



You are accessing the Digital Archive of the Catalan Review Journal.

By accessing and/or using this Digital Archive, you accept and agree to abide by the Terms and Conditions of Use available at http://www.nacs-catalanstudies.org/catalan_review.html

Catalan Review is the premier international scholarly journal devoted to all aspects of Catalan culture. By Catalan culture is understood all manifestations of intellectual and artistic life produced in the Catalan language or in the geographical areas where Catalan is spoken. Catalan Review has been in publication since 1986.

Esteu accedint a l'Arxiu Digital del Catalan Review

A l' accedir i / o utilitzar aquest Arxiu Digital, vostè accepta i es compromet a complir els termes i condicions d'ús disponibles a http://www.nacs-catalanstudies.org/catalan_review.html

Catalan Review és la primera revista internacional dedicada a tots els aspectes de la cultura catalana. Per la cultura catalana s'entén totes les manifestacions de la vida intel·lectual i artística produïda en llengua catalana o en les zones geogràfiques on es parla català. Catalan Review es publica des de 1986.

Catalonia and Belgium: The Paradox of High-Prestige "Minority" Languages
Paul E. O'Donnell

Catalan Review, Vol. XVI, number 1-2, (2002), p. 167-180

CATALONIA AND BELGIUM: THE PARADOX OF HIGH-PRESTIGE "MINORITY" LANGUAGES

PAUL E. O'DONNELL

INTRODUCTION: PRESTIGE AND MINORITY LANGUAGES

This article provides an overview of two minority languages: Catalan in Spain and French in Belgium. I call them both atypical minority languages since they enjoy advantages that many minority languages lack. One feature that works to the disadvantage of many minority languages is "low formal prestige" or "low status." Zang Mier provided the examples of Occitan in France and, until relatively recently, French in Canada as low-status languages. The association of minority tongue with lower prestige remains valid over much of the globe, from Aymara in Bolivia to Spanish in the United States. While Catalan in Spain and French in Belgium are unusual in being high-prestige minority languages, this article will demonstrate that they have little else in common.

The present study examines the paradox of high-prestige "minority" languages, and the prognosis for French in Belgium, and Catalan in Spain. Furthermore, the advantages and shortcomings of official bilingualism (in Catalonia) and territorial monolingualism (in Belgium) are also evaluated. Even the term "minority language" does not find universal acceptance among linguists. Nelde prefers to avoid the term "minority", in favor of term like "lesser used languages" ("Le Conflit" 136). Nelde justifies this preference for the following reasons:

- a) le terme "minorité" a une connotation negative [...].
- b) les langues minoritaires ont généralement moins de prestige que les langues majoritaires [...].

Still, Martí states that "the Catalan language is a minority language in Europe because the territories where this language is used have only ten million inhabitants" (3). Merino categorizes Catalan as "la lengua minoritaria más importante de Europa occidental." Ethnologue.com lists Catalan-Valencian-Balear as having 6,472,828 mother-tongue speakers in Spain, as compared to 28,173,000 Spanish speakers (72.8% of the population) (*Spain* 2-4). Ethnologue.com lists Dutch in

Belgium as having 4,620,150 speakers, with 4,000,000 French speakers (*Belgium* 1). Since linguistic censuses have been eliminated in Belgium since 1947, statistics about language often derive from choice of national identification cards, or voting patterns, in Belgian elections. All regional or national candidates must indicate the linguistic group to which they belong. Still, Belgians may hold a French driver's license, but a Dutch identity card. Nevertheless, Dutch is universally identified as the majority language in Belgium. Fonck demonstrates the dangers of majority/minority designations: "Since 1997, the Flemish government stated that neither Francophones nor Dutch speakers could be considered as 'national minorities' [...] neither in Belgium as [...] a whole, nor in any part of the country" (6, translation mine). While the designation of Catalan as a minority language is well accepted in Spain, Fonck states that "[...] notre pays [Belgium] devra d'abord définir ce qu'il entend par 'minorité nationale'" (6). As for determining language prestige, that matched-guise test remains the most respected tool.

