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With Some Consequences for Education

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On Creativity in Sporting Activity: With Some Consequences for Education

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Abstract

This paper proposes a definition of sporting creativity that is based on a phenomenological account of sporting experience. Taking philosophical cues from the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce, it argues that creativity in sporting activity is the ability to respond to the physical challenges encountered in the practice of sport in spontaneous and imaginative ways on the basis of carefully cultivated physical and mental—or bodyminded—habits. This definition involves several key Peircean notions such as imagination, spontaneity, habit, and the continuity of body and mind, which are expounded one by one (section I). Some examples then illustrate the proposed definition (section II). This is followed by a more detailed discussion of the relationship between imagination, bodyminded skill, practice, experience, and the conception of possibilities in order to enrich the phenomenological description of creative sporting activity (section III). The paper then turns to consider some reasons why sporting creativity is of philosophical interest to sporting communities and, especially, for the integral education of the bodyminded person (section IV). These reasons are finally recast in terms of possibilities for creative self-realization in sport, highlighting the upshot of an education for creativity (section V).

Keywords: Creativity, habit, imagination, Peirce, spontaneity, sport.

Resumen

Este papel propone una definición de la creatividad deportiva que se basa en una explicación fenomenológica de la experiencia deportiva. Tomando ideas filosóficas del pensamiento de Charles Sanders Peirce, se sostiene que la creatividad en la actividad deportiva reside en la capacidad de responder a los desafíos físicos propios de la práctica del deporte. A estos se responde de manera espontánea e imaginativa sobre la base de hábitos físicos y mentales cuidadosamente cultivados. Esta definición implica varias nociones claves de Peirce tales como imaginación, espontaneidad, hábito, y la continuidad del cuerpo y de la mente (apartado I). Algunos ejemplos ilustran la definición propuesta (apartado 2). A continuación se expone una discusión más detallada de la relación entre la imaginación, la habilidad "bodyminded", la práctica, la experiencia, y el concebir posibilidades para enriquecer la descripción fenomenológica de la actividad deportiva creativa (apartado 3). El trabajo retoma el análisis de las razones por las que la creatividad deportiva es de interés filosófico para las comunidades deportivas y, especialmente, para la educación integral de la persona "bodyminded" (apartado 4). Estas razones finalmente se modifican en términos de posibilidades de la autorrealización creativa en el deporte, destacando el resultado de una educación para la creatividad (apartado 5).

Términos Clave: Creatividad, hábito, imaginación, Peirce, espontaneidad, deporte.

Although the practice of sport is often a creative activity, until recently there had been relatively little philosophical literature focusing specifically on defining or describing sporting creativity *in detail*. A notable exception had been William Sadler's article entitled "Alienated Youth and Creative Sports' Experience" (1977). In the essay, Sadler analyzed the creative practice of sport as a way of remedying the problems of youth alienation in contemporary society in the United States. Sadler defined alienation as the perceived discordance between the real and the ideal, between what is and what ought to be, in society and in one's own life. When young people experience such a conflict of values, they may become isolated from society and from themselves. Youth sports—conceived as ludic, creative movement—may in such contexts serve as a way towards reintegration, towards restoring personal and social wholeness. Sadler therefore proceeded to describe the ways in which various forms of alienation may be resolved through creative sports experience. His study, then, presented an important reason to pay philosophical attention to creativity in sports—through the creative practice of sport, the wholeness and integrity of human persons may be restored and strengthened.[1]

His definition of creativity, however, remained vague. He writes that "in the creative experience there is…a fusion of bodily and mental activities in a new tertiary process from which [issue] creative products. Creative endeavor is characterized by an individual's experience of integration that resolves a previous state of disjunction" (Sadler 1977, p. 88). Creativity is a synthesis of bodily and mental processes, but the nature of the synthesis is not described. The process of sporting creativity itself thus was not carefully analyzed. More recently, Teresa Lacerda and Stephen Mumford have written on the sporting genius, discussing creativity as one of its hallmarks (2010). Though they focus on the figure of the genius and the contributions of her *strategic* innovations to the aesthetics of sport, and not on what a creative process itself is in sport, they do provide interesting analyses of the relation of creativity to freedom and to intuition. Peter Hopsicker (2011) makes the detailed description of sporting creativity a more central issue for investigation. He proposes three benchmarks of creative behavior that mark the path towards sporting genius, namely, preparation, risk-taking, and dwelling. In describing these

[1] This is in line with other works including, for instance, Anderson 2001, as we will see in the final section.

benchmarks, a more detailed description of creative activity in sport emerges, even if his discussion is framed in terms of how to train a genius in sport.

In this paper I will engage the philosophical discussion on creativity in sporting activity by proposing a definition that is based on a phenomenological account of sporting experience. Taking philosophical cues from the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce, I will argue that creativity in sporting activity is the ability to respond to the physical challenges encountered in the practice of sport in spontaneous and imaginative ways on the basis of carefully cultivated physical and mental—or bodyminded—habits. This definition involves several aspects to be clarified and refined, including Peircean notions such as imagination, spontaneity, habit, and the continuity of body and mind.

In what follows, I will take up these issues one by one in reverse order (section 1), and then I will provide some examples to illustrate the proposed definition (section 2). I then discuss in more detail the relationship between imagination, bodyminded skill, practice, experience, and the conception of possibilities in order to enrich the phenomenological description of creative sporting activity (section 3). I turn to consider some reasons why sporting creativity is of philosophical interest for sporting communities and, especially, for the integral education of the bodyminded person (section 4). These reasons are finally recast in terms of possibilities for creative self-realization in sport, once again highlighting the upshot of an education for creativity (section 5)

Prior to doing so, however, I would like to delineate the limits and scope of the present study. First, the forthcoming is an account of *effective* creativity under *constraint*. That is, the account implicitly relies on a conception of sport as a test of performance based on physical skills and governed by rules which specify the goal of the sporting activity and the permissible means of attaining that goal.[2] Any alleged kind of "creativity" that breaks the rules—thus

[2] In that regard, a definition of sport as "free, self-conscious, tested play" (Schmitz 1987, p. 35) would be acceptable for the purposes of this paper, since it views sport as emphasizing good performance and rule-governed contest alongside free play. Note, moreover, that for my purposes tested physical skills are bodyminded; at no point throughout this paper do I intend to introduce a body/mind dualism by writing of "physical," "embodied," or "mental" skills or processes. Unfortunately, as John Dewey (1958) has pointed out, this dualism is so deeply engrained in our language that sometimes it is difficult to undo it without tortuous circumlocutions; however, I will try to avoid them, asking the reader to eliminate the dualism from his or her interpretation.

