¿Fue Wittgenstein un conductista? La necesidad de criterios públicos para el juego de lenguaje de lo "interno" y sus implicaciones para la Psicología

This article argues for a behaviourist interpretation of Wittgenstein. We propose an 'epistemological
behaviourist' account of his notion of language games. The behaviourist line we propose does not deny the
ontological existence of the mental, and it understands 'behaviour' in the widest, most social, sense. The gist of our argument is that any supposedly 'inner' language game must inevitably rely on external, publicly available criteria. We explore the possibility of developing a social-psychological epistemology based on a Skinnerian analysis of language yet consistent with the Wittgensteinian perspective. We end with a discussion of the implications for Psychology of a behaviourist epistemology.