The original indirect linguistic attitude test was conducted over forty years ago in Montreal (Lambert et al.). In a matched-guise test, respondents listened to the same text read in different languages. More recent users of this test (e.g. Woolard) use various speakers, both male and female. The respondent rates the speakers (and, indirectly, the languages), as sounding more or less "intelligent," "cultivated," "modern," "diligent," or "educated". Different researchers choose different adjectives. Nevertheless, the language that rates the highest in terms of sounding "intelligent," "self-confident," "educated," and "diligent" (for example), has the higher formal prestige, or status. Woolard demonstrated that, compared to Castilian, "it is Catalan that receives significantly high status ratings" (118).

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

As for French, its traditional dominance in Belgium ensured its high status, while Flemish (as many people call the varieties of Dutch spoken in Belgium), was long seen as a separate group of dialects; not as "co-dialects" of standard Dutch. Dutch in Belgium was in many ways a majority language that did not recognize itself as such. The histories of Spain and Belgium elucidate how the two languages had such different fates. A series of events brought Catalonia into a loose federation of kingdoms, which by the early sixteenth century, we can call "Spain." Many of these events were dynastic marriages. In 1137, Petronila, Crown Princess of Aragon, married Count Ramon Berenguer IV, of Barcelona, creating the Corona d'Aragó. The late

fifteenth century saw Ferdinand (Ferran II) of Aragon married to Queen Isabel of Castile. When Ferran II became king of Aragon (1479), Catalonia's monarch was the same as Castile's. The subsequent unification of Spain weakened Catalonia's position within the federation. As Ferret wrote, "Catalunya passaria a segon rengle dins l'Estat espanyol perquè llavors vivia en un estat de decadència biològica i Castella pesava més" (105). The unification of Spain (however tenuous it may have been during Ferdinand and Isabel's rule) was still the work of residents of the Iberian peninsula. Despite Catalonia's secondary role in Spain, Catalan enjoyed official status from the eleventh through the seventeenth centuries.

Belgian history followed a radically different course. That geographical and political entity now known as the Kingdom of Belgium passed from the control of one foreign power to another, until the mid 1800's. The following chronology outlines some of the most salient events in Belgian history.

Belgium: Historical and Linguistic Chronology (based on Boudart et al., Blom and Lamberts, Von Busekist, and Miguel)

843. *Treaty of Verdun*. This treaty divides Charlemagne's empire into three parts. Modern-day Belgium lay partially in West Francia, (the basis for modern France), ruled by Charles the Bold (Charles the Bald). The remainder belonged to Lothar's Middle Kingdom.

862. *Baldwin Iron Arm* becomes the first count of Flanders. Baldwin marries Charles the Bold's daughter, further demonstrating his independence from France.

1302. *The Battle of the Golden Spurs*. France attempts to assert its claims over Flanders; however, the Flemish defeat the French decisively.

1384. *Philip the Bold of Burgundy* becomes the ruler of Flanders, during the Hundred Years War (1337-1453).

1519. *Charles V*, born in Ghent, (Flanders), becomes both King of Spain and Holy Roman Emperor, adding the Low Countries to his domain. According to Díaz-Plaja, Charles V "habla flamenco y no español" (181). *Charles V*, who also carries the title of Count of Barcelona, connects the histories of Catalonia and Belgium.

1579. The Northern Provinces of the Low Countries unite under the *Union of Utrecht*.

1648. *The Peace of Westphalia*. Philip IV of Spain agreed to the

boundary between the Spanish Netherlands and the Northern Provinces. The Spanish dominance of the Southern Lowlands increased the weight of French speakers.

1713. The *Treaty of Utrecht* officially ends the War of the Spanish Succession, returning control of present-day Belgium to the Austrian Hapsburgs. Barcelona falls to the troops supporting Phillip V in 1714.

1790. Belgium declares its independence from Austria, under the short-lived *United States of Belgium*.

1794. France "liberated" Belgium from Austria, beginning the twenty-year French annexation of Belgium.

1815. After the fall of Napoleon, the *Congress of Vienna* created a new Kingdom of the Netherlands, including Belgium, with William of Orange as Sovereign. For the first time, the Low Countries were united as an independent nation-state.

1819. King William I issues an *executive decree* that includes gradual extension of *Dutch as the official language for the entire kingdom*.

1830. *Independence*. French-speaking liberals and traditionalist Catholics rebel against the Protestant-dominated kingdom in the *Revolution of 1830*.