ignoring relevant constraints—in order to attain the goal, or that is not potentially effective for attaining it, is not relevant to this account. Second, regarding the types of sports for which the proposed definition of creativity is suitable, I would like to adopt Bernard Suits' distinction between sports for which athletes practice and those for which athletes rehearse. According to Suits, there is an important distinction between refereed sports for which individual athletes and teams can practice but cannot rehearse in advance of all the situations they will encounter in competition, on the one hand, and judged sports for which athletes or teams rehearse a pre-specified routine (1988). I do not adopt Suits' distinction so far as to claim that sport is divided into two different, separate kinds; I only deploy it as an useful distinction to restrict my definition of creativity as applying to refereed sports that require practice but where advance rehearsal is not possible. Alternatively, I might say that my definition applies mainly to sports requiring open, as opposed to closed, skills from the athlete. This is not to deny that rehearsed sports which test closed skills demand creativity; clearly the design and invention of diving or gymnastics routines, for instance, involve creativity. But my definition does not pertain to this kind of creativity and thus I admit upfront the limits of my definition. Third, the proposed definition applies mostly to the creativity of individual athletes as enacted in the course of actual competition, even if they practice a team sport. It may be thought of as creativity enacted by sportsplayers in the heat of the moment, and thus it may be called "in-the-moment creativity."[3] I will occasionally use the full label as a reminder of this emphasis in my account of creativity. I note also that in training for association football or basketball competition, for example, teams may create innovative styles and tactics of play, but again my definition does not speak to this type of creativity but to that of the individual player even in the context of team sports. Fourth, the forthcoming account of creativity is meant to apply to athletes at various different levels of skill and competition, not only to highly skilled sporting stars or "geniuses."[4] So long as

[3] I thank Professor John Russell for this observation and the suggestion to call it "in-the-moment creativity."

[4] In this respect the focus of my paper differs significantly from Lacerda and Mumford (2010). I am more interested in describing creative sporting processes phenomenologically and experientially than in characterizing the exceptionality of genius. Moreover, this and the next observation mark some differences with Terry Roberts's discussion of sport and strong poetry (1994) and the possible links between testing boundaries, breaking conventions and creativity in sport.

sportspersons have cultivated a minimum level of skill necessary to practice their sport effectively, they may begin to play creatively with or against players of similar skill level, and my account is meant to apply to their incipient level of creativity as much as to the fruitful creativity of their sport's greatest players. At the same time, the account ought to consider the relationship between skill level and creative potential. In other words, the proposed account must recognize that there may be grades of creativity as related to skill level and not be applicable only to the highest level of effective, creative performance. Fifth, it may be tempting to think that in order to argue for a definition of sporting creativity, one must argue that sport is art or is like art, so that sport is creative just as art is creative. However, I do not think this approach is necessary; furthermore, it unnecessarily invites the complex question of the relation of sport to art.[5] Instead, I wish to argue by examining sport directly and claiming that, in the case of individual athletes who practice sports requiring open skills, creativity may be defined as I propose.

1. Defining Sporting Creativity

I have defined "in-the-moment creativity" in sporting activity as the ability to respond to the physical challenges encountered in the practice of sport in spontaneous and imaginative ways on the basis of carefully cultivated physical and mental—or bodyminded—habits. In the first place, the proposed definition describes sporting creativity as mental and physical ability at once. This involves the recognition of continuity between "mind" and "body"; the sportsperson is an embodied being, an organism that is able to think and respond spontaneously to challenges posed to him or her in the context of practicing a sport. In other words, the sportsperson is a "bodymind" that moves and thinks in a continuous act. In fact, as we will see, highly skilled athletes literally think and create with and through their bodies.

Second, this ability to respond spontaneously to sporting challenges depends, for its success, on the careful cultivation of embodied habits. A habit is a general disposition to act in specific

[5] This is a point of difference with Aspin (1983) and Wertz (1985) who approach creativity in sport by assimilating sport to art. Note that Lacerda and Mumford (2010), though they are interested in the aesthetics of creative genius, focus on the aesthetics of sport *qua* sport, not sport *qua* art.

ways under specific circumstances. In the context of sport, a habit is a cultivated psycho-physical ability; it is an embodied potency that can be activated under specific circumstances to attain specific aims.[6] The human bodymind can become habituated, and the training of a sportsperson consists largely in cultivating specific abilities to perform specific actions. For example, as part of their training, basketball players learn to dribble the ball with their hands, to pass the ball in different ways, and to shoot from a variety positions and angles in order to habituate themselves to perform these actions in many different circumstances during a game. In judo, the athlete habituates herself to move in a wide variety of specific ways while standing or wrestling on the *tatami*, always with the aim of unbalancing or immobilizing the opponent while keeping her own balance and mobility. In association football, the individual technique of a player consists in a set of psycho-physical habits, that is, of cultivated capacities to control, conduct, pass, or shoot the ball with all parts of the body except the hands, and especially with her feet, to dribble, to mark the opponent, to move defensively or offensively. These habits are coordinated and oriented towards a specific aim—to play football. The training of all sportspersons consists, at least in part, in a process of habituation in preparation for actual and specific competitive game situations. Effective creativity depends on habituating the body to perform specific kinds of skilled movement, as required by each specific sport. It is on the basis of cultivated skills that the sportsperson's creativity is unleashed, so that through her body she can respond successfully and innovatively to the spontaneous situations presented to her in the course of the sporting challenge. As previously suggested, football or basketball players must train themselves to be able to dribble, pass, and shoot with correct technique. Once the bodymind is habituated, the player can dribble, pass, or shoot in spontaneous, often surprising, ways.

However, even though creativity depends on carefully cultivated habits to be effective, habituation cannot substitute or eliminate spontaneity in creative sporting performance. Third, then, the proposed definition emphasizes that in-the-moment creativity is spontaneous. By "spontaneity" I mean, along Peircean lines, the irreducibly free element of any activity. In the context of play—which, I think, is wider than sports but also includes them—spontaneity is the

[6] An extensive discussion of this notion of "habit" with regard to the human being can be found in Charles S. Peirce's 1892 article "Man's Glassy Essence," in Peirce 1992, p. 334 – 351.

animating impulse.[7] According to Peirce, "Play…is a lively exercise of one's powers. Pure play has no rules, except this very law of liberty. It bloweth where it listeth" (Peirce 1998, p. 436). Spontaneity is the spirit, or metaphorical "breath," that animates pure play. This is admittedly a metaphor, but it is one intended to help us identify a specific attitude with which we may approach an activity. In the peculiar space and time in which playing a game occurs, for instance, spontaneity is that freshness in our way of approaching the activity that keeps play alive. Spontaneity revitalizes play by renewing the courses that play may take, by changing its paths, and preventing it from becoming routine and ordinary. Spontaneity manifests itself as an exploration of the unexplored, as the giving play to the unforeseen possibilities of an activity. In the specific context of sports, I would say that spontaneity is the instinctive capacity of the sports player to act in ways that are free, unscripted, and not absolutely determined by a previous strategy or plan. It is a capacity to attempt new possibilities of action on the basis of cultivated skills, often by improvising in the face of unexpected or unrehearsed sporting challenges.

