abandon slavery.[82]

The Spanish reply, up to the present, has been resentful indignation and deep denial, in a fiercely nationalist tone: it was all just a vast conspiracy of lies, born of malicious envy, a mere "Black Legend", as the conservative Spanish diplomat and journalist Julián Juderías summed

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[77] M.V. López-Cordón (1995).

[78] H. Epstein (1965), ps. XIII-XX.

[79] Mª.N. Muñiz (1985); for Verdi, see S. Sadie & A. Lansom (1993), ps. 342-344.

[80] W. Bruce Lincoln (1989), p. 134. The opera was Auber's *La Muette de Portici*, also known as *Massianello* (1828), libretto by Scribe, which was a rave success in both France and the Germanies.

[81] C. de Coster (1996).

[82] R.J. Scott (1985); F. de Solano (coord.) (1986).

it all up in the early Twentieth Century.[83] By an inverted argument, Spain was affirmed to be morally superior to all its nationalist enemies and to the forces that kept reducing it to a trivial force in international affairs.[84] Thus, we can see a first demonstration of self-fulfilling prophecy, on both sides of the "Black Legend"/Spanish nationalist divide.[85] Even today, Cuban nationalists can still explicitly survey their battleground with the U.S. in such terms.[86]

CUBAN INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECIES

Needless to say, in the Nineteenth Century, anybody with a grudge against Spanish power could get even more legitimitation by flogging the dead horse of Spanish hegemony. It was a readymade argument, with all the trimmings, which only needed the small addition of remarking that the beast was not dead yet, but was in fact a danger to some or other liberty-loving opponents. The argument carried with it a full historical justification, adaptable to almost any circumstance. It served to specifiy any opponent's goal of representative self-government, religious freedom, civil rights for individuals, as well as an implicit adherence to the values of economic modernity, Nineteenth-century style. If Habsburg rule was the negation of capitalism -begun (if remotely) with the expulsion of the Jews in 1492 and capped with that of the Moriscos in 1609-1611, that is, in this perspective, Spain's only vital candidates for defenders of the values of an active work ethic- then the negation of the Habsburgs was the affirmation of economic progress, savings, hard work, punctuality, and so forth.

Such themes were firmly in place in Portuguese Romanticism, well aware since the beginning of the century of the *"perigo espanhol"* (with a Spanish invasion in 1800 and a subsequent territorial loss that survived the general resettlement of 1815). Catalan particularism, born with Romanticism, made a consistent effort to recover the meaning of Spain's history as an inherently artificial State, born of absolutism, an oppressor of nations, and liberal novelists (although writing in Spanish) such a Victor Balaguer, among others less talented, increasingly combined scenarios based on the 1640 revolt of the Catalans with insistence on the opprobrium of Spanish rule, especially as left liberals became disillusioned with conservative rule under Isabel II and clamored for democratic change: not accidentally, the 1868 revolt that overthrew the Queen was officially titled a "Glorious Revolution", as an intentional, explicit echo of the Whig triumph of 1688 in England.[87] Even the Spanish republican tradition, using a vaguely Castilian regionalist discourse, tried to climb on what was evidently a general view of how to best assess Spain. Republicans idealized the *"Comunero"* revolt of the towns against the Emperor Charles V in 1520-1522 as the expression of native protest against the imposition of foreign, "German"

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[83] J. Juderías (1986); see, in general: R. García Cárcel (1992), for Spanish attitudes in textbooks: C.P. Boyd (1997).

[84] E. Ucelay-Da Cal (1998).

[85] Such themes have proven even more remarkably longlasting than even is argued here, given the ease with which Romantic historical themes were shifted onto the screen. When, in 1940, Michael Curtiz directed Warner Brothers' *The Sea Hawk*, a "swashbuckling epic" with Errol Flynn, that was a little-disguised appeal for American support for an isolated Britain facing the Nazi threat alone, the film began with Philip II plotting world domination in a way clearly aimed to impress the viewer with the obvious analogy to Hitler. The picture's leading writer, Howard Koch, when he later participated in the script for *Casablanca* (1943), gave the opposite tilt, with the same meaning: Rick, the protagonist, is saved from the opprobrium of moral ambiguity because he had run guns to the Spanish republicans during the Civil War. See E. Ucelay-Da Cal (1999a). In another example of reiteration, when the French actor Gérard Philipe directed a film version of Charles de Coster's *La légende d'Ulenspiegel* in the years after World War II, the Spaniards were all uniformly dressed in Spanish-black, intentionally reminiscent of the SS, and the Nineteenth-Century rereading of Sixteenth-Century heroics became a replay of Resistance fighters throwing off the Nazi yoke.

