The immortal soul as seat of moral identity: J. J. Spalding and G. W. Leibniz

In 1748, Johann Joachim Spalding (1714-1804) publishes the first edition of DieBestimmung des Menschen, an immediately acclaimed work devoted to discuss the finalpurpose of human existence. In fact, the seventh edition (1763) is said to promote a fruitfuldebate between Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) and Thomas Abbt (1738-1766): in thewriting published by Mendelssohn as a result of the discussion (Orakel, die Bestimmungdes Menschen bettreffend, 1764), the Jewish philosopher considers that the ideas expressedby Spalding are quite close to the ideas defended by G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716). This articleaims to show that the similarity suggested by Mendelssohn is justified, as Spalding andLeibniz share two central thesis concerning the nature of the human soul: both believe that(i) it is immortal and (ii) it is the basis of the individual moral identity and, furthermore,the subject of rewards and punishments given in the context of the afterlife. In order toillustrate their coincidence, the article will be divided in two parts. First of all, we will payattention to the main elements of Die Bestimmung des Menschen; afterwards, we will analyzethe Leibnizian reflections on moral and spiritual identity contained within Nouveauxessais sur l’entendement humain (1704); finally, we will complete them by making referenceto a crucial passage taken from Monadologie (1710).