1831. The *Belgian Constitution* declares that "The use of languages spoken in Belgium is optional ('facultatif')." French became the *de facto* official language.

1839. *Conclusion of The War Against The Netherlands*. Part of Luxembourg is allotted to Belgium, giving the new country its current borders.

1846. *The first national census* shows the country divided linguistically as follows: 73.0% Dutch (Flemish) speakers, 26.0% French speakers.

1962. Belgian law established the *linguistic border* between Dutch-speaking Flanders and French-speaking Wallonia.

1993. Constitutional changes expand the role of the authority of the regions and cultural communities, affirming the highly decentralized nature of Belgian federalism.

1999. The coalition government of Prime Minister *Guy Verhofstadt* came to power, including the following parties: VLD (Flemish Liberal Democrats), PRL (Francophone Liberal Reform

Party), PS (Francophone Socialist Party), SP (Flemish Socialist Party), AGALEV (Flemish Green party), and ECOLO (Francophone Green Party).

French long remained the prestige language of Belgium. Two predominant factors help explain the intense "Frenchification" of public life in Belgium. The first is France's twenty-year domination (1794-1814) of Belgium. Furthermore, Dutch (or "Flemish") was not viewed as a unified language. As DeVriendt and Willemyns wrote, in reference to Brussels, "standard French, as a language of culture, had no problem in turning down a regional dialect of a language [Dutch] that anyway had less prestige than French" (202).

National histories set Spain and Catalonia apart from Belgium. According to Ferret, Guifré el Pelós had become count of Barcelona, Girona, Osona, Urgell, and Cerdanya by the late 800's (17). The progression towards Catalan unity continued. By the early sixteenth century, Catalonia had become part of Spain. Still, until the early eighteenth century, Spanish kings respected Catalan autonomy. In contrast, Belgium has existed as a nation for less than 200 years. Modern-day Belgium is an extremely decentralized kingdom, with three regions: Dutch-speaking Flanders, French-speaking Wallonia, and bilingual Brussels. Less than 2% of the population speaks German. German speakers compose one of the three official linguistic "communities" of Belgium (along with French speakers and Dutch speakers).

Catalonia practices what I call "asymmetrical bilingualism," with citizens having the right to use Catalan or Castilian in most official settings. Catalan and Castilian are co-official languages in Catalonia. Numerous laws determine language rights in Catalonia. The 1978 Spanish Constitution establishes Spanish as the official language of the state, but allows the Autonomous Communities to give co-official status to other languages. The 1979 Statute of Autonomy states that Catalan as Catalonia's own language: "La llengua propia de Catalunya és el català" (Article 3, Estatut). The 1983 Law of Linguistic Normalization gave the Catalan government the means to extend the social and commercial use of Catalan. The 1998 Linguistic Policy Law clearly establishes Catalan as the vehicular language of the local, educational, and Catalan government administrations. It establishes quotas for Catalan language in local radio stations and cable television. In the commercial sphere, outside business signs must be *at least* in Catalan when listing the type of business (e.g. "Automòbils García"). Furthermore, interior commercial signs, restaurant menus, and price lists must also be in Catalan, and any other languages. Finally, all Catalan citizens have the right to public and commercial service in Catalan.

The asymmetrical aspect of Catalan bilingualism is that both Castilian and Catalan speakers claim to be victims of linguistic discrimination. Martí and Solà stress the predominance of Castilian in the SEAT automobile company, courtrooms, the airports, and in public transportation (notably, among taxi drivers). Furthermore, any casual visitor to Barcelona will note that the Catalan sign-and-service laws are widely ignored. A request for a Catalan menu, or service in Catalan, can often fall on deaf, or hostile, ears. Furthermore, massive immigration to Catalonia (see Turell, "Spain's") has impeded the Catalanization of the public schools. Early results from the 2001 "cens lingüístic" (not published at this time [August, 2002]), but available to some members of the Catalan government) suggest a *decreasing* percentage of Catalan speakers in at least one major area of Catalonia.