[86] R. Fernández Retamar (1997).

[87] For the logic of awakening Catalan nationalism, see: J.M. Fradera (1992).

absolutism. It was not much of an argument, but it was the reason why Spanish republicanism claimed a tricolor, adding a purple band to the State nationalist yellow-red in honor of the old Castilian ensign and the liberal values of representative rule it allegedly embodied.[88]

Of course, no one could more effectively use the "Whig interpretation of History" against Spanish rule than Cuban separatism. More than any other Nineteenth-Century opponents of Spanish governance, they were closest to an audience which thrilled at the repetition of Whig verities, which was of course the United States. Their first ideological necessity was to establish themselves as a separate people, not as Spanish rebels, but as Cuban nationals under the onerous Spanish yoke, struggling for freedom on the model of U.S. independence.[89] Cuban revolt was consistently based on a frontier strategy, from Narciso López in 1850 to José Martí in 1895: the use of the nautical border between the U.S. and Spanish Cuba. With some Eastern Seaboard port as a jump-off point from neutral territory, expeditions could charter a boat, load it with guns, embark with bold rebels and make steam for or sail for the island with the intention of eluding Spanish naval patrols, then landing and sparking off a revolt which would, eventually, lead to a general revolution.[90] If the pressure of broad-scale insurrection against the Spanish military were not sufficient to guarantee victory, the unavoidable destruction of property belonging to U.S. citizens, as well as the uncomfortable proximity of Cuban war to Florida, would hopefully, sooner or later, lead to North American intervention. Given the U.S. insistence in buying the island, by both Democrats and Republicans, before and after the Civil War, such action would most certainly not be advantageous to Spanish interests.

Cuban rebels thus had a consistent interest in winning the propaganda war against Spain in front of U.S. audiences, more than even defeating the Spanish army in the field, which in any case was a much harder proposal. Winning U.S. hearts and minds meant tolerance for "filibusterism" (that is organized revolt from U.S. territory), even money for the cause, and perhaps even legal support in the case of capture by Spanish authorities, ever ready with the firing squad (as in the famous "Virginius" case in 1873).[91] Furthermore, Nineteenth-Century America was a fervently Protestant country, suspicious, North and South, Republican and Democrat (at least in the South) of Romanism, easily seen, as in Republican Thomas Nast's famous cartoons of the 1870s as an invasion of horizontal bishop-crocodiles, ready to gobble up hardwon liberties and Whig values. After all, would not the Roman Pontiff in 1899 explicitly condemned the heresy of "Americanism" (i.e., the pattern of religious lassitude or even indifference that can accompany an excessive enthusiasm for the implications of progress, especially in the optimistic United States)?[92]

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[88] See, for example: E. Rodríguez-Solís (1894).

[89] J. Ibarra (1972), ps. 9-74; J. Ibarra (1997); also S. Aguirre (1990).

[90] For the importance of border-based strategies for revolution in peninsular Spain throughout the Nineteenth Century, see E. Ucelay-Da Cal (1999b).

[91] L.D. Langley (1968), ps. 74-79.

