Prefiguraciones de la compatibilidad en Spinoza, entre omnisciencia divina y libre albedrío humano

The solution given by Spinoza to the compatibility between divine omniscience and humanfree will, can be traced back to the famous dictum by Rabbi Akiva, “All is seen, andfreedom is given”, but Spinoza built it also on his conception of divine understanding,which he considers completely heterogeneous with respect to human knowledge. Thisdivergence is also argued, in very similar terms, in Maimonides’ Moren Nebukim, a workin which he states that God knows what man will do even if he, at the same time, is ableto choose, as is taught in the Torah. This paper also examines the different solutions offeredby Saadia, Sheshet ben Perfet, and Menasseh ben Israel, for whom divine knowledge is not causative, which, in a way somehow paradoxical, distances them from the originalJewish tenets concerning freedom even more so than what happened in the case of thebanned Spinoza.