Umbrella groups like the Foro Babel accuse the Catalan government, through its language policies, of trying to "convertir el catalán en en lengua única y obligatoria de todas las instituciones, con una clara opción por un monolingüismo que no se corresponde con la realidad lingüística existente" (Foro C4). Linguistic free-marketers like Royo make comparisons between the Franco regime and the current Catalan government. According to Royo "Imposar una llengua no és anar a favor seu. Més aviat al revés [...] Franco no li va fer cap favor al castellà, quan li va declarar llengua única [...]. Intentar fer això ara amb el català és una ofensa al català" (180). Royo's book appears in a non-academic, straightforward format that makes it easily accessible for the general public. Written in a more scholarly prose, Branchadell's well-documented and skillfully-crafted 1977 opus on liberalism and linguistic "normalization" caters to a more academic reader. Therein, he calls official Catalan language planning "[...] com a pràctica irremediament il·liberal, [i] és moralment inacceptable" (I). Jardón defends the liberal (free-market) approach even more emphatically. Another group, the "Acción Cultural Miguel de Cervantes," both argues for linguistic liberalism and warns against Catalan separatism.

One of the main complaints of the linguistic liberals remains the lack of linguistic choice in the public schools. The 1983 Law of Linguistic Normalization gave nursery school children the right to receive their early education in either Catalan or Castilian. In practice, local schools choose whether they prefer to have two lines of students: one that starts in Spanish, and later introduces Catalan; and another line that treats Catalan speaking the same, first teaching in Catalan, with later introduction of Spanish. Parents in strongly Catalan-dominant communities may find that only Catalan-language schools exist. Through early immersion programs, all students learn Catalan beginning in nursery school. Such is the nature of Catalonia's

asymmetrical bilingualism: the macrolinguistic forces (immigration, European unity allowing an EU resident to work in Spain, Spanish's position as one of the world's dominant languages) favor Spanish. Nevertheless, in some linguistic domains (especially the schools), some Spanish-speakers feel deprived of individual language rights.

In Belgium, however, "territorial monolingualism" (except in bilingual Brussels and a few suburbs) remains the operant principle. Residents of Wallonia have language rights (in education, work, and dealing with the public administration, for example) in French. Those who live in Flanders have Dutch as their official regional language. In Brussels, Dutch and French are co-official. In addition to these historical differences, modern Belgium and Spain also have important dissimilarities. Catalan has co-official status with Castilian in the *Principat*. French is the only official language of Wallonia (except in the small German-speaking area). Furthermore, French in Belgium has the support of over 50,000,000 Francophones just across the border in France. Catalonia has only Andorra, where Catalan is the official language, with its 65,000 residents. Even in Andorra, with its high percentage of foreign residents, native Catalan speakers are in the minority. Castilian maintains official, or co-official, status all over Spain. In contrast, no single language has official status everywhere in Belgium. The process of decentralization has caused the concept of "Belgian citizenship" to suffer. Francophones and Neerlandophones are less likely to learn each other's language in this divided country. According to *Le Soir*, 71% of the Flemish population of Brussels has studied French, but only 51% of the Francophones have studied Dutch. 63% of the inhabitants of bilingual (but French-dominant) Brussels have studied Dutch. The linguistic division extends into the arena of party politics: since 1978, no national parties remain in Belgium. All major national parties are divided along linguistic lines (e.g. the Flemish Socialists [S.P.] and the Francophone Socialists [P.S.]). Belgian territorial unilingualism means that every municipality of the country (except Brussels and certain suburbs) belongs to one of three language communities: Dutch-speaking, Francophone, and German-speaking. Each city and town, outside the Brussels area, is unilingual as to the language of work, education, and administration. In Catalan public schools, all students have (in theory) studied both Catalan and Castilian. Teaching Catalan in the schools represents a clear attempt to help unify the multilingual residents of Catalonia, as well as to encourage use of the language. According to the *Direcció General de Política Lingüística*, "Pel que fa als centres de secundària, la llengua catalana és la principal llengua d'ensenyament en la majoria dels centres d'ensenyament i és una assignatura obligatòria a tots els centres" (39). D.G.P.L.

further states that knowledge of "[...] la llengua oficial de l'Estat [Castilian], és un requisit obligatori. (39)"