[92] In an apostolic letter *Testem benevolentiæ* (1899), Leo XIII stressed that several outstanding errors, although they could also be found elsewhere, were characteristic of U.S. parishoners or advocated to encourage proselytsm and greater integration in American culture; primarily these were: that spiritual direction is now less needed than in the past; that the natural virtues must be esteemed above the supernatural, and active virtues above the so-called passive ones; that the vows of religious life were not in accordance with the requirements of human progress. D. Attwater (ed.) (1949), p. 20. Such "errors" coincided roughly with U.S. Protestant fears (many were reminded of the critique of modernism and liberalism in the "Sylabus of Errors" of Pius IX in 1864). Specifically, WASP and Whiggish apprehensions were strongly nativist: that American Catholics were bound by a greater loyalty to a foreign sovreign (i. e. the Pope) than to their presumably naturalized citizenship, that they could be thereby (in Teddy Roosevelt's later phrase) "hyphenated Americans", that Catholics actively required exceptions in their case to the separation of Church and State, and, finally, that Catholic values held the soul in thrall in contrast to the free choice, both rational and emotional, of the reformed spirit.

Acting in consequence with the demands of their most important external audience, the Cuban rebels set up a functional propaganda axis between Tampa (the closest city to Cuba in Florida and the point from which publicity directed at Cubans could be emitted) and New York, which became the effective center of the separatist movement and the stage from which the Whig message against Spanish oppression, corruption and barbarism could be promoted to an American audience more than willing to listen.[93] Only certain Catholic circles -including part of German immigrant or Irish opinion- might have some reticence, although that could be overcome if opportunism really beckoned, as happened in 1898.[94] The major intellectual figures of Cuban separatism -such as, of course, Martí- dedicated their time and effort to keep the publicity mill churning. Cirilo Valverde, author of the outstanding Cuban novel of the Nineteenth Century *Cecilia Valdés* (1882), basically spent his life (born in 1812, but exiled from 1849 to 1894) in New York running the propaganda show for the successive *Cuba Juntas*.[95]

This discourse had many natural advantages. The poor, martyred Cubans (Spanish administration was undoubtedly not light) were easily portrayed as hapless victims of the cruel Spanish dons, as anxious for innocent blood as were Cortés' *conquistadores*, as greedy for theft as Alba's minions, always ready to ravish any maiden cast in their path. Thus all the brunt of several centuries of denunciation could be brought to bear, without much need for imagination, as the receiving public already knew what it was going to discover. In this sense, Cuban propaganda was similar to pornography, not merely in content, but in its appeal to a constant demand, in this case the Puritan titllation of vicious monks, corrupt grandees, and such like, which, especially for Northern audiences, could be merged to the image of Simon Legree and the worst of the plantation bosses.[96] Decadent Spain, puffed with pretensions to a rank long since lost (a criticism not lost on believers in "self-made men"), whose collapse was due to a priest-ridden, superstitious society given to displays of organized cruelty (from the "auto da fe [sic]" to the bullfight), was as distant as the moon from any economic take-off such as that Americans had carried out, as its leaders and its very people lacked the skills identified with development. Spain represented empty honor and real violence, therefore deceit and cunning, as opposed to sociability, hard work, persistence. Northerners could see everything despisable in the South in Cuba, while Southerners (outside Lousiana) could see a distasteful Papist backwater that should have been part of the U.S. long ago. In this sense, witness the outrage at "butcher" Weyler, a real figure who was a perfect fit for a readymade discourse. Rather than a backward "cruel don", Weyler, however harsh, was really a modern militaryman engaged in tough counterinsurgency, using the best method of the time.[97] But his actions in Cuba created a stir in the U.S. that was not comparable to the much milder indignation over Kitchener's similar techniques applied to Boer guerrillas in South Africa. On the other hand, in France, for example, Weyler did not provoke the disgust that the British did some four years later, simply because of the anger over the "humiliation" of Fachoda embodied in the same Kitchener.[98]

Spanish propaganda tried inneffectively to counter such a successful barrage with a basically racist proposition: if the separatists won, then Cuba -the largest, most developed island in the Caribbean- would become another sinkhole like "nigger" Haiti, a common theme shared by

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[93] G.W. Auxier (1939).

[94] For the importance of the religious press: J.W. Pratt (n. d.).

[95] J. Lamore (1992).

[96] For the idea of Protestant pornography, see R. Hofstader, "The Paranoid Style...", (1967).

[97] G. Cardona & J.C. Losada (1997).

[98] In general, see: P. Magnus (1968); and, as a corrective to europcentrism: D.L. Lewis (1987).