Fourth, then, this capacity of the habituated bodymind to enact new possibilities instantaneously is inextricably linked to the sportsperson's ability to imagine or envision new possibilities for resolving sporting challenges. The "imagination" here is a semiotic ability, that is, a capacity to create and recreate, to form and transform, signs. For our purposes, I adopt Peirce's description of the imagination as "the power of distinctly picturing to ourselves intricate configurations" (Peirce, manuscript 252).[8] For Peirce, imagination and perception are indeed continuous with and shade into each other. In a 1903 text, Peirce writes that in relation to knowledge and belief—that is, as a matter for logic—it is not valuable "to draw a hard and fast line of demarcation between perception and imagination," even if as a matter of physiological

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[7] Strictly speaking, spontaneity is a manifestation of one of the three categories that are constitutive of any phenomenon according to Charles Peirce's philosophical system. An introduction to these categories can be found in his 1903 lecture "On Phenomenology" in Peirce 1998, p. 145 – 159. A discussion of these phenomenological categories applied to the practice of sport, especially association football, can be found in Campos 2006. Regarding spontaneity and play, see Charles S. Peirce's 1908 article "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," in Peirce 1998, p. 434 – 450.

[8] Peirce's manuscripts are catalogued and numbered in Robin 1967.

psychology the distinction may be justified (Peirce 1932-58, 7.646).[9] This is because the semiotic outcomes of both imagining and perceiving are signs—signs that flow in the course of continuous, ongoing, bodyminded reasoning processes.[10] As Sandra Rosenthal writes, for Peirce "All knowledge begins with perception, but perception is not the having of brute givens. Rather, there is a creative element in perceptual awareness, an interpretive creativity brought by the perceiver" (p. 193). I would venture to say that, in the sense utilized here, the *perceptive* imagination creates diagrams or sketches of given problematic theoretical or practical situations that require interpretation and solution, while the imagination proper recreates, modifies, or transforms those diagrams in ways that may possibly resolve the situation. And just as there is a mathematical and a scientific imagination, for example, there is a sporting imagination. In the context of a sporting challenge, the athlete forms a mental sketch or diagram—a sign—of the specific circumstances that she is confronting. This diagram is already an interpretation of her situation; that is, it is part of a semiotic process to try to understand the relevant general features of a concrete problematic situation. In response to the diagrammed situation, the imagination sketches schemas of possible alternative situations that would resolve the problem. This is an experimental semiotic process that transforms the situation into possible alternatives. The athlete then acts on the basis of one of these possibilities. She actually tries it out. When the imagined solutions are spontaneous, often surprising and ingenious, we may speak of the creative imagination. When they are actually attempted, we may speak of creative play.

In-the-moment sporting creativity, in short, expresses the athlete's imagination, where the imagination is a process of embodied semiosis. The creative player perceives and often anticipates challenging situations, interprets them, and is able to imagine possible solutions that

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[9] Peirce's *Collected Papers* are referenced by volume and paragraph number. This reference, for instance, is to Peirce 1932-58, volume 7, paragraph 646.

[10] Peirce's analysis of perception is itself quite complex. I cannot do it justice here, but merely sketch some aspects of it that will be helpful to understand its relation to the imagination. Very roughly, a percept (object) imposes its presence upon a perceptual awareness, and a perceptual judgment—a sign that purports to represent the percept—is formed as a result of the interaction between percept and perceiver. This perceptual judgment in the perceiver's mind is itself an uncontrollable hypothesis so as to the contents of the percept, and must itself be logically scrutinized, in the course of experience, for us to learn whether it does accurately represent the percept. See a 1903 account of perception in Peirce 1932-58, 7.619-636. A good article to start exploring interpretations of Peirce on perception is Rosenthal 2004.

are immediately enacted. This involves the creation of "diagrammatic" or "schematic" scenarios that are quickly fleshed out and attempted. The player, for instance, envisions the possibilities for dribbling, passing or shooting in the very course of playing and dribbling, passing, or shooting. Now, it is important to emphasize that this does not mean that the mind "imagines" and the body "obeys;" rather, it means that the bodymind imagines, assesses, and performs in one coordinated act. The *creative* player at once imagines and enacts fresh possibilities that are not usually anticipated or expected by others. In sport, the imaginative interpretation of a problem and the experimental consideration of its possible solutions are part of a psycho-physical process. The concrete situation of sporting challenge is not analyzed by disembodied reason. It is rather a sensible and reasonable organism—a body that senses and thinks—that experiences it and tries to solve it. Imagining possible solutions does not involve only abstract considerations but concrete bodily considerations, that is, considerations of what the body feels and thinks to be possible.

2. Examples

Let us now try to flesh out, through examples, the proposed definition of in-the-moment creativity in sporting performance as the ability to respond to the physical challenges encountered in the practice of sport in spontaneous and imaginative ways on the basis of carefully cultivated physical and mental habits.

Let us consider the case of ice hockey player Wayne Gretzky. In an article for *The New Yorker*, Malcolm Gladwell describes Gretzky's capacity to pick up on subtle patterns that others generally miss. This is what we mean when we say that great athletes have a 'feel' for the game, or that they 'see' the court or the field or the ice in a special way. Wayne Gretzky, in a 1981 game against the St. Louis Blues, stood behind the St. Louis goal, laid the puck across the blade of his stick, and then bounced it off the back of the goalie in front of him and into the net. Gretzky's genius at that moment lay in seeing a scoring possibility where no one had seen one before. (Gladwell 1999).

The article then quotes Gretzky himself as saying, "People talk about skating, puck-handling, and shooting…but the whole sport is angles and caroms, forgetting the straight direction the puck is going, calculating where it will be diverted, factoring in all the interruptions" (Gladwell 1999). Gretzky is describing, I suggest, a creative semiotic process in which he perceives a situation, forms a schematic image of it, and anticipates possible transformations of this schema that may be turned into actual play situations. The key to creativity is imagination, the envisioning of possibility, even though cultivated skill is necessary for actually effective creativity.