LINGUISTIC CENSUSES AND NATIONAL UNITY¹

The approach to information about language usage is vastly different in the two countries. Belgium's last official linguistic census dates from 1947. Baetens Beardsmore explains this unusual situation: "All questions pertaining to language were abolished from census questionnaires after the refusal of a large number of municipal authorities in the north of the country to distribute forms containing such questions, because a census may be interpreted as a referendum of the language group with which one wished to identify, rather than the language group to which one belongs" (148). Belgium established a clear linguistic border in 1962. Baetens Beardsmore also refers to a "[...] double linguistic boundary [...] where on top of a geographic division between north and south there was a socio-economically determined language boundary within the Netherlandic [Dutch-speaking] area in which social mobility went hand in hand with language switch from Netherlandic to French" (147). The "Belgian model" ignores potential changes in a city or town's linguistic composition in favor of the maintenance of the 1962 borders between officially monolingual communities. For its part, the Catalan government conducts linguistic censuses every five years. In Catalonia, an increase from 68.3% of the population who could speak Catalan in 1991 to 75% who could in 1996 is viewed as favorable both for the "llengua pròpia de Catalunya," and for Catalan unity (see D.G.P.L. 30 for census information). An increase in the number of speakers of one major language or another does not necessarily enhance Belgian unity: No single language is official throughout the country. With the establishment of territorial monolingualism throughout Belgium (except in the Brussels metropolitan area) regional and ethnic identities have gained in importance, and ethnolinguistic barriers have been reinforced.²

¹ The Kingdom of Belgium is composed of three official regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels). The Spanish Constitution (Article 2) allows us to refer to Catalonia as one of the "nacionalidades" of Spain. Article 1 refers to Spain as "un Estado social y democrático de Derecho." For both constitutional and historical reasons, I refer to Catalonia, (but not Flanders or Wallonia), as a "nation." Spain and Belgium are referred to as a "nation/states."

² According to a survey whose results were published by Mouton (4), French-speaking residents of Brussels are the most likely to identify themselves as Belgian (43%). Flemings feel more Flemish (48.9%) than Belgian. Walloons are just as likely to iden-

CONCLUSION

This article focuses only upon the most salient similarities and differences between Catalan and French as minority languages. French is clearly the dominant language in two of Belgium's three regions (Wallonia and Brussels). Catalan's position in the Spanish linguistic hierarchy remains radically different. According to numerous sources (including Junyent and Boix), Catalan may have minority status even in Catalonia (in terms of number of people who use the language habitually). During the mid-nineteenth century in Belgium official censuses place French almost out of the minority category: 42.4% of Belgians were monolingual Francophones, as compared to 50% monolingual Dutch-speakers, 0.7% monolingual German-speakers, and 6.9% multilingual speakers (VanVelthoven 16). While both French in Belgium and Catalan in Spain represent minority languages with high formal prestige, French had an institutional dominance that Catalan never did. As Baetens Beardsmore explains, "[a]lthough the newly independent kingdom granted equal status to both French and Netherlandic [Dutch] it was the first language which became the effective medium for national [Belgian] administration" (147). Nelde calls Dutch speakers in Belgium "la seule majorité opprimée d'Europe" 'Europe's only oppressed majority' ("Le Conflit" 137).

Our overview of history and language planning underscores the lack of resemblance between the situation of Catalan and that of French in Belgium. By the early seventeenth century, Spain already existed as a loose federation of kingdoms. Catalonia dates its origin back to the ninth century. In the year 2000, my informants in Brussels were still calling Belgium "un pays artificiel" 'an artificial country.'³

tify themselves as Walloon (38.9%) as Belgian (38.8%). 30% of the population of Brussels feels "European." Geeraerts et al. suggest that being a resident of Brussels might constitute a separate identity.

Although Belgian Francophones speak a high-prestige minority language, they also feel the threat of the omnipresent English language. As Verhaegen stated "the French language is losing its importance as a scientific tool, both at the level of Europe and the world" (10, translation mine). See Fonck about the treatment of the Francophone minority in Flanders.

³ In Fall, 2000, I interviewed 94 speakers in the Region of Brussels. This study of linguistic and political attitudes showed a plurality of both Dutch and French speakers to be pessimistic about the future of Belgium. Furthermore, it showed a marked tendency for respondents to use English rather than the other major national language. Janssens in reference to Brussels, maintains that, "It is clear that English is no alternative to French [...] but for some it might be an alternative for the Dutch language" (*Sociolinguistic* 12).