American and European racism. A consistent effort was made to "tarbrush" the rebel cause, showing it always as represented by bestial Africans, with thick grinning lips, big teeth, subhumans of the worst rank. In metropolitan Spain, this derogatory "nigger" image was coupled to baiting the U.S. as an inherently piggish society, without any honor, lying, churlish, uncivil, rude, in short, the usual stereotypes directed, in the first half of the eighteen-hundreds, by sophisticated Europeans at the crude "Jonathan" (symbol in Britain of the U.S. before the end of the Civil War). Thus the explosion of patriotic fervor in Spain at the menace of war with the *"yanquis"* in 1898, as well as the outbreak of hostilities, was celebrated with an absolutely unrealistic explosion of derision at the "hog butchers of Chicago", with the conviction that such backward types could never confront men with centuries of experience in warfare at their backs.[99] Naturally, nobody was silly enough to try to sell this image to an American political market: in fact, the very whiff of such ideas, more or less politely expressed in a Spanish diplomat's private letter, stolen and publicized by the Cuban propaganda outfit, served to heighten war fury in the U.S.[100] Spanish propaganda to North American publics, thus, as would happen a decade and a half later to the Germans during World War I, was in extreme unsuccessful, although the inherent racist message was well understood and shared by opinion makers. The perceived racism even encouraged a noticeable level of African-American volunteers, to the general approval of "progressive" whites such as Teddy Roosevelt.

In pre-war pro-Cuban propaganda, the Cubans appeared as a unity -poor, slightly dusky Cuba- and as natural victims, since the whole conceptual package defined their role quite neatly. However, never, despite all the enthusiasms of "yellow" journalism (and that includes, beyond Hearst and Pulitzer, the illustrated press, such as the republican *Puck* or the democratic *Judge*), were Cubans turned into real subjects, as opposed to objects. In other words, the Cubans had significance only as objects at the mercy of Spanish wrath, but they never could become subjects of a Protestant ideal that was quite spontaneously racist. From a WASP perspective, perhaps especially for the anti-imperialists, Cuba as symbolic matron was represented as a pretty "octoroon", a "mulatta" who could "pass for white", but clearly was not so.[101]

The propaganda succeeded far too well. U.S. intervention, whether needed or not, finally decided the outcome. But when the "bad, decadent Spaniards", with all their cruelty, had been booted out, North American opinion could not muster mush sympathy for the Cubans, who instantly became mere "little niggers", full of noise and incapable of taking care of themselves. Seen close up, heretofore abstract Cubans revealed themselves to be a mix of the worst WASP fears: abundantly Black, miscegenated, Hispanic, and Catholic, with an emerging political culture based on thirty years' of sustained civil war, all told enough to pull together Boston Yankees and Southern Dixiecrats in shudders of distaste at the traditional prospect of annexation.[102] Furthermore, increased status as a great power made American policy ever more oriented towards questions, real or made-up, of national security, with a political unconscious curiously obsessed with fears of invasion or secret attack.[103] Accordingly, Cuba was placed in a discretely colonial situation, first, under U.S. military administration, and then under an effective protectorate, which allowed the "restless natives" their agitated politics and formal independence,

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[99] C. García Barrón (1974).

[100] C. Robles Muñoz (1988), ps. 227-88; C. Robles Muñoz (1990); also the articles by M.C. Seoane & J. Álvarez Junco in F. Villaverde (ed.) (1998).

[101] C. Lasch (1958).

[102] R.F. Weston (1972), chap. 5. In general, see the explicitly racist argument of Lothrop Stoddard (1981), chap. V. At the time, Stoddard was taken seriously as an anthropologist.

