Contingency theories of causation and explanation: comments on Paul Humphreys

In his article, «Theories of causation and explanation: necessarily true or domain-specific?», Paul Humphreys researches Wesley Salmon’s modal status of theories of causation and explanation. He attempts to show that though if indeed true, his later theories are barely contingently true, a stronger interpretation is possible and (at least he suggests) desirable. In this article, I accomplish four things. First, I ponder possible reasons for seeking a theory of causation and explanation that is stronger than merely contingent. Second, I show well-known counterexamples that demonstrate that Salmon’s theory is not universally true. Third, I show that although it is coherent to sustain a necessary domainspecific theory, arguing in favour of this theory would breach Salmon’s global empirical standpoint. Fourth, I briefly sketch an alternative interpretation of Salmon’s theory which would not hurt empirical feelings.