Ethnologue lists Dutch as having 20,000,000 speakers (or more) (*Belgium* 1), as compared to 10,000,000 (total, native and non-native) for Catalan (*Spain* 1).

Language planning in Catalonia attempts to enhance the prestige and usage of Catalan. In Belgium, the federal government has established a system of decentralized territorial monolingualism, in an attempt to keep Belgium from disappearing as a nation/state. In the process, it reinforced the ethnolinguistic barriers between the two main language communities, which now live mostly in their monolingual enclaves. Belgium's division into homogeneous monolingual zones (with a bilingual capital), and its ongoing decentralization, constitutes a response to what Nelde called "[...] a struggle for socio-cultural equality, which has lasted for more than 150 years, [...] led by the Dutch-speaking community of Belgium" (!47, translation mine). Dutch speakers in Belgium represent a linguistic majority that long received second-class treatment. Meanwhile, Catalan "asymmetric bilingualism" makes both Catalan speakers, and some Castilian speakers, feel like the linguistic underdogs.

We have identified, in the course of the present study, four central paradoxes of the Belgian and Catalan dichotomies:

a) Catalan and French represent, in Spain and Belgium, minority languages. Nevertheless, their high-prestige statuses endow them with a social desirability that few minority languages can claim.

b) Dutch (or "Netherlandic") speakers represent "Europe's only oppressed majority" (Nelde, "Le conflit" 137). Thus, Dutch in Belgium constitutes a majority language whose prestige and influence was traditionally *lower* than the minority French language.

c) The challenges facing language planners in Belgium and Catalonia remain radically different: Large groups of both Dutch-and French-speakers in Belgium perceive that their language is endangered (Blom and Landers 456, Fonck). Nevertheless, official Belgian language planning has created a *de-facto* psychological and social chasm between the two main ethnolinguistic groups, which is a reflection of the strict linguistic border. In Catalonia, expanded usage of the "llengua pròpia" also reinforces the unification of its diverse population. Designating official monolingual areas (as Belgium does) contradicts the inclusive Catalan concept represented by the saying "Som una nació."

d) In Catalonia as well as Belgium, sectors of both the majority groups (Spanish-speakers in Catalonia, Dutch-speakers in Belgium) and the minority ethnolinguistic camps, feel threatened. Still, the asymmetrical bilingualism of Catalonia presents us with a "double-minority" autochthonous language (Catalan) that faces massive

immigration, a co-official majority language that is a world language, and other formidable macrolinguistic forces. At the same time, a critical mass of Spanish-speakers expresses resentment at the "imposition" of Catalan. Language planners, politicians, and educators in Catalonia must strike a delicate balance between enhancing the social and work use of Catalan while avoiding anti-Catalan backlash (O'Donnell, "I'm Catalan").

The prognosis for the two minority languages (Catalan and French), and for Dutch, are surprisingly dissimilar. Knowledge of Catalan has continued to expand in Catalonia since the first linguistic census in 1981 (CIDC). Until the mid-1990's, Catalan expanded its social and administrative use. A decree from the Catalan government (75/1992) made Catalan the vehicular language of the schools. Despite the pro-Spanish backlash of the mid-1990's (O'Donnell, "I'm Catalan"), orchestrated by privately-owned media (Strubell 152-3), by 1996, the conservative Partido Popular was entering into parliamentary pact with the Catalan *Convergència i Unió* to govern Spain. High levels of allophone (neither Spanish - nor Catalan-speaking) migration to Catalonia had slowed the Catalanization process by the year 2000 (Idescat, and Turell, "Spain's"). While the question of immigrants and immigrant education is problematic throughout Spain (Rodriguez, Miller), it remains even more perplexing in Catalonia. The Catalan Christian Democrats (*Unió Democràtica*) currently debate how to "integrar a la inmigración para superar la crisis del catalanismo" (Orta 1). While Francophone minorities in Flanders object to their linguistic marginalization (Fonck 6), the French language *per se* cannot be viewed as endangered. Harris characterizes French as "by any standards, one of the major languages of the world [...]" (210). Leitner predicts that French will become, after English, the second language of the European Union (294). Finally, Gonzalez predicts that "El francés crece, pero pierde peso como vehículo de comunicación internacional" (46).