Clearly, habituation of the bodymind through practice was necessary for Gretzky's creativity to be effective. As the same article reports, Gretzky "would frequently stay behind after practice, long after everyone had left, flipping pucks to a specific spot in the crease, or aiming shot after shot at the crossbar or the goal post" (Gladwell 1999). What seemed most important to Gretzky's creative style of play, however, was the ability to observe the whole rink in order to recognize sequences or patterns of play situations and therefore anticipate possibilities:

> Gretzky, who holds nearly every scoring record in professional hockey, baffled many observers because he seemed to reverse the normal laws of hockey. Most great offensive players prefer to keep the rest of the action on the ice behind them—to try to make the act of scoring be just about themselves and the goalie. Gretzky liked to keep the action in front of him. He would set up by the side of the rink, or behind the opposing team's net, so that the eleven other players on the ice were in full view, and then slide the perfect pass to the perfect spot. He made hockey look easy, even as he was playing in a way that made it more complicated. (Gladwell 1999)

The second goal that Diego Armando Maradona scored for Argentina against England in the 1986 FIFA World Cup may serve as another illustration of the account of sporting creativity here proposed. In particular, I would like to use it to highlight the relation between spontaneity, habituation, and enacted creative possibility. Maradona received the ball in his team's own half of the field, with his back turned to the English side of the field. Through some skillful control of

the ball, he was able to turn quickly, dribble two opponents and head towards the English area. As he ran along the right side of the field with the ball close to his left foot, he had several play possibilities available. His teammate, Jorge Burruchaga, was running next to him, to his left, as an English defender came to mark Maradona. The easiest and most commonly anticipated play alternatives were either to dribble towards the right and continue running along the line or to pass to Burruchaga. Maradona chose, however, a short dribble to his left to continue advancing towards the area. The last English defender, as he came to mark him, now anticipated either another short dribble to the left, towards the area's semicircle, the best alternative for a left-footed shot, or a pass to Burruchaga or Jorge Valdano. Maradona, however, saw the defender's movement and chose to dribble towards his right, away from the center. After this dribble, Maradona was confronting only the English goalkeeper, with two defenders still running alongside him. Maradona feinted that he would either shoot or dribble to his left, to procure a better angle of shot with his most skillful foot. The goalkeeper reacted by beginning to dive to his right, but upon perceiving this reaction Maradona again dribbled to his right, eluding the goalkeeper but also choosing a more difficult angle of shot. Maradona was nonetheless able to finish the play successfully and score with his left foot. In this play we can see the spontaneous actualization of embodied habit. The success of the play clearly depends on cultivated skill, but this skill is enacted spontaneously, freely, in ways that are fresh and unanticipated. We can also see Maradona perceiving and interpreting a series of problematic challenges and considering possible solutions. And we can see him actually enacting a series of creative possibilities. These enacted possibilities are in a way less probable, or at least, less plausible, options than the alternatives—to pass, to dribble searching for easier or more comfortable angles of play, or even to wait for more teammates. The play was successful because of Maradona's capacity to put his mental and physical, or bodyminded, skills into play imaginatively and spontaneously.[11]

These two examples pertain to two highly skilled players, among the best in the history of their respective sports. This does not mean, however, that my proposed account of creativity

[11] Lacerda and Mumford observe that Maradona's genius "consisted in his vision, anticipation of the game, and in his ability to control the ball" (2011, p. 185). My account so far has aimed to organize this claim phenomenologically by describing the elements of imagination and habit, among others, in detail.

applies only to elite athletes, let alone geniuses. I agree with Douglas Anderson when he writes that "exemplary cases abound and are useful for making a case for creativity. But they are hardly exhaustive. As exemplars, they stand for a wide range of experiences. The creativity enabled by sport and movement is open to all of us, even if it occurs in ways that to the rest of the world may seem trivial. We must attend to the features of our own…creativity" (2001, p. 144). Anderson illustrates: "One might figure out how to move in such a way as to overcome an opponent one has not previously beaten. An ordinary jogger might find a new way to negotiate icy terrain. A right-handed player might successfully explore the possibilities of the left-hand" (2001, p. 144). The Gretzky and Maradona examples, then, rather are meant to put in sharp relief the various elements of creativity that I have proposed. The high degree of creativity displayed by these players is precisely a difference in *degree*, not in kind. Another approach to describing the various elements of creativity would be to observe carefully the accomplishments in particular plays, games, or seasons, of less extraordinary but still highly skilled players. Think, for instance, of Saeed Al Owarain's goal for Saudi Arabia against Belgium in the 1994 FIFA World Cup that is often compared to Maradona's against England. Though Al Owarain's cultivated skills were not Maradona's and perhaps the Belgian defense was not as good as England's, one can see in the play the same elements of bodyminded habit, imagination, and spontaneity that I have described.

Yet another approach is to observe carefully, with phenomenological gaze, one's own experience performing, competing against, or witnessing creative plays in sport at various levels. Suppose there is a person who plays both association football and basketball. In football, he has developed from childhood all the fundamental bodyminded habits for controlling the ball, passing, marking, shooting, and so on, and has developed the tactical understanding of the game to play in the minor leagues of a professional team. This player probably can point to moments or games in which he was particularly creative in scoring, play-making, or solving difficult situations, and test whether the elements of bodyminded habit, spontaneity, and semiotic imagination work together to yield creative performance in the ways described here. But suppose this same player has only developed very basic skills for playing basketball—he passes well,

dribbles adequately, but shoots inconsistently and understands only very basic plays and tactical schemes. He can probably observe then, by contrast, the ways in which low-level bodyminded skill, stunted spontaneity, and lack of imagination lead to uncreative playing. It is precisely to this experiential approach that I appeal in the next section to develop further the details of the proposed phenomenological account of sporting creativity.

3. Semiotic Imagination, Bodyminded Skill, and Creative Possibilities

There is much more to investigate about the process of sporting creativity on the basis of what I have proposed so far. For instance, more needs to be said about the nature of what I have called creative possibilities. How are such possibilities conceived? What role do experience, practice, knowledge of the sport, and assessment of one's own skill play in the conception of possibility? What is the relation between cultivated, bodyminded skill and imaginative potential? How do they constrain and foster each other? I will suggest some answers that I hope will provide at least a good beginning towards a fuller phenomenological account of creativity in sporting activity, even if they are tentative and will require further examination. Let me emphasize again that I aim to provide in this section a phenomenological description which is to be tested by reference to experience—both one's experience in sporting and in witnessing sport.