[103] J. Chace & C. Carr (1988).

but kept their problems at a distance. With the assurance of a naval base at Guantanamo, the anxieties of the geopoliticians and other players of strategic war games, such as Mahan, were neatly calmed. Cuba thereby became "a nice place to visit, but you wouldn't want to live there", by having it somehow inserted into the United States. In marked contrast to a Cuba characterized by unending civil strife throughout the second half of the Nineteenth Century, "Porto Rico" was a quiet place, manifestly less Black in social coloration, which could be calmly contemplated as a colony in "America's Backyard", without foreseeing any pernicious racial blowback, at least in the short term.[104] The Republic of Panama, invented out of Colombia's isthmian province in 1903 by American imperial legerdemain, was sustained by the same U.S. discourse: self-determination as the prize for a seccionist movement with a long tradition, and, in compensation, a U.S. colonial zone on a concession basis (with American "Zonians") isolated from the new host country, but otherwise a certain WASP distaste for the dependent society (beyond, as in Cuba, for the invention of systematic sexual tourism).[105] Finally defeated, Spain could be treated with a certain disdainful indulgence, which, although it did not exactly erase old Protestant verities, also served to remind WASPs of the subtle distinction between "Spanish" (European, White, even classy "first comers" in places like Arizona or California) and the dusky Hispanic pale.[106]

In other words, the propaganda of both Cuban separatists and Spanish colonialism, in appealing to stereotypes, was instrumental in determining American attitudes, both during the independence struggle from 1895 to 1898, when the images of the Cubans called out to the Whig vision, and then, with the problem of Spanish oppression solved, when the Spanish racist "reminder", came out of failure to impose itself as the dominant perspective. With the switch in U.S. attitude, Cuban nationalism naturally turned to Spain in an embrace of newfound brotherhood of oppression, a hug which Spanish nationalism enthusiastically returned: a unity of language, of spirit -of civilization- in the face of the materialistic "Colossus of the North" and the onerous weight of the "yanqui dollar".[107] Spain needed participants to justify and share the idea that it remained a veritable "cultural empire", despite its patent backwardness in cruder terms of productive development.[108] Such sentiment, of course, did not keep Cuban nationalism from crushing Afro-Cubans as a supposed "threat" in 1912 nor from expelling *"gallegos"* (i.e. Spanish immigrants) as an analogous labor menace in 1933.[109]

In this sense, I am presenting the propaganda surrounding 1898 as establishing "self-fulfilling prophecy". Adjusted to a foundational prophecy, fixed at a specific turn in political events, the discourse still feeds into historiographic "paradigms", albeit in more complex ways. This exchange of propaganda-derived prophecies serves to illustrate a larger problem in the interaction of politics and historiography. As Merton himself observed, to break "the tragic, often vicious, circle of self-fulfilling prophecies", "[t]he initial definition of the situation which has set the circle in motion must be abandoned. Only when the the original assumption is questioned and a new definition of the situation introduced, does the consequent flow of events give the lie to the assumption." He even goes on, with sociological optimism to assure that institutional opposition to self-fulfilling prophecies -using the explicit example of U.S. racism- could serve as break,

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[104] R.F. Weston (1972), chap. 6. For the contrast between Cuba's pugnatious nationalism and Puerto Rican identity, see: A. Cubano (1995).

[105] D. McCullough (1977).

[106] An optimistic perception in R. Sánchez Mantero (1994).

[107] J.M. Macarro Vera (1994).

[108] E. Ucelay-Da Cal (1998).

[109] A. Helg (1995), chaps. 6-7; S. Farber (1976), p. 44.

since such forms of social communication operate "only in the absence of deliberate institutional controls" that negate them.[110] This is clear for the century-old Cuban-U.S. logjam between locked nationalisms and crossed diplomatic interests. The question, however, for historians of Spain is how this same circular dynamic can still keep going.

In conclusion, I should underline that the interpretation here presented in no way contradicts Pérez's description of the mental changes that American written opinion underwent in 1898, before its long-lasting solidification into a recurring pattern. But it does set such a progression in a broader perspective, and, I would hope, helps understand how the succession of perceptions -and, especially, the final definition- could so quickly jump in mood then become fixed and set. The deeper reason, I am suggesting, was that American attitudes towards Cubans and Spaniards were limited in range, situated in an old but flexible perspective which offered a short list of roles. The results were foreseable, except, of course, to Cuban nationalists, who were to pay a high price for their earlier manipulation of stereotypes deeper and more unmanageable than they imagined.

[110] R. K. Merton (1968), ps. 478, 490.

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