Which strategies will improve the possibilities for the at-risk languages? Dutch, while the national language of the Netherlands, and the majority language in Belgium, may not survive as well as some smaller languages. Part of the Belgian linguistic paradox derives from the unusual status of Flemish (Dutch): "The Flemings were undoubtedly, in terms of demography and political clout a 'minority' in Belgium in the early years of this century" (Strubell 49). In addition to their "majority-minority" status in Belgium, Dutch speakers in the Netherlands "in comparison to other nations, do not seem especially willing to defend their own language and culture" (Blom and Lamberts 459). Donaldson remarks that Netherlandic remains

difficult to learn, because "... the Dutch are loath to speak Dutch to [English-speakers], their own linguistic ability being quite remarkable, but also an inevitable consequence of nobody but the Dutch and Flemings being able to speak Dutch. You may need to plead your case with the Dutch to speak Dutch with you" (x).

Few visitors to Catalonia would find Catalans "loath to speaking Catalan" to them. Indeed, O'Donnell stresses the efficacy of Catalan "linguistic recruitment" ("Linguistic"). In an age of globalization, in which English accounts for 68% of internet pages and has a wider dispersion than any other language (Finegan 77), a minority language's (or a lesser-used national language's) ability to survive may depend in large part on two variables: What Blom and Lambers call "[...] willing[ness] to defend their own language and culture" (459), and the ability to recruit speakers to the target language may be the minority speakers' greatest asset in the international market of languages.

PAUL E. O'DONNELL
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN-FLINT

WORKS CITED

- BAETENS BEARDSMORE, Hugo, 1980. "Bilingualism in Belgium." *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 1.2 (1980): 145-54.
- BLOM, J.C.M., and E. Lamberts, eds. *History of the Low Countries*. New York: Berghen, 1999.
- BOIX, Emili. *Triar no és trair*. Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1993.
- BOUDART, Marina, Michel Boudart and Renée Bryssinck, eds. *Modern Belgium*. Palo Alto, CA: Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship, 1990.
- BRANCHADELL, Albert. *Liberalisme i normalització lingüística*. Barcelona: Empúries, 1997.
- COMRIE, Bernard, ed. *The World's Major Languages*. New York: Oxford UP, 1987.
- Consorci d'Informació i Documentació de Catalunya (CIDC). *Padrons Municipals d'habitants de Catalunya. Cens lingüístic*. Barcelona: CIDC, 1986.
- DEVRIENDT, Sera, and Roland Willemyns. "Linguistic Research on Brussels." In Witte and Baetens Beardsmore. 195-231.
- DÍAZ-PLAJA, Fernando. *Otra historia de España*. Barcelona: Plaza & Janés, 1973.
- Direcció General de Política Lingüística (D.G.P.L.). *La llengua catalana en la actualitat*. 3rd ed. Barcelona: D.G.P.L., 2000.