One may begin to address these questions by detailing more carefully the sporting challenges and constraints that call for creativity. The types of sports upon which I have focused here can be broadly described as rule-guided tests of bodyminded—ostensively physical—skills. The constraints on what the sportsperson may do, when confronted with such a test, are then given at least by the rules that delimit the activity, his or her skills, and, in the case of contests, other competitors' own skills, strategies, and so on. All of these constraints present the sportsperson with a challenge that can be described as a problem to be solved. Perhaps for this reason, Hopsicker writes about solving "movement problems" and overcoming "movement challenges" by way of creative "movement solutions" and "movement pathways" (2011). Similarly, Lacerda and Mumford write:

> Creativity is of particular importance to success in sport. As Suits defined it succinctly, sport is 'the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles' [2005, p. 55]. Sometimes those obstacles are known in advance, sometimes they are unpredictable, and sometimes they are created by opponents. The genius can find new ways of overcoming these obstacles or can respond to their unpredictability through their creative acts. There is a problem-solving aspect in sport, which demands original and unexpected answers, improvised and innovative solutions. (2011, p. 189)

Faced with such problems, then, *how* does the sportsperson *conceive* of creative solutions? My suggestion has been that this involves a semiotic process of perceiving and interpreting the challenging situation and imagining possible solutions that are instantaneously compared and then discarded or selected and attempted. Let me now explain, further, that the perception and interpretation of the challenge involves the elaboration of a complex sign of the situation. This sign is the result of an embodied process of cognition, and it is constituted by bodyminded sensations, feelings, reactions, and conceptions. The player sees, hears, touches, perhaps even smells and tastes, the challenging environment and its constitutive elements—e.g. playing surface, ball, wind, rain, teammates, opposing players, and so on. She feels both the qualities of the context—hostile, friendly, intense, relaxed, and so on—and her own bodyminded state—strong, tired, concentrated, distracted, confident, frustrated. She reacts and is reacted upon by that environment—she resists and is resisted, pushes and is given in to, is pushed upon and gives in, slips and falls or stands firm, and so on. And she has a general conception of the challenge—e.g. the general offensive and defensive schemes, dribbling and marking strategies, or wrestling styles that she is applying and that she is confronting. All of these elements are bound up together in her experience and are integrated in a sign that provides an interpretation of the complex situation she is confronting. I call this sign a diagram of the situation, but only when keeping in mind that this diagram involves not only intellectual conceptions but also bodily sensations, feelings, and reactions. The sign, then, is no mere mental image or representation; it

is a bodyminded integration of all the aforementioned elements of sensation, reaction, and intellection. Phenomenologically, this is what the sportsperson experiences.

Given this interpretation of the sporting challenge, the sportsperson must conceive of and attempt a solution. I have suggested that she accomplishes this by *imagining* a way to reach an alternative situation that solves the problem and trying it out. Let me emphasize again that I am appealing to the *semiotic* imagination—that is, to the capacity to create and transform signs. But as I have just proposed, the signs involved in sporting activity are threefold as they involve sensations and feelings, reactions, and conceptions. The athlete at once senses, feels, exerts forces, reacts to them, and thinks about what is possible or not possible to do given the challenge. Therefore, imagining a solution involves sensory, energetic, and intellectual considerations. For instance, what a player may feel and think to be possible early in a game, when he is rested and full of energy, may be quite different from what he regards as possible late in a game that has gone into overtime. Similarly, what extraordinarily skillful players like Gretzky or Maradona may sense and conceive to be possible is not so to players of lesser bodyminded skill. Consider also Lacerda and Mumford's example of Elena Shushunova's "new combination of elements in the floor routine" to win the Olympic gold medal in 1988: "a straddle jump to land in front lying support, also with a half turn. The possibility of such a routine was of course open to anyone before but it needed Schuschunova's vision and ability in order to become a reality" (2011, p. 185). Alternatively stated, what are imaginative possibilities for a rested or more skilled player are, at best, imaginative impossibilities for a tired or less skilled player, and what interests us is *effective* creativity. Such effective creativity requires, in sum, the imaginative conception of alternative situations that solve a sporting challenge and of the pathways to realize them. Experientially, these alternative situations and courses of action are conceived through signs that transform in key ways the challenging situation—e.g. feign right to destabilize the defender and dribble left; bounce the puck off the wall and skate to receive it; signal a hard kick to the side and lob the ball softly over to goalkeeper to the middle of the net—and the player then essays the imagined solution.

One important consequence of this account is that the conception of creative possibilities is not the result of intuition in the sense of unmediated cognition. It is rather a semiotic response to ongoing embodied cognitions. Thus consider Lacerda and Mumford's claim that creative genius "is intuitive. Rather than being a part of their conscious thought processes, the genius's actions are more a matter of instinct and intuition" (2011, p. 188). From my Peircean perspective, this is fine since they mainly tie intuition to instinct and contrast it with conscious deliberation. The creative sporting experience is often one of unconscious, or at least unarticulated, bodyminded cognition. Such cognition involves sensations and feelings of the nature of instinct. The claim would be problematic, however, if intuition were understood as an *unmediated* cognition—that is, a cognition that is not the result of a continuous, though often unconscious, bodyminded process of interaction with an environment.

The foregoing description of the creative process also suggests that the athlete's assessment of his own bodyminded state and skill fulfill important roles in the imaginative conception of play possibilities. The sportsperson must be sensibly and reasonably attuned to what both her own cultivated capacities and her bodyminded feelings and thoughts allow her to do in a given context. A football player who is quick to dribble in reduced spaces and has a low center of gravity, feels fresh, and is reading the game lucidly, may imagine and attempt to solve a defensive challenge on a corner of the field by a quick succession of dribbles and a pass to a teammate she sees sneaking into the penalty area behind the defenders. If she is a slow sprinter and feels tired, though, she will not attempt to solve another challenge by outrunning her defender along a sideline, as she will not imagine it to be a viable solution.

This account suggests, moreover, that bodyminded habit fosters and increases imaginative potential. The player must have cultivated the fundamental skills of the sport so as to embody them. This embodiment in turn liberates and encourages the sporting imagination since the latter is a capacity to conceive of possible courses of action that must not only be visualized but must be felt to be possible. The greater the mastery of skill, the stronger the imagination, as the player senses richer, more effective movements to be possible for him or her. This agrees with Lacerda and Mumford when they claim that one must have "certain capabilities—some physical and

some mental—in order to create, and one must be free to exercise those capabilities" (2011, p. 187).[12] I would emphasize, again, that it is not only in the case of elite athletes that bodyminded skill enriches the imagination. Learners at any level progress in their habituation sense and envision new possibilities of action. Both a young football player with a gifted left foot who improves his passing with the right foot and an old basketball hacker who makes efforts to improve his shooting grow in imaginative potential as they feel they are capable of new movement pathways.

