A fuzzy and intuitionistic fuzzy account of the Liar paradox
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The Liar paradox, or the sentence
What I am now saying is false. and its various guises have been attracting the attention of
logicians and linguists since ancient times.
A commonly accepted treatment of the Liar paradox [7,8] is by means of Situation semantics, a powerful approach
to natural language analysis. It is based on the machinery of
non-well-founded sets developed in [1]. In this paper we show
how to generalize these results including elements of fuzzy
and intuitionistic fuzzy logic [3,4]. Basing on the results, a way
is proposed towards solving the problem of modelling the two levels of
Situation theory -- infons and propositions -- with a single one
retaining the specific features of the two-levels logics.
What I am now saying is false. and its various guises have been attracting the attention of
logicians and linguists since ancient times.
A commonly accepted treatment of the Liar paradox [7,8] is by means of Situation semantics, a powerful approach
to natural language analysis. It is based on the machinery of
non-well-founded sets developed in [1]. In this paper we show
how to generalize these results including elements of fuzzy
and intuitionistic fuzzy logic [3,4]. Basing on the results, a way
is proposed towards solving the problem of modelling the two levels of
Situation theory -- infons and propositions -- with a single one
retaining the specific features of the two-levels logics.
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Com citar
Nikolov, Nicolai G. «A fuzzy and intuitionistic fuzzy account of the Liar paradox». Mathware & soft computing, 2002, vol.VOL 9, núm. 1, http://raco.cat/index.php/Mathware/article/view/84853.