- DONALDSON, Bruce. *Colloquial Dutch*. New York: Routledge, 1996.
- FERRET, Antoni. *Compendi d'història de Catalunya*. 6th ed. Barcelona: Claret, 1976.
- FINEGAN, Edward. "English." In Comrie. 77-109.
- FONCK, Edgar. "La minorité francophone protégée en Flandre?" *Nouvelles de Flandre* 14.5-6 (2001): 5-6.
- "Foro Babel. Por un Nuevo modelo de Cataluña." *El País* 20 June 1998: C4-5.
- GEERAERTS, Rik, Kas Deprez, and Armel Wyants. "Brusselaar, een aparte identiteit?" *Plurilingua X* (1997): 27-33.
- GONZÁLEZ CABEZAS, J.R. "El francés crece pero pierde peso como vehículo de comunicación internacional." *La Vanguardia* 16 October 2000: 46.
- GRIMES, Barara E., ed. *Ethnologue: Languages of the World*. Vol. I. Dallas: SIL, 2000.
- HARRIS, Martin. 1987. "French." In Comrie. 210-35.
- "Immigració exterior. Provincies. 1998." *Idescat* (online publication of the Institut d'Estadística de Catalunya) 2001.
- JANSSENS, Rudi. *Sociolinguistic Research: Some Methodological Issues*. Brussels: VUB, 2001.
- . *Taalgebruik in Brussels*. Brussels: VUB, 2001.
- JARDÓN, Manuel. *La "normalización lingüística," una anomalía democrática*. Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1993.
- JUNYENT, Rosa. "L'ús de la llengua catalana." *Avui* 18 March 1979. Quoted in Woolard. 33.
- LAMBERT, Wallace E., Richard C. Hodgson, Richard C. Gardner, and Samuel Fillenbaum. "Evaluational Reactions to Spoken Languages." *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 60.1 (1960): 44-51.
- Languages of Belgium*. Ethnologue.com. 2002. (online version of Grimes 2000).
- Languages of Spain*. Ethnologue.com. 2002. (online version of Grimes 2000).
- LEITNER, Gerard. "Europe 1992: A Language Perspective." *Language Problems & Language Planning* 15.3: 282-96.
- LEMAIRE, Jacques. *Le Français et les Belges*. Brussels: Editions de L'Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1969.
- MARTI, Fèlix. *Catalònia Culture* 3 (1994): 3.
- MERINO, Juan Carlos. "Galicia, la comunidad con más porcentaje de habitantes que entienden la lengua propia." *La Vanguardia* 23 October 2000: 45.
- MIGUEL, Pierre. *Histoire de la France*. Paris: Fayard, 1976.
- MILLER, Sarah B. "Spain scrambles to give immigrants better schooling." *Christian Science Monitor Daily Online Newspaper* 11 December 2001: 1-4.

- MOUTON, Oliver. "Belge toujours, ou Flamand avant tout?" *La Libre Belgique* 25 October 2000: 4.
- NELDE, Peter. "Confli(c)t." *ABLA papers* 14 (1990).
- . "Le conflit linguistique." *ABLA papers* 14 (1990): 129-41.
- . "Migration interne et changement de langue à Bruxelles." *Tranel* 4 (1982): 147-66.
- O'DONNELL, Paul. "I'm Catalan but I'm not a Fanatic: Shifting Tides in Catalan Public Opinion." *Language Problems & Language Planning* 20.1 (1996): 44-52.
- . "Linguistic Recruitment and Linguistic Defection in Catalonia: An Overview." *Catalan Review* 5.2 (1991): 97-105.
- ORTA, Josep M. "Unió urge cambios en el nacionalismo." *La Vanguardia Digital* (online version of *La Vanguardia*) 29 April 2002: 1-2.
- Qu'en est-il du bilinguisme en Belgique? *Le Soir en ligne* (online version of *Le Soir*) 20 May 1999: 1.
- RODRIGUEZ, Jorge A. "Las rutas de la inmigración ilegal." *El País Digital* (online version of *El País*) 15 April 2002: 1-4.
- ROYO, Jesús. *Arguments per al bilingüisme*. Barcelona: Montesinos, 2000.
- SOLA, Joan. "Cartes a Jesús Royo (4): El tabú." *Avui* 28 December 2000: 7.
- STRUBELL, Miguel. "Language, Democracy and Devolution in Catalonia." In Wright. 146-80.
- TURELL, M. Teresa, ed. *Multilingualism in Spain*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 2001.
- . "Spain's Multilingual Makeup: Beyond, Within and Across Babel." *Multilingualism in Spain*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 2001. 1-57.
- VAN VELTHOVEN, Harry. "Historical aspects." In Witte and Baetens Beardsmore. 15-45.
- VERHAEGEN, Georges. "Allocution D'Ouverture." In Lemaire. 9-12.
- VON BUSEKIST, Astrid. *La Belgique: Politique des langues et construction de l'État*. Paris: DeBoerck & Larcier, 1998.
- WITTE, Els, and Hugo Baetens Beardsmore, eds. *The Interdisciplinary Study of Urban Bilingualism in Brussels*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1987.
- WOOLARD, Kathryn A. *Double Talk: Bilingualism and the Politics of Ethnicity in Catalonia*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1989.
- WRIGHT, Susan, ed. *Language, Democracy and Devolution in Catalonia*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1998.
- ZANG MIER, Jeanne. "Catalan: An Atypical Minority Language." *Michigan Romance Studies* 4 (1984): 180-96.