Likewise, practice, experience, and knowledge of the sport foster the creative imagination. Training practice is not only clearly linked to bodyminded habituation, but it provides a setting in which the developing sportsperson may try out creative possibilities more freely. In the context of practice, players may begin to take risks without fearing competitive error. Hopsicker argues, for instance, that well-prepared athletes must take risks to be creative and such risks may be taken in practice, where errors may be taken as opportunities "to turn mistakes into honed abilities" (2011, p. 119). As skill level increases—and the imagination grows—the fears and anxieties of taking risks in competition would diminish (2011, p. 119). Trial and error in practice also lead to a level of experience that is compounded by actual competition, and this experience also fosters creative potential. We may term this as *experiential* knowledge—the sensible and reasonable understanding of what has worked, is working, and might work and why. This understanding integrates the sportsperson's detailed recalling of courses of action he has been able to follow or not, reflection upon why, and projection of what he may be able to modify in order to solve successfully future sporting challenges. The player learns from his trials and errors, his successes and attempts at perfecting them, and his failures and efforts at correcting them. He embodies this experience as a sense of what is possible and how.

In sum, the imaginative conception of creative possibilities in sport involves not only an intellectual visualization of tentative movement solutions to sporting challenges but a felt and actually experienced sense of what may work and how and why it may do so. Cultivated

[12] They in fact emphasize, in this quote, the element of spontaneity in effective creativity as well.

bodyminded skill, practice, and experiential knowledge are conditions that foster the creative sporting imagination and guide it towards effective and realizable solutions to sporting tests.

4. Sporting Creativity, Enriched Communities, and Integral Education

Let me turn now to a crucial question: Why should there be philosophical interest in defining, describing, and understanding sporting creativity? From a Peircean perspective I would like to emphasize two interrelated kinds of reasons, namely, the importance of creativity for enriching sporting communities and for enhancing the integral education of the individual members of those communities. I will note the first kind but focus on the second one, as my foregoing argumentation concerned individual creativity.

The first point about communities is a general feature of Peirce's systematic thought—creative individuals can be agents for promoting the growth and enrichment of their communities, e.g. for communities of scientific inquiry to advance towards the knowledge of truth. In the case of sport, creative individuals and creative acts—in the sense of creativity as promoting effective problem-solving *within* the constraints and rules of the sport—enrich the practice of communities. When enlarged to apply to *all* individuals and acts with some measure of creativity, this point in fact contains Lacerda and Mumford's thesis that sporting genius creates strategies that tend towards competitive success (2011, p. 184). They offer the example of Dick Fosbury, who originated the "flop" for the high jump and it became the best way to overcome the bar (2011, p. 181). Sporting creativity does lead to better—more effective, often simpler—ways to solve sporting challenges. This enriches the realm of sporting possibilities that the community conceives of and pursues. As Shushunova's example from gymnastics suggested, possibilities are always there but creative individuals advance their communities by clearly imagining those possibilities and how to actualize them.

I would add, moreover, that sporting creativity does not lead only to innovative strategies but to enriching experiences altogether. Even though most sport practitioners are not geniuses, a creative approach to playing in accordance with one's skill level and within the constraints of the sport is often more joyful and satisfactory for individuals and communities than a rigid,

unimaginative approach. Players with a passion for sport enjoy, and later remember and cherish, those special occasions in which they have spontaneously and imaginatively overcome a sporting challenge at their level, whatever it might be. A fine, spontaneous, imaginative performance in youth football or a single fine pass to break a defense in pick-up basketball in one's neighborhood may be cherished and relived for a long time. Similarly, most practitioners and fans appreciate the instances of creative action they have witnessed and received like a graceful gift. Though it has not been my focus, I may note here that this is also in line with Lacerda and Mumford's thesis that creativity adds to the aesthetic value of sport (2011, p. 184). My point is simply cast in terms of the enriched quality of the experiences that sporting communities may aspire to and enjoy.

For this reason, Hopsicker has pointed out that the issue of creativity is germane to the conception of what is good for sport. Creative strategies or techniques provide opportunities for emulation, point out clear possibilities for action, and set new standards for all levels of play (Hopsicker 2011, p. 115; Lacerda and Mumford 2010, p. 184). This involves a responsibility on the part of the genius or the highly creative sportsperson more generally—namely, creative innovations must improve the sporting practice (Hopsicker 2011, p. 119, 122). Again, creative improvement means providing better ways to solve sporting challenges. Building upon Hopsicker's point, I would add that high level sporting creativity is not only germane to the conception of the good for the sport itself but of what is good for sporting communities. Such creativity enriches the ideals that the community strives to achieve and actualize. Creative strategies, techniques, performances, and plays embody what is good and admirable for the community to strive for and seek to realize.

Regarding now the improvement and development of the individual within the community —philosophical, and especially phenomenological, attention to the processes and experience of sporting creativity holds the promise of improving the integral education of the sportsperson. This includes the *sporting* education of the person, but I will suggest it goes beyond it. Regarding sport education and training, Hopsicker has argued that phenomenological attention to creative experience yields three experiential benchmarks that signal a developmental pathway to sporting

genius (2011, p. 122-123). These three experiential markers are like road signs that show the way and measure the progress towards genius. They are worth considering here with an eye towards promoting creativity in sporting activity even for that vast majority of athletes and players who do not aspire to genius but do aspire to excellence in their own measure of possibility.

The first benchmark is preparation or "the embodying of raw, foundational material that allows the performer to experience more complex and innovative actions" (Hopsicker 2011, p. 116). This is broadly compatible with what I have called bodyminded habituation. In an analogy between learning a sport and learning modern dance or jazz playing, Hopsicker goes into a helpful and lucid level of detail about the different kinds of skills the athlete must cultivate in the preparatory stage for creative genius—general skills or conditioning; practice-specific skills; engagement and integration with performance space, equipment, and own body; and learning of rules, histories, traditions and constraints of the sporting practice (2011, p. 116-117). I would like to highlight the last point regarding constraints, since I think this is one of the issues that make the question of creativity in sport interesting for education more generally. The embodied, physical aspect of sport makes it evident to students, practitioners, and observers that creativity is effective and even admirable when displayed within relevant constraints. Sport makes it possible for students and teachers to experience that one cannot be effectively creative until one has mastered the skills necessary for an activity within the limits that define the activity and make it meaningful. Hopsicker draws this point from relevant literature on the practices of jazz and modern dance and extends it to sport. I suggest that this is crucial for other areas as well. The case of sport may point out in very clear, tangible ways for other fields that an education for creativity does not imply an education without regard for relevant constraints in the arts, sciences, and humanities as well.[13]

Be that as it may, the second experiential benchmark is risk-taking and responsibility. This is broadly compatible with my suggestion that in order to be creative, the sportsperson must be free and spontaneous in the ways she enacts and deploys her bodyminded habits. For Hopsicker, the

[13] In a different context, for instance, I have argued that mathematical education must first engage the students' creative imagination, but this engagement is framed and delimited by the nature of mathematical problems and their objects of study (Campos 2010). As in sport, creativity in mathematics is meaningful and effective within proper constraints.

well-prepared athlete must eventually begin to take risks and be willing to make mistakes in order to solve difficult sporting challenges (2011, p. 117-118). He characterizes this transition as an "attitudinal shift" or "a shift from reliance on others to a reliance on the self" (2011, p. 118). By this shift, he writes, "the athlete must abandon format, prescriptions, and dedicated strategies and instead seek the creative, the novel and the innovative. Coaches must 'disappear' into the background to be retrieved as part of the athlete's now personally instigated performances" (2011, p. 118). According to Hopsicker, this involves the assumption of responsibility on part of the creative player to accept, recognize, and recover from mistakes and to improve her sport through creative or innovative performances (2011, p. 118). I might add that this also involves a responsibility on part of the coach or teacher—those who engage in teaching for creativity must accept that their pupils might make mistakes and their innovative trials may fail. What both teachers and students, coaches and athletes, must keep in mind, though, is that creative attempts are for the sake of solving movement problems or sporting challenges effectively. Unnecessary or ineffective selfishness in the context of team play or innovations that complicate what can be solved in more simple ways, for example, do not constitute effective creativity.

The third and final benchmark is dwelling within the sporting performance. It is the fruition and enactment of creative activity. In the terms I have used, it is the actual experience of integrating bodyminded habits, semiotic imagination, and a spontaneous approach to solve sporting challenges in fresh, free-flowing ways that surprise, delight, and are effective. Hopsicker describes "dwelling" precisely in terms of judicious perception and fertile imagination leading to effective movement:

> The performer [or athlete] sees more choices when solving movement problems and can utilize more innovative skills. She recognizes the varieties of potential pathways—the differences between "these places" and "those places"—the vast possibilities available to her to "go" and "do." Dwelling in the activity requires the performer to regularly and efficiently connect actions happening in the past with those that will come in the future through an ever-changing intentionality yet

> remaining focused on the goals of the project. Dwelling requires the performer to make split-second decisions, selecting one action or path in place of all others that beckon. (2011, p. 120)

Notice the emphasis on bodyminded continuity. Habits or skills, knowledge, experience, perception, imagination, conception of possibilities, and bodily movement all flow together. The sportsperson seamlessly connects past actions to present and future ones, and all these actions are purposeful and teleological. This continuity—this seamless flow, linkage, and association of thoughts and actions—again suggests that what creative players do is not due to unmediated cognitions or intuitions *ex nihilo*, but to the capacity to feel, perceive, react to, and interpret sporting problems, imagine and conceive solutions, and enact them. The experience may be unconscious and perhaps ineffable, but it is one of bodyminded continuity and flow.

Dwelling strikes me as an apt way to describe phenomenologically the experience to which creative sportspersons aspire. As Hopsicker concludes, the three benchmarks signal an experiential and developmental pathway towards highly creative behavior in sport, and future studies might delve into how teachers and coaches might foster students' and athletes' progress along that pathway (2011, 122-123). Since I have argued that creativity is not an experience limited to geniuses or highly skilled athletes, I propose that the developmental pathways pointed out by Hopsicker may be extended from the education of such athletes to sporting education in general. Sport education could be an area in which students learn to experience the continuity and integration of habituation, cultivation of skill, spontaneous play,[14] imagination, and effective action for problem-solving. The experience of creativity is not the exclusive privilege of the elite level athlete; there are creative experiences to be lived and enjoyed at various levels of skill, play, and competition.

I propose, furthermore, that fostering creativity in sporting activity may lead, for learners and strivers of all ages and levels, to the integral education of the bodyminded person. I have

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[14] Elsewhere I have argued that in the case of youth sport, play is not only the main reason for sporting but also a condition for creativity (Campos 2008). In other words, the ludic attitude is not merely an added ingredient to youth sport, but it is its reason for being and is the animating impulse for creativity. Since I have not argued for the centrality of play in youth sport here, though, I will only state the view. For more on the role of the ludic attitude in youth sport see McLaughlin 2008.

already emphasized, for instance, that in sporting activity students may experience the relationship between respecting proper constraints and *effective* creativity. This strikes me as an important aspect of education in contemporary society, certainly in the United States where I teach, but in other places as well. Given the enormous environmental, social, economic, political, moral, scientific, and technological challenges that our contemporary societies confront, "creativity" often becomes a vague word for nebulously miraculous ways to overcome these challenges. There seems to be then a tendency to speak of creative education—or of education for creativity—as a solution to our problems. However, there is also a tendency to forget that creativity confronts limitations and constraints that must be acknowledged and understood, not ignored or disregarded. The experience of bodyminded creativity within constraint in sport then emerges as one in which teachers and students alike may learn about the relation between learning, training, cultivating abilities, understanding limitations, and imagination, freedom, and spontaneity for effectively overcoming challenges.

Moreover, when I argue for the integral education of the bodyminded person, I am proposing to achieve what Sadler thought was an important purpose of creative sports' experience (1977). As I observed at the outset, he saw in such experience the possibility of restoring the wholeness and integrity of persons, especially of alienated youth. Extending his proposal to *all* students, I am proposing that through education for sporting creativity we might foster the experiential integration of the person as *well-balanced*, *purposeful* bodymind. The educational systems with which I am familiar in the United States and Latin America do not help students to sense and to understand themselves as being both embodied and minded in a continuum. There is a decided privileging of mind, while the body is in fact treated as merely sustaining it. It is very common to see in those contexts, for example, that programs in art, music, and physical education, which emphasize ostensively embodied abilities and skills, are the first to be cut when there are budgetary problems. The result is a *de facto* Cartesian dualism in the lives of students, at least at school—to learn intellectual truths they must ignore the body or minimize its interruptions. From my perspective, I see this as an *experiential* problem. Students experience themselves to be seemingly disembodied beings. Then, even in programs that aim to educate for creativity, the

focus is intellectual creativity abstracted from the body. Their education does not tend to provide them with well-balanced psychophysical experiences, so that they can have a sense of themselves as bodyminded persons, let alone persons capable of bodyminded creativity. My first suggestion, then, is that a physical education for sporting creativity may help students develop a *well-balanced* sense of themselves as being an embodied and minded continuum.

My second suggestion is that through such education students may experience themselves as being *purposeful* bodyminded persons. According to Peirce, a person is a coordination of ideas—that is, of sensations, feelings, sentiments, energies, actions, reactions, perceptions, thoughts, inferences, habits, and so on. This coordination is purposeful or, more precisely, teleological, that is, guided by a *telos*, end, or aim. The person coordinates ideas in the pursuit of goals and ends. This teleological view has its roots in Aristotle, for whom human beings, like all other beings, have some proper function and *telos* in the order of nature. What is original in the Peircean perspective is that the personal teleology is developmental, that is, that the ends that a person pursues evolve and grow over time, and the person has some level of creative control over how these ends develop and how he or she will pursue them.[15] I have not argued for this conception of the person here. I pose it, however, as a supposition in order to draw a consequence consistent with the rest of my argument. Through an education for creativity in sport, along the phenomenological pathways previously discussed, students may develop the sense that they are pursuing ends that evolve and grow and that they have a measure of creative control over how they will pursue them. The phenomenological benchmarks suggested by Hopsicker do not signal a linear progress towards a fixed end. It is not as if the sportsperson, once she is creative, dwells always in a fixed state. Rather, through renewed preparation and self-controlled risk-taking, greater challenges and higher-level tests may be tackled and new creative possibilities to solve them may be conceived and attempted. The ends, then, evolve and grow.

Moreover, the conscious pursuit of a personal horizon for being effectively creative may imbue with purpose and meaning the stages of bodyminded habituation and preparation and of spontaneity, freedom, risk-taking, and assumption of responsibility. Hopsicker emphasizes that

[15] Peirce provides a full exposition and arguments for this view in his 1892 article "The Law of Mind," in Peirce 1992, p. 312- 333.

an education for creativity in sport requires the virtues of patience and persistence, since preparation and deliberate practice are necessary for reaching the stage of dwelling (2011, p. 123-124). Moreover, I suggest that the students, with the end of effective creativity in view, may develop a sense of the importance of self-control both in the sense of self-discipline and of self-mastery. The students would develop self-discipline for controlling the urges, distractions, and frustrations that would deter them from cultivating bodyminded skills. They would develop self-mastery in the sense of having skillful, well-honed control over their raw capacities and talent. Thus, virtues such as patience, persistence, self-discipline, and self-mastery would be imbued with meaning and purpose along the way to bodyminded creativity. These lessons, I suggest, are not relevant only in physical or sport education, but in the integral education of the bodyminded person.

5. Upshot: Transactional Possibilities and Creative Self-Realization in Sport

Overall, the most important outcome of an education for sporting creativity would be promotion of personal bodyminded integrity for those students, learners, movers, and players that are open to the possibilities afforded by sport. In this sense, the upshot of my preceding phenomenological arguments and descriptions falls in line with what Douglas Anderson (2001) calls the recovery of our humanity through movement, sport, and nature. He writes of three transactional possibilities afforded by sport and movement, namely, (1) the "felt" sense of sheer possibility, (2) the enactment of human creativity, and (3) the grasping of a larger sense of meaning, that is, the possibility of self-realization and self-transformation of the person as a locus of meaning. The first transactional possibility, then, is the "had" or "felt" sense of possibility. This is, for example, the possible experience of feeling "lightness when stepping onto a basketball court in anticipation of a game—even a friendly game. The court seems to respond to the players' anticipation and becomes a site of freedom. They burst onto the court almost as if they were dancers…[T]he felt possibility wrenches us free from the domineering social world of the everyday....We know—because the game or the practice lets us feel it—that we have a capacity for more, even if we're not precisely sure what that 'more' is" (2001, p. 143).

The second transactional possibility is that of enacting human creativity. Anderson writes that the initial sense of possibility becomes "a condition for human creativity. The athletic world is full of exemplary cases in which a sport or practice is openly transformed by an athlete who takes up the sense of possibility and goes to work on realizing novel ways of participating or performing" (p. 144). What takes place here, then, is a transition from sheer possibility to its realization in concrete, particular ways. Anderson elaborates: "Even in the most ordinary cases, our creativity, our attention to realizing some of our possibilities, can fully awaken us to the fact that we are not only free to perceive or feel, but we are free to act. Creativity in movement reveals our human agency to us and helps shatter the sedating effects of the everyday world. We are made directly aware that we are more than passive 'sensors' of the unattainable" (p. 144). This is important because it emphasizes that these possibilities for creative action are available to any mover, player, or sportsperson who would be open to them and willing and able to try them out, to experiment with them; they are not available exclusively to elite athletes, as I have taken pains to argue.

Anderson insists on the contemporary relevance and importance of pointing out the creative possibilities afforded us by sport and movement: "The claim that creative experiences in movement may awaken us to our humanity may, at first glance, seem trivial. This is surely something we should all know. But…we actually live as if we were blind to this dimension of our humanity, even to the fact that humanity involves such possibilities" (2001, p. 144). Examples include the amount of time we spend in front of TVs and movie screens—and now the internet—, teaching practices that presuppose passive students, and advertising practices that presuppose manipulable observers. In connection with this he concludes that sport "provides a sense of possibility, calls on us to face the world novelly, and gives us the room to create. Creativity in movement and sport reminds us that humanity is at once physical and mental, that we are part and parcel of nature; our physicality is directly involved in creating and is not an innocent bystander" (2001, p. 144). In my terms, the experience of creative action in movement and sport is important because it may reveal—if we are open to the possibilities—our

bodyminded humanity to us; it may restore a personal wholeness that we are in danger of losing in our *de facto* Cartesian society.

The third transactional possibility is self-realization and self-transformation through creative action. It is thus conducive to fostering the wholeness and integrity of the sports*person*. Anderson explains it as follows:

> Human physicality, however, is neither inanimate nor without import. Just as creativity emerges from the initial sense of sheer possibility, so a larger sense of meaning may develop from our creative activity.... [Occasionally] creativity in sport leads outward to self-transformation. Movement and sport…may become the homes of epiphanic transitions that change our lives. These are the moments that allow us to see and experience ourselves in our humanity—we are awakened to the fact that we are embodied loci of meaning. In such instances, I think it is fair to say that sport and movement allow us to realize and to re-create ourselves. By this I don't mean that we come to some final consummation of being, but that we bring our full range of powers and energies to life-we become fully human. (2001, p. 144-145)

If Anderson is right, as I think he is, then the stakes of an education for sporting creativity are high. It is part of an education for self-realization, for personal integrity, wholeness, and fulfillment. Bringing our "full range of *energies*" to life through creative action in sport is one way to actualize our highest capacities and achieve our highest ends as human beings. Therefore, this is one way in which sport educators have the potential for playing crucial roles in students' lives by fostering their integral growth and self-realization.

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